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Abstract 
While domestic fascism within the United Kingdom has never critically challenged 
Parliamentary sovereignty, it has decisively disrupted public order since its roots 
were established in the inter-war political scene. The violence provoked by Sir 
Oswald Mosley’s British Union of Fascists (BUF) was one of the stimulating factors 
behind the enactment of the Public Order Act 1936. This Act significantly 
strengthened the powers of the police to regulate or proscribe varies forms of 
political activism.   
This thesis analyses the legal responses of Parliament, the police and the judiciary 
to interwar British fascism. In addition, by analysing the legal responses to public 
disorder from before and after the 1930s, it positions the BUF within their wider 
historical context which enables this thesis to assess and evaluate consistencies and 
discrepancies within the application of the law. By enhancing the historical 
contextualisation of the period with a critical legal lens, the principal forms of fascist 
propaganda are evaluated, including public processions, public meetings and the 
wearing of political uniform. 
It is argued that the application of a historico-legal methodology challenges the 
perception that the authorities were inherently politically biased. This thesis explores 
alternative factors which explain why the responses of the legal authorities appeared 
inconsistent in their approach to the far-Right and the far-Left. In order to critically 
analyse the police’s decision making process when monitoring political activism, the 
limitations of public order law and the nature of police discretion itself become 
fundamental components which offer a more balanced explanation for the 
appearance of political partiality within the police force.  
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Introduction 
 
In short, there is nothing you or the members of the House of Commons can 
do to stop our practices… We know how to circumvent legal measures, and 
we have ample moneys and resources at our command to provide any 
further auxiliary legal machinery.1 
1) Fascism and the Law 
The relationship between the British Union of Fascists (BUF) and the law has had a 
controversial history. Many modern historians and lawyers have accused legal 
authorities, such as Parliament, the police, and the judiciary, of political bias in favour 
of the fascists. In the inter-war period, contemporary politicians, Left-wing 
commentators and the National Council for Civil Liberties (NCCL) have also directed 
criticism towards the police, who they believed acted partially in favour of the fascists. 
In turn, fascist propaganda has accused the authorities of being anti-fascist, although 
understandably this cause has not been taken up by modern academic scholars. It is 
not the intention of this thesis to defend, or to offer legitimacy for fascist activity and 
propaganda, but to contextualise the legal responses to the provocation and public 
disorder which was instigated by the political methods deployed by the BUF. In order 
to address these responses, the activism of the Communist Party of Great Britain 
(CPGB) and anti-fascist movements are also examined. It is argued that the addition 
of a critical legal lens to the historical contextualisation of political extremism in 
1930s Britain will offer an alternative explanation to the condemnation of the police, 
the Government, or the judiciary as being inherently politically biased.  
The introductory quote from BUF political officer Richard Plathen’s letter to the Home 
Secretary demonstrates how the fascist movements’ leadership perceived their 
relationship with the law. The letter was sent unofficially, as the immediate sanction 
                                               
1
 The National Archives (TNA), Home Office, HO 144/19070, letter from BUF political officer Richard 
Plathen to Home Secretary Sir John Gilmour. 22 Feb 1934. 
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from Sir Oswald Mosley could not be obtained, and it is very possible that, due to the 
confrontational approach of the letter, had Mosley been available it may never have 
been sent. As a result, it is now held in the Home Office files within the National 
Archive. The revealing feature of this letter is the self-assurance of the BUF to stay 
within the law and the confidence that they could obtain their political objectives by 
‘circumventing legal measures’. Indeed, this was a key characteristic of the BUF’s 
political methods. They opposed Parliamentary democracy but aimed to reach power 
by operating within it, rather than any other revolutionary means. Mosley gave his 
members strict instructions to obey the law and the police. For example, it has been 
frequently documented that BUF members obeyed police orders to close public 
meetings when disorder was anticipated.2 In the authorised history of the BUF, We 
Marched with Mosley, this point is reiterated by National Inspector Richard Bellamy 
that, ‘the fascists intended not only to adhere strictly to the law but also to uphold 
lawful authority.’ 3  Yet, these actions do not justify other forms of BUF political 
violence, incitement to racial hatred and provocation. The fascists were also 
commonly accused of overt brutality at their political meetings.4 Blackshirt stewards 
frequently used heavy-handed tactics to eject interrupters from the premises. Even 
at meetings and processions held in public places, incidents of fighting and conflict 
with opponents tarnished their image of a movement that claimed to stand for law 
and order. In addition, the BUF’s public processions frequently targeted Jewish 
communities, which triggered further conflict, and their militaristic uniform added to 
this provocation. Individual members also committed acts of violence away from 
official propaganda activities. This included physical assaults on political opponents 
                                               
2
 Examples can be found in Chapter 2 regarding the BUF procession which resulted in the Battle of 
Cable Street and a meeting closed by police in Stockton-on-Tees. 
3
 R. R. Bellamy, We Marched With Mosley: The Authorised History of the British Union of Fascists, 
Black House Publishing Ltd (2013), p. 50.  
4
 This is documented in Chapter 4. 
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and Jews, as well as the vandalism of their property. Other fascist tactics which were 
also employed were not necessarily physically violent, but were still calculated to 
intimidate members of the local Jewish population. Daniel Charter, Labour MP for 
Bethnal Green North East, recalled: 
I myself have seen groups of Fascists standing outside Jewish shops 
shouting at customers who were likely to go in, in order to prevent them from 
dealing at those shops; I have listened to groups of Fascists hurling insulting 
remarks at Jews; and only quite recently, travelling on the top of an omnibus, 
I had to listen to a group of 15 Fascists, accompanied by a Fascist officer in 
uniform, singing a most obscene song about Jews.5 
Whilst recognising that this sub-culture of violence, racism and intimidation was 
prevalent in members of the movement, which further moulded their reputation for 
brutality and intolerance, this thesis is primarily concerned with the behaviour of BUF 
members on official party activity.  
Today, the popular memory of the provocative activism of the BUF is frequently 
resurrected by the media, anti-fascist activists and politicians. In particular, the Battle 
of Cable Street has come to signify the decisive victory of the anti-fascists. In a 
debate on the 75th anniversary of Cable Street, Tower Hamlets Mayor Lutfur 
Rahman noted its significance. 
This was a momentous day in the history of London's East End, when 
Oswald Mosley and his blackshirts were driven out of the then mainly Jewish 
area by demonstrators whose slogan was "They shall not pass!"6 
Yet, this simplistic interpretation of Cable Street’s significance neglects the 
intense BUF activity that continued in East London until the local elections in the 
spring of 1937. Perhaps the most significant legacy of Cable Street was the 
legislative response in the form of the Public Order Act 1936.7  The new powers 
                                               
5
 HC Deb 16 Nov 1936 vol 317 cc1385. 
6
 The Guardian, 3 Oct 2011.  
7
 However, the National Government had been considering and drafting public order legislation before 
this event, so although the provisions within the Public Order Act 1936 could not necessarily be 
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introduced in this Act significantly hindered the political movements of the 
extreme Left and Right. However, BUF activism continued until 1940 when the 
movement was proscribed, and they even experienced a wave in popularity with 
their anti-war campaign in the months either side of the outbreak of war in 
September 1939.8  
There is a danger that the inaccurate recording of history provides false 
impressions of the past which are analogised with the present. Media coverage 
of the 75th anniversary of Cable Street frequently compared issues of the BUF to 
the current public order problems relating to the anti-Islamic street movement, 
the English Defence League (EDL). 9  This parallel was also made by the 
Communities and Local Government Secretary, John Denham, who warned that 
the rise of far-Right activity in Muslim neighbourhoods echoed a return to the 
incendiary marches of Oswald Mosley’s Blackshirts. While the ideological 
principle of this analogy was proven to be erroneous by historian David Cesarani, 
the practical comparisons from a public order standpoint are clearly evident.10 
The new far-Right cause of anti-Islamism has replaced the interwar fascists’ 
adoption of anti-Semitism, and their activism has frequently targeted Muslim and 
Jewish communities respectively. These confrontational tactics can be utilised to 
provoke a violent reaction from the communities they target. This subsequently 
fuels their propaganda, which could then depict their rivals as the aggressors and 
opponents of ‘free speech’ and democracy. Provoking large scale conflict also 
                                                                                                                                                  
considered as a knee-jerk reaction to 4 October, the disorder on that day did provide a significant 
cross-Party consensus that public order legislation was necessary. The previous drafts of public order 
legislation from 1932 and 1934 are examined in Chapter 3.   
8
 P. Catterall (ed), ‘The Battle of Cable Street: Witness Seminar’, Contemporary Record, (Summer 
1994) Vol. 8 (1), p. 123. 
9
 Ibid. and The Times, 30 Sept 2011,  
10 D. Cesarani, ‘Remember Cable Street? Wrong Battle, Mate’, History and Policy (2009) accessed at 
http://www.historyandpolicy.org/papers/policy-paper-93.html on 10 Jan 2011. 
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has the advantage of attracting national media attention which publicises their 
movement. In his analogy, Denham stated that, ‘The tactic of trying to provoke a 
response in the hope of causing wider violence and mayhem is long established 
on the far-Right and among extremist groups.’11 This explanation is too simplistic 
and overlooks the true value for targeting and scapegoating the communities of 
ethnic minorities. By creating friction and disorder where migrant residents live in 
close proximity to a predominantly indigenous populace, the far-Right aim is to 
manipulate and recruit from the white working class residents, by encouraging or 
creating community tension, based on fear, fabrication and ignorance of the 
‘foreign other’.  
For the Blackshirts, anti-Semitism proved a valuable recruiting tool which was 
validated by their claim that it was the Jew who was the aggressor and not the 
fascist, who was defending British liberty. Convinced of this misplaced 
righteousness, many recent memoirs and recollections of interwar fascists still 
maintained that the disorder was caused by Jews and anti-fascists. In a witness 
seminar on Cable Street in 1991, historian Geoffrey Alderman asked former BUF 
member Ronald Webb if Mosley’s anti-Jewish rhetoric affected him. Webb 
replied, ‘Well, it seemed that the attacks come from the Jews in the first place.’12 
This version of events, which depicts the BUF as the innocent victims of political 
violence, is also consistent in the memoirs and autobiographies of Mosley, 
Jeffrey Hamm, John Charnley and Richard Bellamy, who all fail to acknowledge 
any fault in their own anti-Semitic activism and propagate the lawfulness of their 
                                               
11
 The Guardian, 11 Sept 2009. 
12
 Catterall, ‘The Battle of Cable Street’, p. 121. 
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own political activism.13 Therefore, some fundamental concepts of public order 
law need to be addressed before a legal examination of BUF activism is 
conducted. 
2) Public Order and the Common Law: Definitions 
In Keeping the Peace, David Williams stated that the law of public order was a 
compromise which sought to balance the ‘competing demands of freedom of speech 
and assembly on the one hand and the preservation of the Queen’s Peace on the 
other.’ 14  Historically, this compromise has repeatedly failed, resulting in a 
considerable catalogue of public disorder and riot. As ‘keepers of the peace’, the 
police and their tactics are intrinsically scrutinised by the media in any event of 
disorder. Diversely, effective public order policing does not attract the same attention. 
In this respect, Reicher et al. commented, ‘public order policing is a no-win 
situation.’ 15  The interplay between the law and police tactics is integral to this 
investigation of public order responses to political extremism in the 1930s. The wide 
common law powers at the discretion of the police are a controversial feature of the 
law of public order and resonate throughout this thesis. Important legal concepts 
therefore require definition. 
2.1) The Breach of the Peace Doctrine 
 
The breach of the peace doctrine empowers the police to make an arrest without 
warrant when such a breach is committed in their presence, or is reasonably 
                                               
13
 O. Mosley, My Life, Friends of Oswald Mosley (2006), downloaded from 
http://www.oswaldmosley.com/downloads/My%20Life.pdf on 15 April 2010; J. Hamm, Action Replay, 
(1983); Bellamy, We Marched With Mosley; J. Charnley, Blackshirts and Roses, Brockingday 
Publications (1990). 
14
 D. Williams, Keeping the Peace: The Police and Public Order, Hutchinson & Co Ltd (1967), p. 9. 
15
 S. Reicher, C. Stott, P. Cronin, O. Adang, (2004), ‘An integrated approach to crowd psychology and 
public order policing’, Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, vol. 27, 
iss. 4, pp. 558-572. p. 559. 
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anticipated. However, breach of the peace is not a substantive criminal offence in 
England and Wales, although it is recognised as a crime in Scotland. Under this ill-
defined doctrine, the police have a duty to preserve the peace and are provided with 
an arrest power which can be used when no substantive criminal offence has taken 
place. In the use of this power as a preventative measure, the police must 
demonstrate to the court that their actions were justified by the facts as well as in 
theory. As the nature of the breach of the peace doctrine is broad, and largely 
subjective, the discretion of the police officer and the interpretation of the judge do 
not necessarily harmonize. Williams has scrutinized the basic foundation of the 
doctrine with the questions, “what, for instance, is a ‘breach of the peace’, or what is 
meant by ‘in their presence’, or what grounds are sufficient to justify an arrest in 
anticipation of a breach?”16 The standard definition that is frequently referred to in 
case law today was composed by Watkins LJ in R v Howell17. 
We are emboldened to say that there is a breach of the peace whenever 
harm is actually done or is likely to be done to a person or in his presence to 
his property or a person is in fear of being so harmed through an assault, an 
affray, a riot, unlawful assembly or other disturbance. It is for this breach of 
the peace when done in his presence or the reasonable apprehension of it 
taking place that a constable, or anyone else, may arrest an offender without 
warrant.18 
Before this there was a tendency to equate breach of the peace with any sort of 
disturbance. Criticism on the lack of definition and certainty of breach of the peace 
has frequently reoccurred in legal scholarship. In 1954, Glanville Williams remarked 
that there was a ‘surprising lack of authoritative definition of what one would suppose 
to be a fundamental concept in criminal law’. 19  There was still an element of 
confusion in Brownlie’s Law of Public Order and National Security in 1981, which 
                                               
16
 Ibid. p. 116. 
17
 R v Howell [1982] QB 416. 
18
 Ibid at 427. 
19
 M. Supperstone, Brownlie’s Law of Public Order and National Security, Second Edition, Butterworth 
and Co (1981) p. 2. 
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stated, ‘the creation of a breach of the peace is probably not a substantive crime.’20 
In 1983, the Law Commissioners Report, Offences Relating to Public Order, 
recommended that, because of the changeability at common law of what constituted 
a breach of the peace, the term should not be used in statutory form, such as in s5 
Public Order Act 1936.21   
The modern argument for the abolition of the breach of the peace doctrine has been 
led by academic lawyers Richard Stone and Helen Fenwick. Stone defined the 
current position, with regard to police powers, stating ‘[a] police constable may take 
any reasonable action to stop a breach of the peace which is occurring, or to prevent 
one which the constable reasonably anticipates will occur in the near future.’22 The 
focus of Stone’s argument is centred upon the desirability of certainty within the law, 
the retaining of proportionality when infringements of individual rights and freedoms 
are created, and the undesirability of duplicated legal powers. He concluded that the 
wealth of statutory provisions presently available has made the breach of the peace 
doctrine an ‘anachronism’. He argued that its vagueness was not consistent with the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which stipulates that certain 
Convention rights can only be restricted where the constraint is ‘prescribed by law’. 
Fenwick also criticised that, despite the wide use of powers available for policing 
public protest under the Public Order Act 1986, the police still utilised the ‘immensely 
broad and bewilderingly imprecise powers under the breach of the peace doctrine.’23 
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2.2) Police Discretion  
 
Without clearly defined legislation, and vague powers available under the breach of 
the peace doctrine, police officers are afforded wide discretion in fulfilling their duty. 
The primary debate of police discretion, in the context of this thesis, considers how 
this can ultimately lead to inconsistent police practice and accusations of political 
partiality.  
Criminologist Tony Jefferson criticised the conservative notion of police ‘impartiality’, 
stating that, “it is based on very unrealistic sociology… [and] constitutes an 
‘impossible mandate’”.24 He argued that Chief Constables necessarily make choices 
and select priorities, which are based on limited knowledge and restricted by time 
and resources. Similarly, in situations where the law does not supply any clear 
guidance, police constables on the street must, ‘make an inevitably subjective (and 
hence partial) judgement about the right course of action.’25 Criminologist Robert 
Reiner’s influence on the debate about police partiality added a particular focus on 
police culture. He stated that police bias and prejudice exist in police work, but 
argued that it was not necessarily the ‘product of peculiarities of the individual 
personalities of police officers, but a reflection of wider societal prejudice, 
accentuated by the characteristics of police work.’26 
The existence of police discretion has been most distinctly evaluated by academic 
lawyer Laurence Lustgarten. He argued that the degree of discretion that existed 
within the police force was higher at the lower levels of the hierarchy as ‘they act 
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within an almost infinite range of lawful possibilities.’27 The decision making process 
for a police officer includes many variables of both ‘action and inaction’. For instance, 
when a constable had been summoned to the scene of a minor fight, Lustgarten 
demonstrated the breadth of police discretion by highlighting the following options 
available: 
1. Breaking it up, with an informal warning to the participants and no other 
action. 
2. Breaking it up, inquiring into the cause and attempting to conciliate or 
mediate between them. 
3. Formally cautioning either or both. 
4. Attempting to inquire into the cause of the fight, arresting only the one he 
believes was responsible. 
5. Arresting both participants, on any of a wide range of charges relating to 
public order and/or varying degrees of assault as seem to him 
appropriate.28 
Despite their vast variation, Lustgarten expressed that all these options were in the 
scope of the constable’s legal powers. Although both men may have committed 
common assault by law in this instance, it is perhaps the availability of the first two 
options that demonstrate the breadth of this discretion. Lustgarten stated that the 
police constable has a greater amount of discretion ‘when he chooses not to invoke 
the law… [as] that will seldom come to his superiors’ notice.’ In contrast, when a 
constable wishes to invoke the law, as in the case of Constable Joy of the Kent 
Constabulary, who arrested an MP for a traffic offence, his superiors were ‘able to 
substitute their discretion for his’ overruling Joy’s wish to prosecute in favour of a 
caution.29  
It is in public order situations where legal guidance is defined by such vague terms, 
such as ‘breach of the peace’ and ‘threatening, abusive or insulting words or 
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behaviour’ that discretion is particularly wide as ‘virtually any action can, depending 
on its context, be plausibly branded as criminal so as to justify an arrest.’ 30  
Lustgarten asserts that common sense discretion is needed in such situations and 
under-enforcement becomes the norm. However, the danger that arises from under-
enforcement is that it becomes ‘a cloak for conscious or unconscious discrimination 
on the basis of political opinion, personal appearance, demeanour, social status or 
race.’31 Therefore, the resulting selective enforcement has the power to discriminate 
against those that Reiner describes as ‘police property’. These are the low status, 
powerless groups of society that the dominant powers leave for the police to deal 
with and ‘turn a blind eye to the manner in which this is done.’ These groups include 
‘vagrants, skid row alcoholics, the unemployed or casually employed residuum, 
youth adopting a deviant cultural style, ethnic minorities, gays, prostitutes and radical 
political organisations.’32 The use of police discretion to under-enforce, or selectively 
enforce the law, therefore, means that individuals that fall within the broad category 
of ‘police property’ are more at risk from arrest.   
The power of the police ‘not’ to make an arrest and exercise restraint from enforcing 
the full extent of their legal powers can be a particularly useful tool in the police’s 
constable’s armoury in defusing a situation or preventing a minor disorder from 
escalating. Yet, as discretion ultimately leads to selective enforcement, it can also 
prove very controversial, especially if an individual or group of people feel as though 
more discretion is afforded to others than themselves. This situation is thoroughly 
explored in this thesis as communists and anti-fascists regularly argued that police 
tactics were more autocratic and brutal towards them than towards the BUF. 
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Although it is not the intention of this thesis to defend fascist activism or incidents of 
violent policing, it does promote various explanations for the perceived difference in 
discretion that was exercised in the interwar period, and also stimulates a wider 
understanding of this by also analysing incidents where the fascists were also at the 
receiving end of autocratic police practice. 
The debate on police discretion demonstrates that not only does partiality exist as 
part of the inherent nature of police work at all levels, but certain levels of bias and 
prejudice towards minority groups (such as ethnic minorities or lower-working-class 
youth) can also be institutionally manufactured. Reiner warned that a vicious circle 
can develop from such encounters between the police and their ‘property’ generating 
hostility and suspiciousness on both sides, which only exacerbates the situation.33 
Indeed, by the time the BUF were formed, the police and the political Left already 
had an established history of confrontations, violence and distrust. The different 
relationships that the far-Left and the far-Right formed with the police, and the 
manner of their interactions with them was a significant factor which potentially 
influenced the use of police discretion and the selective enforcement of the law 
which is examined in this thesis.   
2.3) Human Rights and Residual Freedom 
 
Before the Human Rights Act 1998 and the incorporation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), there was no legally defined ‘right’ of public 
meeting or freedom of speech. Previously, people were at liberty to exercise freedom 
of speech or assembly, provided that their actions did not contravene any existing 
law. Without a written Constitution that guaranteed such ‘rights’, the notion of 
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residual freedom was prevalent in English law. Since the nineteenth century there 
has been various legal references to such rights, but as lawyer Davis Mead suggests, 
there ‘is no time at which one can easily plot the entry of a right of assembly and 
protest into legal and judicial discourse in England.’ 34  Mead cites Bonnard v 
Perryman35 as possibly the earliest mention of a right of free speech.36 Here Lord 
Coleridge CJ stated ‘The right of free speech is one which it is for the public interest 
that individuals should possess, and, indeed, that they should exercise without 
impediment, so long as no wrongful act is done’.37  
In An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution A. V. Dicey offered a 
contradictory view. Although the first edition of this work fell six years before Bonnard, 
Dicey continued to amend the text until 1908, and his latest version omitted this case. 
Dicey clearly rejected that any rights to freedom of speech existed in English law. 
As every lawyer knows, the phrases “freedom of discussion” or “liberty of the 
press” are rarely found in any part of the statute-book nor among the maxims 
of the common law. As terms of art they are indeed quite unknown to our 
courts. At no time has there in England been any proclamation of the right to 
liberty of thought or to freedom of speech.38 
 
Similarly, in respect of the right of public meeting, Dicey also stated that ‘it can hardly 
be said that our constitution knows of such a thing as any specific right of public 
meeting.’39 However, the omission could possibly be due to Bonnard being a libel 
case. 
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In the 1930s, when the issue was directly related to political protest and activism, 
Lord Hewart CJ emphatically quashed any notion of such rights in Duncan v Jones40 
ruling, ‘English Law does not recognize any special right of public meeting for 
political or other purposes.’41  This particular case is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 3. However, 40 years later in Hubbard v Pitt,42 Lord Denning cited Bonnard 
v Perryman to convey the importance of the right to protest, ‘As long as all is done 
peaceably and in good order, without threats or incitement to violence or obstruction 
to traffic’.43 Despite these sporadic and inconsistent references to the rights of free 
speech and public assembly, the confusion is often caused by the terms ‘right’ and 
‘liberty’. In Hubbard, Stamp LJ agreed with Denning described it as the ‘liberty to 
speak, [and] the liberty to assemble’44 which is more consistent with the notion of 
residual freedom than expressly defined and legally protected ‘rights’. David Mead 
emphasised the difference that the HRA had, by stating that the move from a 
‘residual, liberty based system to one based on positive rights brings a shift in the 
burden of proof.’45 This means that public authorities must now provide an objective 
basis for any ban or condition that they impose on public assemblies and all 
restrictions must be justified in Article 11(2) terms. Effectively Chief Constables are 
required to enforce the least restrictive measures open to them in relation to the 
potential for disorder, when imposing conditions on public assemblies. 
Therefore, the concept of residual freedom is applied to the analysis of the activity of 
the BUF and their political rivals. The only ‘right’ associated with the public highways, 
was the right of free passage. Without legal protection to the ‘right’ of public 
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assembly, those who did assemble in public without permission of the owner of the 
highway, which was usually the local authority, could technically be guilty of trespass. 
2.4) Unlawful Assembly, Rout, Riot and Affray 
 
The common law offences of riot, rout, unlawful assembly and affray were abolished 
under s9(1) Public Order Act 1986, yet they had been part of English law since the 
Early Modern period. In Lambard’s Eirenarcha of 1591, ‘Riot, Route, or other 
Unlawfull Assemblie, etc.’ are described as breaches of the peace which were 
punishable as misdemeanours.46 In 1840, the Criminal Law Commissioners declared 
that the division of unlawful assembly, rout and riot, as separate offences was 
considered ‘unnecessary and inconvenient’ as the element of ‘unlawful assembly’ 
was prevalent in all three. Therefore, an unlawful assembly was said to consist of: 
(1) An assembly of three or more persons; 
(2) A common purpose (a) to commit a crime of violence or (b) to achieve some 
other object, whether lawful or not, in such a way as to cause reasonable men 
to apprehend a breach of the peace.47 
An unlawful assembly then became a rout, once members of that assembly started 
to move towards the execution of their ‘common purpose’ or ‘joint design’. Members 
of the assembly are then guilty of riot when the joint design is either executed or part 
executed. The Commissioners continued: 
[I]t seems to be a simpler and more intelligible principle of arrangement to 
consider the unlawful assembly as the groundwork of the offence and the 
part execution of the joint design or the motion towards it as aggravations.48 
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Further factors which indicate when an unlawful assembly became a riot was the 
necessity that the execution or part execution of their common purpose to, ‘be such 
as to be calculated to cause alarm in the mind of at least one reasonable person.’49  
The Riot Act 1714 created a statutory felony of riot and was repealed by s10(2) 
Criminal Law Act 1967. Under this legislation, if 12 or more persons were ‘unlawfully, 
riotously, and tumultuously assembled together, to the disturbance of the publick 
peace’, the Justices were required to read the Riot Act, which ordered all persons to 
disperse and depart to their habitation or lawful business. It was a felony for any 
person to remain in the area one hour after the reading of the proclamation. Lawyer 
Richard Vogler highlighted that the statutory offence of riot differed from the common 
law offence, as it was not necessary to prove a specific act or intention (common 
purpose) of those assembled, and presence was merely enough to hang the 
accused.50 If those assembled had not dispersed within one hour then, the justices 
were empowered to command all citizens ‘of age and ability’ to assist them to seize 
or apprehend ‘such persons so unlawfully, riotously and tumultuously continuing 
together after proclamation made’. Furthermore, if any of the rioters were ‘killed, 
maimed or hurt’ then the justices, and those assisting them, ‘shall be free, 
discharged and indemnified’ of any crime. The Act was last read in 1919, and was 
repealed in 1967. Vogler noted that its legacy was still considered in 1981 during the 
inner-city riots, when the Metropolitan Police Commissioner ‘argued vigorously for its 
re-enactment’.51 
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The common law offence of affray occurred when there was unlawful fighting (or a 
display of force without actual violence) between one or more persons in such a 
manner that reasonable people might be frightened or intimidated. The second 
element dictates that unless the violence is seen by persons other than the parties 
concerned, the offence would only constitute assault. This does not necessarily 
mean that an affray could only be committed in a public place, as assumed in 
Sharp,52 as the following judgment in Button v DPP53 demonstrated. There was also 
a large distinction between the punishments attributed to affray and common assault; 
while the latter was punishable on indictment with one year imprisonment, affray was 
punishable with a fine or imprisonment at the court’54  
3) Aims and Methodology 
Primarily this thesis is a historico-legal study of public order law and the responses to 
the BUF in the 1930s. By adding a critical legal lens to the history of political 
extremism in the interwar period, the principal forms of fascist propaganda are 
evaluated, and the responses by the Government, judiciary and the police are 
analysed. It is questioned that with such broad and imprecise powers relating to 
public order, how could the police fulfil their role consistently, impartially and 
democratically? The tactics employed by the police and the use of their discretion 
during the extreme political activism of the 1930s is examined in order to question 
the accusations of police partiality. Significant incidents are analysed which 
demonstrate that police tactics also stifled fascist activism, suggesting that there 
were other significant factors that influenced police discretion. Therefore, these need 
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to be examined in order to provide a greater understanding of the policing of political 
extremism in the interwar period.    
In the introduction of Comparative Histories of Crime, Barry Godfrey, Clive Emsley 
and Graeme Dunstall noted that, ‘Underpinning all categories of comparative 
approach is the belief that researchers can disaggregate, interrogate and theorise a 
culture that is not their own.’55 Although this reference was applied to comparative 
criminological research of different countries, the same principle is present when 
using a historical methodological framework. An understanding and an appreciation 
of the cultural and social differences of 1930s Britain are as important to the 
knowledge of the historical development of the law.  
Academic lawyer Lorie Charlesworth argued that ‘the very process of studying law in 
action cannot forsake a historical form of analysis.’ Historical contextualisation is 
needed, argued Charlesworth, ‘in order to appreciate the extent to which the guiding 
ideas, beliefs and values contained within, or otherwise attributed to or associated 
with, the research topic, have come to be constituted in their present but still 
developing form.’ 56 The addition of a historical methodology will therefore enhance 
the research, but will also present distinct obstacles. Godfrey supplemented 
Hartley’s famous quote that ‘The past is a foreign country’ by adding ‘moreover, one 
we can never visit.’57 This viewpoint should not be seen as a deterrent to historical 
research, but a stimulus to question and handle sources in a scholarly and 
perceptive fashion in order to achieve accuracy in representing the past.  
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This thesis is primarily concerned with political extremism and public order law in the 
inter-war period. It requires the contextualisation of the past in order to understand 
the legal system, as well as those who amended it, enforced it, and operated within it. 
The result is a methodology that embraces the disciplines of Law, History and 
Criminology. This historico-legal analysis draws on a wealth of primary source 
material including, political publications, memoirs, newspaper reportage, police 
reports, Parliamentary debates, Home Office reports and correspondence, as well as 
legal sources such as case law, legislation and statutory developments. This 
research is thematically separated into different areas of public order law. The 
principal methods of disseminating propaganda by the interwar fascists, which 
frequently disrupted public order, are broken down into four separate topics; public 
processions, public meetings, public meetings held on private premises, and the 
wearing of political uniforms. Each topic came under the focus of the National 
Government which framed the Public Order Act 1936 to minimise the disorder 
associated with politically extreme propaganda and protest. Within these themed 
chapters, an examination of legal responses before and after the era of the BUF 
situates them within their historico-legal context. The Public Order Act provided the 
police with wide-reaching powers to supress political activism and public protest 
more generally. The immediate legacy of such legislative responses to political 
extremism in the interwar period are also examined and applied to the post-war 
activities of Mosley’s political return with Union Movement (UM) as well as other 
politically extreme groups such as Sinn Fein. 
 
The level of blame for political violence in the inter-war era has frequently grabbed 
the attention of historians of British fascism, with the emphasis on the culpability 
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swinging gradually between the far-Right and the far-Left. Similarly, the established 
historiography has argued about different intensities of far-Right political partiality 
within the police force. However, this thesis is less concerned with how much blame 
should be attributed to who, or how partial the police were, but its objectives are to 
provide a legal framework for understanding individual legal responses which 
emphasise the importance of discretion and offer a richer understanding of the 
relationship between the police and the judiciary with fascist activism. This 
methodology promotes the view that the police are not a monolith, and that scholars 
who have argued that the police were politically partial towards the fascists are not 
only offering a simplistic overview which ignores vital evidence, but they also only 
present a one-dimensional assessment of the nature of public order policing itself. 
4) Chapter Synopsis 
 
The first chapter provides a brief overview of the BUF and their place in interwar 
Britain. Then, the historiography of the BUF and the principle literature relating to 
public order law and policing is reviewed.  
Adopting the first topic of public order law, Chapter 2 evaluates the use of, and 
responses to, public processions. The Public Order Act 1936 introduced 
controversial provisions which enabled police authorities, with the sanction of the 
Home Secretary, the power to prohibit or regulate public processions. In order to 
evaluate how this major legal development occurred, the chapter analyses the 
common law history regarding public procession and public assembly. The landmark 
cases of Beatty v Gillbanks58 and Wise v Dunning59 are given particular reference. 
The hunger marches of the National Unemployed Workers Movement (NUWM) are 
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then analysed and compared to the BUF’s own provocative marches including the 
famous East London march of 4 October 1936 which resulted in the Battle of Cable 
Street. The subsequent legislation and how it was consequently applied to BUF 
activism is examined. The continued use of s3 in the post-war period and its 
application to emerging fascist groups such as Union Movement is then examined.  
Chapter 3 analyses the legal issues associated with public meetings in public spaces. 
It focuses on the ideas associated with the right to free speech; although no legally 
protected right existed until the Human Rights Act 1998. An evaluation of the 
Trafalgar Square riots of 1888 provides the historical context for the debate on the 
claims to the ‘right’ of free speech, before examining the public meetings of the BUF 
and the famous case of Duncan v Jones,60 where a Left-wing speaker refused to 
close her meeting at the request of a police officer who anticipated a breach of the 
peace. The development of legislation that restricted free speech, such as s5 Public 
Order Act 1936, is evaluated and a comparison of the legal responses to fascist anti-
Semitic speeches and anti-fascist heckles are made. The continuing use of fascist 
anti-Semitism in the immediate post-war era is examined with relation to the 
effectiveness of s5. 
The principal focus of Chapter 4 is the BUF meeting at Olympia, London, where 
Blackshirt stewards brutally ejected anti-fascist hecklers from the hall without any 
police interference, and the communist meeting in South Wales which was attended 
by police without the permission of the organisers, and resulted in the controversial 
judgment in Thomas v Sawkins61. This chapter demonstrates that the fundamental 
differences between the two events could be understood by more elements than just 
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politically motivated policing. Before the analysis of fascist meetings held on private 
premises, context of political and legal responses to the appropriate stewarding of 
meetings is given by the examination of the Suffragette tactic of opposing Liberal 
meetings between 1905 and 1908, and the Departmental Committee Reports of 
1908. An examination of the Conservative Party Conference at Blackpool in 1958 
demonstrates that there was still a vibrant legal debate concerning the use of 
violence by stewards in the post-war era. Demonstrating the application of 
inconsistent police tactics across the country, this chapter argues that the ambiguous 
nature of public order policing on private premises, and the legacy of the Edwardian 
Government’s laissez-faire attitude to the autonomy of individual police authorities 
using their own methods in such cases, hindered effective and consistent policing of 
meetings held on private premises.     
In Chapter 5, the issue of political uniforms is addressed and the contemporary 
accusation of the Blackshirt being a particular instrument of provocation conducive to 
public disorder is evaluated. The mainstream political responses are analysed and 
the debate on proscribing them is evaluated from the Blackshirts introduction to 
British society, to their ultimate prohibition under s1 Public Order Act 1936. Various 
s1 offences are then investigated, and the definition of what constitutes a ‘uniform in 
connection with a political object’ is analysed utilising various magistrates’ judgments. 
The legacy of this provision is also analysed in relation to the prosecution of Ku Klux 
Klan and Sinn Fein activists in the 1960s and 1970s respectively.  
In the final concluding chapter, the research findings of the previous thematic 
chapters are assimilated. It is argued that inconsistent police practices across 
different police authorities are dependent on several variables which include the 
reliance on the highly ambiguous breach of the peace doctrine and the prevalence of 
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subjective legislation in controlling disorder. It is contended that, although partiality 
maybe understood to have existed within the police force (especially at street level), 
the difference in policing protestors of the far-Right and far-Left is better understood 
by the different behaviour and conduct of each extreme group and the different 
relationships that each group manufactured with the police. Additionally, it is 
considered that each police force, with the influence of their watch committee or 
standing joint committee, had scope within the wide legal framework to fashion their 
own practice making national standardisation unlikely. It is argued that the amount of 
discretion available within public order law offered little confidence that it could have 
been applied consistently, impartially and justly. In conceding this, however, it is also 
important to note that this inconsistency also saw the fascists on the receiving end of 
autocratic police practice as well as members of the far-left. Therefore, it is argued 
that police inconsistency is attributable to wider legal factors than previous notions of 
pro-fascist partiality.  
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Chapter 1 
The British Union of Fascists and Public Order 
 
You are on the wrong track, I am afraid sir, for whereas the Fascisti stand for 
law and order, Blackshirt is responsible for many mysterious affairs which are 
decidedly against the law.1 
 
1) Introduction 
The above quote is part of the opening dialogue in Bruce Graeme’s 1925 fictional 
crime novel Blackshirt. The title character is described as a ‘super-criminal’ in this 
exchange between a police officer and Sir Allen Dunn, which distinguishes him from 
the fascist movement and sets him up as the novel’s anti-hero; a gentleman thief, 
who burgles the rich for fun. Yet, it also reveals the fictional police officer’s opinion of 
the fascist movement as one which stood for law and order. This reference to the 
Fascisti demonstrated an opinion which was commonly held amongst British society. 
The British public’s perception of fascism in 1925 would have been shaped by 
favourable newspaper reports of Benito Mussolini’s regime in Italy in the pages of 
the British Conservative press, and the British Fascisti (BF) which formed in 1923. 
Historian Martin Pugh, commenting on Mussolini’s visit to London in December 
1922, stated that the Conservative politicians of the far-Right found him ‘intriguing 
and even inspiring’, and suggested that for the British Government, ‘fascism in Italy 
was an experiment deserving of success, and its violent aspects could simply be 
overlooked.’2 The BF also received some favourable reportage, and they claimed 
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that they were ‘mainly concerned with the observance of law and order.’ 3  This 
relationship between fascist activism and the expansion of public order law in the 
1930s is the principal focus of this thesis. This chapter first examines the significant 
developments of far-Right movements in Britain in the interwar era and places the 
BUF within their historical context. The existing historiography and secondary 
literature is then analysed in relation to specific themes of far-Right research and 
public order policing.  
2) The BUF in Historical Context 
2.1) The Predecessors of the BUF 
 
The BF was the first self-professed fascist movement in Britain, and was formed by 
Miss Rotha Lintorn Orman. Historian Richard Thurlow described her as ‘a spirited 
young middle-class woman’ who served in the Women’s Reserve Ambulance during 
the First World War and twice won the Croix de Charité for heroic rescues in 
Salonica.4  Inspired by Mussolini, the BF had a quasi-military structure and their 
agenda was to combat communism and to stand for law and order. They argued that 
they did not support the idea of dictatorship and formed to help the British authorities 
in an anticipated struggle with socialism and communism which they believed were 
organising to upset the Constitution.5 This was demonstrated by the several hundred 
BF members who helped the Government during the General Strike in 1926. They 
even drilled members so that if the occasion ever arose, they could contact the 
police and propose, ‘if you want a trained body of men to help you, here we are.’6 
Critics from within the BF included Arnold Leese who left the movement and became 
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a founder member of the anti-Semitic movement the Imperial Fascist League (IFL). 
He stated, ‘there was no Fascism, as I understood it, in the organisation, which was 
merely Conservatism with Knobs On.'7 History has also failed to take the movement 
seriously as a potential political force; Pugh notes that historians have tended to treat 
the BF as ‘a movement for Boy Scouts who had never grown up.’8   
The IFL, along with the Nordic League and the Britons Society, represented the main 
British far-Right racial nationalist groups of the inter-war period that espoused 
extreme anti-Semitism and held a dedicated belief in the Protocols of the Elders of 
Zion. The Protocols purportedly unveiled a secret international organisation of Jews, 
who had an undying hatred of the Christian world and plotted to attain world 
domination. First distributed in Russia in 1905, it was not published in Britain until 
1920 as The Jewish Peril. It was uncovered as a hoax in a series of articles in the 
Times, demonstrating that many of the passages claiming to be minutes from a 
meeting of Jewish leaders, were in fact plagiarised from other sources which 
included the Dialogue in Hell Between Machiavelli and Montesquieu (1864) by 
French satirist Maurice Joly.9 The IFL were a small militant group, averaging only 
150 members throughout the 1930s. Thurlow asserted that their activities were only 
kept going by 50 enthusiasts based in London and the ‘obsessional fanaticism’ of 
their ‘guiding spirit’, Arnold Leese. The NL and BS were also small movements which 
only averaged between 200-400 and 30-50 members at their most popular meetings 
respectively.10  
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2.2) Patterns of BUF Support in Relation to Incidents of Disorder 
 
The introduction of Sir Oswald Mosley’s British Union of Fascists in 1932 eclipsed 
the minor movements in membership and activity. Mosley had previously 
represented both the Conservatives and Labour in Parliament. In 1930, when his 
radical proposals to combat rising unemployment in Britain were rejected by the 
Labour Cabinet, he resigned from Government and formed the New Party in 1931. 
During the brief existence of the New Party, Mosley’s political meetings suffered 
violent disruption which convinced him that trained stewards were required if his 
audiences were to hear his speeches. Following a visit to Benito Mussolini in Rome, 
Mosley created the BUF, who were instantly recognisable by their distinctive 
Blackshirt uniform. Members were given military style ranks and the national 
headquarters, known as Black House, was established in Chelsea in 1933. The site 
was used for the offices of senior officials and was also home to between 50-200 
Blackshirts who resided there under military discipline.11  
The history of the BUF between 1932 and 1940 witnessed an ebb and flow of 
support, with peaks and turning points established by particular events. The first was 
the BUF meeting at Olympia, London in June 1934. The meeting was labelled by the 
BUF as Britain’s largest indoor political meeting with an estimated audience of 12-
15,000. This was to be the first downturn for the movement’s support, as violent 
methods utilised by the Blackshirt stewards to eject hecklers were widely criticised in 
the popular press. Although the initial reaction was a surge in membership, by those 
who were attracted to the thrill of political confrontation and wished to help preserve 
free speech, it is widely accepted that the peak of BUF membership of 40,000 
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declined in the long run following the violence at Olympia. 12  Within a year it is 
estimated that membership fell to 5,000. The second major event in BUF history 
became known as the Battle of Cable Street. BUF activity increased in 1936, their 
processions attracted more members, and with renewed fascist activity, anti-fascist 
retaliation also intensified.13 The BUF made steady progress in London’s East End 
with their anti-Semitic propaganda. On 4 October, the BUF planned a provocative 
public procession which would have taken them through large Jewish communities 
of East London. In response, anti-fascists, comprising of Jews, communists, Irish 
dock workers and local residents built barricades across streets in an attempt to 
prevent the march. The majority of the violence occurred between the police and the 
anti-fascists. The police failed to clear the route, and fearing further violence 
prohibited the Blackshirt procession. The violence which occurred impelled the 
Government to create new laws which gave more power to the police to maintain 
public order.  
The subsequent Public Order Act 1936 prohibited the wearing of political uniforms 
and proscribed quasi-military organisations. The BUF was therefore deprived of their 
Blackshirt uniform. It also gave the police wide discretionary powers to prohibit or 
regulate public processions, and ban words or behaviour which was threatening, 
abusive or insulting with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or whereby a 
breach of the peace may be occasioned. Historian Gerald Anderson suggested that 
following the new legislation, the BUF ‘had reached its peak’ and the ‘amount and 
intensity of public disorder did decline’.14 The BUF began to attract large numbers to 
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its political meetings in 1939 with its peace campaign. Mosley spoke to an estimated 
11,000 at Earls Court on 16 July, but the recovery of the movement was limited. 
Thurlow highlighted that although many joined who were desperate to keep Britain 
out of another war, others left in protest as it was deemed that the movement was 
putting fascist loyalties above patriotic considerations.15 The movement effectively 
came to an end following the outbreak of war, when in 1940 the BUF’s main 
activists, including Mosley and his wife Diana, were interned under Defence 
Regulation 18B as potential traitors to the British war effort. The BUF was proscribed 
later that year. 
2.3) Anti-Semitism in British Society 
A particular feature of this era that needs some reference is that of casual anti-
Semitism within British society. In the interwar period, contemporaries were unaware 
of the horror that would soon unfold in the shape of a second world war and the 
Holocaust. Without such knowledge, and an influx of Jewish migrants during this 
period, prevalent attitudes in British society need to be understood. Established 
politicians such as Neville Chamberlain and Harold Nicolson were known anti-
Semites,16 but how much further did anti-Jewish feeling permeate British society? 
Emsley stated that, ‘Where the police were less than sympathetic to Jewish victims 
of Sir Oswald Mosley’s British Union of Fascists they were probably reflecting the 
relatively widespread prejudice towards Jews in interwar Britain.’17 Historian Colin 
Holmes stated that a culture of anti-Semitism was evident at a popular level in British 
society since the 1880s, but it also extended ‘into official policy as well… [where] it is 
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often disguised as alienism.’ 18  An interim report from a social survey on anti-
Semitism conducted in 1938, revealed a popular casual disliking of Jews, especially 
in East London. The report described the remarks by one interviewee, an East 
London docker, as an ‘overt expression of a much wider feeling.’ He declared: 
The dockers round here, they loathe 'em. The other day there were a couple 
of Jews reading the Communist rag, the Daily Worker you know, and talking, 
and the chaps came along and chucked 'em both into the water... Yes, I work 
in the docks 
The Jews Communist? Yes, they're anything that pay's 'em. They're 
Conservative when the Conservatives are up, and Liberal when it's the 
Liberals, and now they're Communist. Anything that suits 'em.19 
Indeed, the survey reported that the communist paper the Daily Worker was read by 
18 Jews for every ‘cockney’.20 Even popular contemporary fiction such as Sapper’s 
Bulldog Drummond,21 made casual links between Jews and international Communist 
terrorism, while the title character and novel’s hero represented the prototype fascist; 
he was a patriot and man of action, who ruthlessly uncovered and brutally defeated 
the attempted communist insurrection of Britain. Other views recorded of the survey, 
reported that Jewish immigration had roused a nationalist resentment about 
conflicting values. It stated that previously as a non-Christian the Jew could not be 
tolerated in a religious state, but with ‘the rising spirit of nationalism… the Jew as a 
member of a different “race” could not be considered a true patriot.’22 Although the 
majority of those surveyed in a small doorstop investigation, 69% of men and 77% of 
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women, were against anti-Semitism, 23  other prevalent views demonstrated an 
instinctive pull towards anti-Semitic sensitivity: 
My own opinion is that the Jew is as good an Englishman as the rest of us… 
But, and it is a big but, I am aware that this opinion has been formed… by 
making a conscious effort to be fair and tolerant. Instinctively, I’ve got a 
prejudice against them. I don’t know how or when ir (sic) arose because I’ve 
had practically no dealings with them.24 
I have an antipathy to Jews, and, while realising that it is unreasonable, I am 
unable to overcome it.25 
 
It was activism in areas such as East London where such prejudice existed, that 
BUF propaganda was able to attract support by creating community tension, 
suspicion and aversion. 
 
3) The Historiography of the BUF 
The historiography of British fascism is extensive, and Historian Richard Payne’s 
criticism of what may be deemed an overpopulated area of historical study is 
perhaps justified.26 Yet, the diversity of approaches adopted by researchers has 
vindicated such wide scholarly attention. The historiography of British fascism not 
only reveals an interesting account of domestic far-Right movements but also adds 
to the understanding of British society and culture; it reveals attitudes to the role of 
authority, women, class, religion and race. This review of the historiography of British 
fascism outlines the different methodologies utilised which are relevant to this thesis. 
Firstly, it provides a short review of the leading texts on the BUF. Secondly, the more 
specific theme of cultural and social history is examined which is beneficial to this 
thesis’ aims of positioning responses to extreme political movements and their 
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associated disorder within its wider historical context. Thirdly, this review identifies 
the different approaches taken by historians regarding the association of political 
violence with the BUF. Finally, there is an examination of relevant literature relating 
to public disorder and the police which includes the work of historians and 
criminologists.  
4.1) Major contributions to the History of British Fascism 
 
The major recent contributions to studies relating to British fascism have been 
Richard Thurlow’s Fascism in Britain, Nigel Copsey’s Anti-Fascism in Britain, 27 
Thomas Linehan’s British Fascism 1918-1939, 28  Martin Pugh’s ‘Hurrah for the 
Blackshirts!’ and Stephen Dorril’s Blackshirt: Sir Oswald Mosley and British 
Fascism.29 Thurlow presents a concise chronology of extreme Right wing politics in 
Britain from its ideological beginnings in the 1910s to the demise of the National 
Front in the 1980s with special attention paid to the development of Sir Oswald 
Mosley’s BUF. Linehan’s book explores the roots and ideology of the different 
Parties and personalities within British fascism whilst also considering the cultural 
aspects behind it.30 The aim of Pugh’s book is to demonstrate the significance of 
fascism in Britain between the wars by relating fascist ideology and activity to the 
vital events of this period. Dorril’s Blackshirt is a recent biography of Mosley and the 
BUF that questions the sympathetic view presented in Robert Skidelsky’s 1975 
biography Oswald Mosley.31 
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Edited volumes such as Tony Kushner and Nadia Valman’s Remembering Cable 
Street, 32  Julie Gottlieb and Thomas Linehan’s The Culture of Fascism, 33  and 
Kenneth Lunn and Richard Thurlow’s British Fascism,34 contain interesting chapters 
that need to be referenced in this thesis. Among them are Thurlow’s account of the 
passing of the Public Order Act 1936 following the Battle of Cable Street, Philip 
Coupland’s assessment on the meaning and function of the Blackshirt, and John 
Stevenson’s account of the Metropolitan Police and public order.  
Accounts on the political violence associated with the BUF will also be studied from 
journal articles, including ‘Bullies or Victims: A Study of British Union of Fascists 
Violence’ by Daniel Tilles,35 Jon Lawrence’s ‘Fascist violence and the politics of 
public order in inter-war Britain: the Olympia debate revisited’36 and Martin Pugh’s 
reassertion of the revisionist view of the Olympia debate in ‘The National 
Government, the British Union of Fascists and the Olympia Debate’.37 
In ‘Hurrah for the Blackshirts!’, Martin Pugh demonstrated that fascism in Britain was 
not necessarily marginalised and the early twentieth century saw the authoritarian 
nature of the British state,38 the attraction of members from the major parties to the 
idea of National Efficiency which ‘represented a halfway house to the corporate 
state’39 and the flow of ideas and personnel between fascism and the Conservative 
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Right. 40  He also discussed the disillusionment of some Conservative MPs with 
regard to the National Government and fascist responses to the interwar political 
troubles, including the General Strike 1926, the crisis of Empire, growing 
unemployment 1929-1931, and the Abdication of Edward VIII.  
While much literature has been produced on the BUF, there has been relatively little 
research on their antagonists. Nigel Copsey’s Anti-Fascism in Britain was a decisive 
response to this imbalance, and he defended its importance stating that ‘far more 
people supported the anti-fascist cause than ever supported fascist organisations’ 
and added that the anti-fascist movements played an important part in the failure of 
British fascism.41 Copsey examined both passive and active forms of anti-fascism 
and their positive and negative effects on fascist movements. For instance, the anti-
fascists campaign at the Olympia meeting helped deny the BUF political legitimacy 
and militant anti-fascists ‘ensured that Mosley remained outside the political 
mainstream’ during the early years of the BUF’s history. However, he concedes that 
the price for this in the later years of BUF activism was to confine them to areas, 
such as the East End of London, where they cultivated the ‘cultural tradition of anti-
Semitism.’42 Copsey identified an escalating cycle which saw a greater involvement 
of Jews partake in anti-fascist activism in response to the anti-Semitic campaign, 
which in turn, provided more ammunition for fascist propaganda heightening its 
impact. Seeking alternative measures to combat fascist activism, Copsey noted that 
the Labour Party and the Board of Deputies of British Jews advice of ignoring 
fascism would be one way to break this cycle, but he advocated that community 
action was more effective in eroding support for fascism.       
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4.2) Looking Back: Fascism, Society and Culture in Interwar Britain 
Fascism today is frequently associated with Nazism and its extreme objectives which 
were manifested in total war and genocide. The place of fascism in British history is 
therefore a controversial subject which raises questions about family and community 
association with a movement which was associated with violence, brutality, anti-
Semitism and the Holocaust. In Blackshirts in Devon, Todd Gray highlighted the 
problem of writing about a period as recent as the 1930s that touched the lives of 
‘unsuspecting friends and relatives’ or recorded a ‘shameful aspect of local history’ 
but argued that for a historian not to research areas on grounds of such sensibilities 
would be irresponsible.43 He also importantly linked modern perceptions of fascism 
as being associated with the Holocaust, causing popular repulsion towards fascism 
and the belief that those who followed it were depraved or evil.44 Modern reflections 
on fascism in the 1930s will be tarnished by the knowledge of the Nazi atrocities that 
were to become evident in the aftermath of the Second World War, but the period of 
1930s Britain needs to be examined in its own cultural and political context. 
However, a cultural interpretation of British fascism potentially sets a dangerous 
precedent that Linehan and Gottlieb address in The Culture of Fascism. They stated 
that a cultural interpretation of fascism ‘does not provide retrospective legitimacy’ 
and that ‘any reinterpretation of fascism must remain firm in its fundamental 
condemnation of the British far-Right’.45 By introducing cultural research methods to 
the history of British fascism, Linehan contested the conclusion of Robert Benewick’s 
1969 monograph Political Violence and Public Order that the BUF’s downfall was 
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due to its ‘alienation from the British political culture.’ 46   Citing Lewis, Linehan 
asserts that this view has since become obsolete as, ‘it is naïve and smug to suggest 
that the BUF’s failure was somehow ‘preordained by the intrinsic nature of British 
society’.'47  
In interwar Britain, despite numerous instances of violence involving fascists and 
anti-fascists, there were no deaths associated with the clashes. With this in mind, 
Daniel Tilles pointed out that it would be unfair to associate British fascism too 
closely with German Nazism or Italian fascism although Mosley himself made little 
effort to dissociate himself from these movements.48 One difference between British 
fascism and German Nazism was highlighted by Gray, who recited a Western 
Independent article on the violence during Mosley’s speech at Plymouth. The report 
stated that a German fascist at the meeting claimed ‘Plymouth fascists shouted and 
fought while German fascists shot their opponents’.49 In writing the history of the 
BUF it is therefore important not to associate British fascism too closely to its 
European counterparts. Also, the political violence that occurred needs to be aligned 
to its contemporary political culture. For the historian, this creates ethical questions 
on how the history of the BUF can be written without being sympathetic to the fascist 
cause without dismissing wider cultural aspects of the period which may not 
necessarily place them as far outside of the violent political culture as we may have 
previously thought.  
4.3) The BUF and Political Violence 
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Throughout the historiography on the BUF, attitudes towards the violence associated 
with them have frequently changed. Early orthodox accounts, such as Colin Cross’ 
The Fascists in Britain50 and Robert Benewick’s Political Violence and Public Order 
held the BUF largely responsible for generating violence, even when they appeared 
to be the victim. They were considered accountable because of the provocation 
caused by their political uniforms, choice of locations and their violent stewarding. 
Revisionists, such as Robert Skidelsky, have attempted to show that the BUF were 
more victim than aggressor. He claimed that a small group of militant communists 
targeted the BUF forcing them to adopt aggressive self-defence tactics. As would be 
expected, this view is also consistent with the fascists own version of history, 
recorded in memoirs and autobiographies such as Mosley’s My Life, 51  John 
Charnley’s Blackshirts and Roses,52 Richard Bellamy’s We Marched With Mosley 
and Jeffrey Hamm’s Action Replay.53 Hamm even sited Skidelsky’s biography to 
defend the tactics used by Blackshirt stewards at Olympia claiming, ‘Professor 
Robert Skidelsky… can hardly be accused of partiality’.54  
However, it is now commonly acknowledged amongst historians that the biography 
was partial. This was argued by David Lewis who stated that ‘Skidelsky’s judgment 
was warped by his obvious sympathy and admiration for his subject.’ 55  Lewis’ 
monograph, Illusions of Grandeur, is part of the more recent interactionist school 
who have modified previous approaches and acknowledge that both fascists and 
anti-fascists both hold a significant amount of responsibility for public disorder in the 
inter-war period. Other interactionists include Thurlow, Linehan and Daniel Tilles.    
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Tilles clearly defines this approach in his article, ‘Bullies or Victims? A Study of 
British Union of Fascists Violence’. He sought to evoke the contemporary pro- and 
anti-BUF attitudes towards political violence identifying a middle ground that argued 
that they were not the ‘bullies’ of the ‘political playground’ as they were so often 
portrayed, but nor were they innocent victims of anti-fascist obstruction either. He 
stated that ‘the BUF must shoulder a large part of the blame for the clashes which 
took place’56 which included the provocative nature of their uniformed marches and 
meetings in Jewish areas and virulent anti-Semitism, but also unorganised attacks 
by BUF members on Jews in the street, ‘Jew-baiting’ and the Mile End Pogrom. It 
was this link with violence, some justified and some not, which Tilles suggested was 
the ‘most important factor in the movement’s failure.’ Other recent accounts, such as 
Stephen Dorril’s Blackshirt, have been motivated by their rejection of the 
‘sympathetic view’ of Mosley, and have reinstated an orthodox approach which has 
utilised recently released records to demonstrate the nature of Mosley’s relationship 
with German Nazi regime, the BUF’s funding from them, and the truth about 
Mosley’s anti-semitism which was at the core of his fascist movement, and not a just 
a response to their decline.  
Despite the different approaches taken by historians of British fascism, incidents of 
public disorder frequently dominate any discourse on the BUF. It is critical events, 
such as the Olympia meeting and the Battle of Cable Street, which has led to 
frequent debate between historians about political violence and public order. Jon 
Lawrence debated the contemporary attitudes towards political violence in ‘Fascist 
Violence and the politics of public order in inter-war Britain: the Olympia debate 
revisited’. He introduced the pre-war political culture in which the ‘old ways’ of party 
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politics and the disorder that occurred are referred to as a ‘form of sport’ and 
presented the views of the Liverpool Chief Constable who argued that ‘if you 
consider that your meeting is going to be disrupted by fifty roughs you must have 
seventy-five roughs who can throw them out’. 57  Therefore, it was commonly 
accepted by politicians that the mobilisation of a private force was necessary to 
ensure successful political meetings.  
Lawrence argued that this view changed after the First World War when ‘the politics 
of misrule ceased to be tolerated by the vast majority of politicians.’ He also stated 
that gender issues played an important part in this shift following the Representation 
of the People Act 1918 as females became more involved with politics.58 Lawrence 
continued to detail the origins of Mosley’s Blackshirts and Fascist Defence Force 
which were created as a result of the disruption to Mosley’s political meetings after 
he split from the Labour Party.59 The fascist emphasis on ‘defence’ and Mosley’s 
direction to his party’s members to obey the police meant that the BUF saw 
themselves as acting within the law and defending the principles of free speech. 
However, Lawrence argued that Mosley’s gamble had failed because it resurrected 
old political methods of violence, and introduced the political uniform which was seen 
as ‘shockingly new and ‘foreign’.’60  
Lawrence pointed out that popular disgust for BUF violence and anti-Semitism can 
be evidenced by examining the contemporary reactions to their political methods 
such as those deployed at Olympia which demonstrated that ‘average public opinion’ 
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was against the ‘old ways’ for fighting and violent ejection. 61  Similarly, Tilles 
demonstrated that popular revulsion to BUF methods and anti-Semitism could be 
highlighted by the 100,000 anti-fascists that were present to demonstrate against 
less than 2,000 BUF marchers at Cable Street in 1936.62 Lawrence also argued that 
just four Conservative MPs defended the Blackshirt methods during the Olympia 
debate in the Commons which countered Martin Pugh’s assessment that there had 
been a split in the Party in which a majority were prepared to defend or justify the 
BUF.63 Pugh responded to this article and successfully defended his approach by 
arguing that there were other outlets for Conservative MPs to have expressed their 
view of the debate mentioning Conservative journals and the Morning Post. He also 
argued that when old attitudes change they do so gradually and reminded Lawrence 
‘that many of the inter-war M.P.s had grown up in an era when political violence was 
routine and they retained the assumptions of an earlier generation.’64 
The dispute between Pugh and Lawrence highlights the contentious issues 
surrounding the place of the BUF and political violence in 1930’s culture. While 
Lawrence was keen to point out the popular revulsion towards the BUF, advocating 
that Mosley had so badly misjudged the contemporary attitudes, Pugh goes further 
evidencing that such attitudes had not changed completely since the war and there 
was still some acceptability within British political culture for the methods of the BUF 
and their heavy handed stewarding. As a landmark event in the history of the BUF, 
Olympia has been widely discussed and has split historians’ interpretations on the 
impact on the movement’s fortunes. Textbook accounts have pointed out that the 
violence at Olympia was only a factor in the movement’s decline in the latter part of 
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1934. Additionally, the loss of support from the Rothermere press in July 1934, the 
National Government’s relative economic upturn in mid-1934, which undermined 
Mosley’s view of economic collapse, and the negative link and fear in the public 
minds with Nazism following the Night of the Long Knives in Germany on 30 June, 
were all factors that underscored the BUF’s decline in late 1934.65 
Another seminal event involving the BUF and political violence occurred on 4 
October 1936. Sir Oswald Mosley’s planned parade through East London was 
eventually banned by the Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir Philip Game, as the 
highly provocative march had prompted 100,000 anti-fascist demonstrators to take to 
the streets to prevent the Blackshirts from passing. The violence that resulted was 
largely held between the anti-fascist protestors who had barricaded streets, and the 
police who tried to disperse them and clear a route for the march. Less than three 
months later, the Public Order Act 1936 was introduced. The Battle of Cable Street 
and the resulting legislation initiated an interesting discussion between the 
relationship of the Government, the police and the BUF. 
In ‘The BUF, The Metropolitan Police and Public Order’ John Stevenson argued that 
contemporaries often thought of the police as being pro-fascist and anti-communist 
on account of the police often protecting BUF marches from anti-fascist retaliation. 
Stevenson’s reflection on the relationship was to see the police as being irritated to 
the problems caused by the BUF, but hostile to the organised Left and claimed that if 
any bias should be attributed to the Metropolitan Police he stated that they were 
‘anti-left’ rather than ‘pro-fascist’.66 Stevenson also highlighted complaints from the 
NCCL that the police did little to protect Jews and non-Jews alike from the ‘organised 
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hooliganism, intimidation and physical assaults by fascists’.67 Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner Sir Philip Game rejected the need for a deputation with the NCCL and 
merely responded that they make written suggestions. Stevenson argued that this 
cool response was not due to police ignorance of the situation, but to the distrust that 
they had to the NCCL, which they deemed to be a ‘front’ organisation for the far-Left, 
and that the Secretary Ronald Kidd had connections with the Communist Party. 
These contemporary perceptions on Kidd’s affiliations have since been refuted by 
Janet Clark who stated that Kidd had little to gain from Communist Party 
membership, as he already had the support of the political Left, and that ‘a non-party 
identity was key to the conception of the NCCL.’68 However, she conceded that Kidd 
did attract radical Left attention, but as he challenged the authorities on the policing 
of Left-wing political activism, it would have been ‘more surprising if communist 
factions… had not taken an interest in him.’69 
Stevenson argued that the increasing tempo of clashes between fascists and anti-
fascists, and anti-fascist protestors and the police during 1936 culminated in the 
Battle of Cable Street. This led the Home Secretary to argue that unless more 
powers were given to the police then ‘serious disorder might occur.’70 The police 
attempts to clear the anti-fascist blockades for Mosley’s march gave fuel for those 
who believed the police to be pro-fascist. However, Stevenson argued that the police 
methods were more an attempt to demonstrate that the police were ‘the arbiters of 
what was or was not permissible on the streets of London.’71 Stevenson’s view on 
police perceptions were obtained from the files of the Commissioner and he stated 
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that within the higher echelons of the force there were attempts to prevent BUF 
provocation but continued that it is not clear whether this was filtered down to ‘local 
divisions and officers on the spot.’72  
In ‘The Straw that Broke the Camel’s Back’, Richard Thurlow examined the Battle of 
Cable Street and its influence on the National Government’s decision to strengthen 
police powers in order to control political extremism via the Public Order Act 1936. 
Thurlow stated that the Government was previously reluctant to increase the powers 
of the authorities amid the fears of how public opinion would regard the reduction of 
civil liberties, but argued that the Battle of Cable Street was the ‘straw that broke the 
camel’s back’ which ‘resulted in changes to the law and influenced national history.’73 
Cable Street, therefore, was a pivotal moment in the development in new legislation, 
but Thurlow contended that the Public Order Act 1936 must not solely be seen as a 
reaction to fascist and anti-fascist violence. There had previously been a series of 
events that threatened public order, including militant trade unionism, Irish 
Insurrection, industrial unrest between 1918 and 1922, the General Strike of 1926, 
the rise of unemployment from 1 million to 3 million between 1929 and 1933, and the 
marches of the NUWM. 
Thurlow’s assessment of the Metropolitan Police was that at the higher levels of the 
force there was great hostility to the BUF. He stated that Lord Trenchard, 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner (1931-1935), wished to ban fascists because of 
the public order problems and the waste of police resources at their processions and 
meetings; he was also keen on banning the political uniforms and did not want the 
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police force to look as though they were protecting the fascists.74 Trenchard was 
succeeded by Sir Philip Game who was even more anti-fascist and told his force to 
‘err on the side of harshness with regard to cautioning and arresting anti-Semitic 
speakers in the East End.’75 However, due to the numbers of police on the ground, 
and the evidence of anti-Semitic speeches being made, Thurlow argued that with the 
small numbers of arrests made, despite the instructions of Sir Philip Game, the 
police on the ground were more concerned with upholding the right to free speech as 
long as public order was not threatened.76 Although free speech was not a legal 
right, the inconsistent actions of police officers towards political speakers highlights 
the problems associated with police discretion. 
Thurlow considered the notion that the Public Order Act might potentially be 
perceived as a national over-reaction due to the violence in a small area of East 
London.77 He argued that although there was violence between fascists, communists 
and Jewish radicals elsewhere, they did not experience the same level of fascist 
anti-Semitism as London’s East End. He also suggested that the authorities in other 
areas were able to contain political anti-Semitism and political violence. The Public 
Order Act utilised provisions from draft Bills which were discussed in 1932 and 1934. 
According to Thurlow, revisionists saw the period as one in which two political 
extremes came together resulting in public disorder, which led the state to fairly 
successfully regulate and control public order. 78  However, Thurlow added that 
                                               
74
 Ibid, p. 84. 
75
 Ibid, p. 85. 
76
 Ibid. 
77
 Ibid, p. 78. 
78
 Ibid, p. 92. 
61 
 
although the Public Order Act checked fascist provocation, it also hindered the 
possibility of protest and therefore restricted fundamental civil liberties.79  
These studies have looked at the relationship between the BUF and public order 
without any in-depth examination of the legal system. Stevenson declared that there 
was further need for investigating the views and methods of the police on the 
ground, as his study was largely created from correspondence between the high 
echelons of the police force. Thurlow has added to this argument by stating that the 
police on the ground were more interested in preserving public order and let some 
anti-Semitic speeches go unpunished if they believed acting on it would create a 
disturbance. The application of criminological theory on police culture, and the 
examination of the contemporary legal system can be utilised to harness a greater 
understanding of responses to political extremism. 
4.4) Policing and Public Order Law 
The role of the police during the confrontationally charged political arena of 1930s 
Britain has been the subject of considerable historical and legal investigation. 
Contemporary accounts and debates instigated by Left-wing politicians and civil 
liberty campaigners frequently challenged inconsistent police practice on the 
grounds of its perceived partiality.80 Their allegations were supported by a range of 
police action, such as, facilitating fascist processions while taking violent action 
against anti-fascist protesters, and allegedly turning a blind eye to gratuitous fascist 
violence and the unlawful use of abusive or insulting words or behaviour. The 
historiography has also frequently advocated that police practice, tactics and 
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responses often demonstrated bias or partisanship in favour of the fascists when 
dealing with the problem of public disorder. Stevenson’s contention that the 
Metropolitan Police in this era were ‘anti-left’ rather than ‘pro-fascist’, has been 
countered by lawyers, Ewing and Gearty, who identified that, ‘the protestors on the 
receiving end of police militancy [would have seen] little difference between the 
two.’81 Historians, such as Richard Thurlow have highlighted that while the police at 
the highest level were not in favour of fascism, there were problems of interpreting 
the law at street level that led to inconsistent treatment of fascists and anti-fascists, 
but he stopped short of advocating that there was a political motivation for this.82  
Other authors on British fascism, such as Lewis and Dorril acknowledged that 
political discrimination did exist in police practice. 83  Lewis categorically claimed 
‘beyond all doubt that instances of police bias did occur’, yet he further admitted that 
a ‘full examination of the attitude towards the BUF of the police… lies beyond the 
scope of this book.’84 Indeed, an investigation of the relationship between the legal 
authorities and the extreme political movements would also require the analysis of 
the contemporary law, and the application of sociological theory regarding police 
culture and practice. Also, the methods employed by each movement should be 
analysed in both their historical and legal context.  
The legal context has been explored in great detail by Ewing and Gearty. They 
examined BUF activism and the role of the state in their chapter ‘The Rise and Fall 
of Fascism’ in The Struggle for Civil Liberties: Political Freedom and the Rule of Law 
in Britain, 1914-1945. They offer an important evaluation of the legal issues relating 
                                               
81
 K. D. Ewing and C. A. Gearty, The Struggle for Civil Liberties: Political Freedom and the Rule of 
Law in Britain, 1914-1945, Oxford University Press (2004) p. 296 n 113. 
82
 Thurlow, Fascism in Britain, p. 84. 
83
 See Lewis, Illusions of Grandeur, p. 161 and Dorril, Blackshirt, p. 307. 
84
 Lewis, Illusions of Grandeur, pp. 160-1. 
63 
 
to political extremism in the inter-war period but as an historical account, the 
argument is hindered by the partiality of the authors and the neglect of important 
sources. Their prejudice is highlighted most clearly by Thurlow’s review, in which he 
accused Ewing and Gearty of agreeing with the parts of the Public Order Act that 
directly affected the BUF but criticised the increased powers of the police relating to 
marches and demonstrations that also hindered the anti-fascists as well as the 
fascists.85 It is the authors’ contention that the police were pro-fascist and anti-Left in 
this period and the selected evidence which supported this claim. However, it is this 
partiality that potentially led to the neglect of divergent sources and to the nonchalant 
comparison of policing tactics at fascist and anti-fascist or Left-wing events. By 
neglecting certain historical perspectives, such as the difference between the 
extreme political movements’ methods and an appreciation of popular cultural and 
social attitudes, an evaluation of why the police acted more frequently against the 
anti-fascists and communists as opposed to the fascists cannot be objectively 
understood. In addition, the lack of historical scrutiny of highly subjective sources, 
such as those written by contemporary anti-fascists, emphasises the bias of the 
authors and their agenda of amplifying the claim of pro-fascist policing.86 
The relationship between the disciplines of law, history and criminology are important 
to the study of British fascism, political violence and public order, with the potential to 
synthesise a greater understanding of the correlation between the BUF and the law. 
The legal debates which have been either neglected or not fully utilized by historians 
have been addressed by academic lawyers, such as Ewing and Gearty, yet, in turn, 
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they have neglected aspects of cultural and social history. Criminological theory is 
also important to understand social behaviour and how ‘criminal behaviour and 
society’s reaction to it have changed over time’. 87  This aspect is particularly 
important when considering public attitudes towards fascist activism in the 1930s in 
comparison to those in the post-holocaust era. 
Adding the element of Criminology will also create a wider comprehension of the 
principles of policing. For example, it would be inept to discuss the issue of the BUF 
and law enforcement without an understanding of police discretion and impartiality. 
Criminologists, such as Tony Jefferson and Peter Waddington, have theorised these 
principles which add sociological elements to the history of the police and public 
order. Jefferson criticised Waddington’s ‘idealist’ approach that upheld paramilitarism 
as the most effective way of implementing impartial public order policing.88 In The 
Case against Paramilitary Policing, Jefferson argued that although the concept of 
impartial law enforcement, which obliges the police to uphold the law generally 
without favour, is a fine ideal, he asserted that it is sociologically unrealistic and 
“constitutes an ‘impossible mandate’”. He contended that limited knowledge about 
offences, and lack of time and resources, ultimately lead to prioritization and decision 
making within all levels of the police force, founding the notion of police discretion. 
Jefferson argued that it was the development of a radical sociology of police work 
that emphasized ‘class-based outcomes of discretionary decision-making [that have] 
exposed a hidden politics of policing.’89  
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The potential for political policing in the inter-war era has been examined by Clive 
Emsley in both The English Police and ‘Police Forces in England and France During 
the Interwar Years’. 90 Emsley importantly asserted that it is:  
too easy to assume that there was a “police view” with regard to politics and 
public order during the nineteen-thirties… [adding] the opinions of police 
constables were shaped by a variety of pressures and experiences and there 
are dangers in assuming a causal link between the conservative function of 
the police and the conservative principles in policemen.91 
The importance of not treating the national police as a monolith with a single political 
objective is clear, and certainly variations and inconsistencies in policing public order 
across the Britain need to be evaluated in order to understand the relationship 
between the BUF and the law. Emsley also evaluated the involvement of the English 
police in matters of haute police. In contrast to many European police forces, he 
argued that the English police were able to remain non-political and non-military for 
much of the nineteenth century. By the early twentieth century police involvement in 
the secret service grew in response to the First World War and the Russian 
Revolution. Although this growth continued in the inter-war years of the BUF, the 
idea of the ‘non-political Bobby’ was still perpetuated in this period.92 Yet, as political 
policing was developing in this era, it is important to question how much influence 
haute police had on the policing of political extremism. In The Great British Bobby, 
Emsley revealed some of the superficial attitudes of contemporary police officers 
regarding politically extreme movements that neglected the politics of each group. 
He quoted Sergeant H B Green, an admirer of Mosley, who stated, ‘It is much easier 
to like a man who is carrying a Union Jack, who is smart and clean with close-
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cropped hair, than a man who has shouted an obscene insult at you and spat in your 
face.’93 On the policing of Left wing activism, Emsley noted that the police officers 
were often frustrated by having to police such events, as they often lost a day’s leave 
and were not given any overtime pay. The violence attributed by the police was a 
mixture of ‘relief and exhilaration when, after a period of standing in a line and taking 
abuse and occasional missiles, they were directed to clear the ground.’94  
Jane Morgan’s Conflict and Order, which examines the policing of Labour disputes 
from 1900-1939, also needs to be cited. In this account, she importantly addressed 
the imbalance of the history of the Labour movement which had previously neglected 
the role of the police who were largely regarded as either ‘a monolithic class enemy,’ 
or ‘an irrelevance.’95 Although Morgan’s research is largely focused upon responses 
to the labour movement, the evolution of public order law which she charts in this 
period, as well as the growing influence of the Home Office over provincial police 
forces, are all important aspects which also relate to any similar account of fascist 
activism in the inter-war era. 
Adding to the work of Emsley and Morgan, Chris Williams critically analysed the 
relationship between the Home Office and the provincial police forces in ‘Rotten 
boroughs’.96 It is of particular interest to this thesis that the increased presence of the 
Labour Party in local government in the years following the First World War led to an 
increase in political battles between police authorities and their Chief Constables. In 
the ‘battles’ noted by Williams, the Home Office came down against the Labour 
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authorities in favour of the Chief Constables. 97  Therefore, evidence of political 
partiality is arguably present at all levels of law enforcement in this era. Yet, despite 
the judgment of McHardie J in Fisher v Oldham Corporation98 in 1930 that the police 
were officers of the Crown and not servants or agents of the local authorities, there 
was still significant ambiguity in public order law that provided a wide amount of 
discretion to the police and the judiciary.    
In Keeping the Peace: The Police and Public Order, David Williams combined the 
disciplines of Law and History to produce a volume on public order that spans the 
1850s to the 1960s. Written in 1967, its contemporary relevance is stimulated by the 
inclusion of the then recent disturbances between the Mods and Rockers. Williams 
approached the issue of public order as the struggle between maintaining freedom of 
speech and assembly and the preservation of the Queen’s peace. The volume 
added valuable arguments and information relevant to the fascist/communist 
violence of the 1930s with discussions on preventive justice, private premises, the 
policeman on the spot, and insults, abuse and threats. There are few direct 
references to the BUF, (most notably in Chapter 6 ‘Prevention and Private 
Premises’) and the legal discussion offered adds vital understanding of the law. For 
example, in discussing the nature of preventive justice he highlighted the vagueness 
of legislation and the courts of being of value to prosecutors, complainants and the 
police. Yet despite the ‘sporadic and unpredictable’ nature of intervention, preventive 
justice ‘remains a valuable deterrent in the preservation of the Queen’s Peace.’99  
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Charles Townsend’s Making the Peace: Public Order and Public Security in Modern 
Britain, is a more recent account which principally uses a historical approach to 
examining disorder, particularly from the legal framework of public order policy and 
state management in Britain from the mid-nineteenth century to 1980s. Townsend 
dispels the myths of a ‘golden age’ in public order, highlighting the flawed perception 
from the 1990s standpoint that the 50 years between the Public Order Act 1936 and 
1986 could be split into two unequal parts; the first being the period a relatively 
peaceful era before the disorders at Brixton in 1981. From Brixton onwards he 
highlighted the disorders at Southall, Toxteth, Handsworth, St Paul’s and Tottenham, 
as well as a continuing decade of football hooliganism, terrorism and strike battles. 
He stated that there always seems to be a public perception of a recent deterioration 
in security and a growth in violent crime, a recurrent theme that always advocates ‘a 
golden age’ about 20 years previous. Reminding the reader of the 1974 Red Lion 
Square disorder and the 1972 miners’ strike, Townshend argued that the division is 
less clear cut and whether there may be a ‘mismatch between concept and 
reality’. 100  A further important feature of Townshend’s Making the Peace is the 
identification of the notion that the public interest was largely believed to have been 
determined by the public themselves; a belief which he stated could not be 
widespread now (1993). A theme of the book is of the tension that grew between the 
police and the public in the 1970s and 1980s during violent clashes at protests and 
industrial disputes, and the growth of police militarism. This shift in attitudes is further 
attributed to the realisation that a ‘right’ to public meeting did not exist, although it 
was once believed to have. Townshend claimed that in losing this once perceived 
right, the ‘right’ to order was gained, although no right existed in legislative terms.  
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The existing literature on the history of the BUF, the police, and public disorder 
needs to be integrated and combined with an analysis of legal sources in order to 
determine a better understanding of the relationship between the authorities and the 
activists of the far-Right. It is through the appreciation of social and cultural factors of 
the 1930s, as well as an understanding of contemporary police practice and the 
continual development of public order law that is central to the understanding of the 
use of police discretion in the interwar period. 
4) Applying a Legal Lens to Research on British Fascism 
Most textbook literature on British fascism considers the background of the Public 
Order Act 1936, and offers a brief synopsis of the policing of political violence. 
However, there has not been a critical legal investigation of significant court 
proceedings, developments in legislation, and the role and duty of the police in 
relation to far-Right activism. Although these legal developments have been 
examined in Morgan’s monograph on Labour activism, and both Emsley and Morgan 
include references to the BUF in their research, an examination which places the 
fascist movement at the heart of a study of interwar public order law is critical if 
questions about the BUF’s relationship with the police and the judiciary are to be 
satisfactorily answered. Establishing a historico-legal investigation would help 
determine the attitude of the authorities and either defend or reject the contemporary 
concern that far-Right groups were treated more leniently than Left-wing groups. An 
analytical analysis of contemporary law, as well as developments in public order 
legislation and policing, would offer a greater understanding of the relationship 
between British fascist movements and the authorities. 
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Within mainstream historical study, John Tosh argued that legal history ‘arouses 
relatively little interest among historians at present’ but highlights that court records 
are ‘probably the single most important source’ for the social history of the medieval 
and early modern periods.101 This is because a vast majority of the population were 
illiterate and left no records. However, historians should also not neglect the value of 
legal history to twentieth century research. This thesis demonstrates the value of 
legal sources in gaining a critical understanding of attitudes of the Government, the 
police and the judiciary towards competing extreme political movements, and reveals 
that assumptions about institutional partiality among these bodies of authority are 
misplaced. Analysis of Statute and common law will offer an understanding of how 
the criminal justice system operated before the era of the BUF, and how the 
authorities used these existing powers to deal with the public order issues 
associated with political extremism. In addition to case law, other contemporary 
sources such as police reports, Home Office files and newspapers will contribute to 
the history of the BUF. Such a study also expands our understanding of the 
relationship between fascism, the police, the courts and the National Government. 
This is achieved by utilizing criminology and law, which have discipline specific 
theory and function, that will advance the historical perspectives of British fascism, 
political violence and public order law to create a valuable, critical and balanced 
account that will be a key addition to the existing historiography.  
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Chapter 2 
No Pasaran – “They shall not pass”1: Legal Responses to 
Public Processions 
 
I think there is no doubt that this disorder was largely due to the adoption of 
semi-military evolutions by the Fascists, their marching in formation, and their 
general behaviour, which was regarded by the crowd as provocative.2  
 
1) Introduction 
A dominant feature of the BUF’s propaganda campaign was the organisation of 
public processions which attracted media attention and advertised their political 
agenda to communities all over Britain. This method drew hostility from their political 
opponents and, as legislation was ill-equipped to deal with the disorder that this 
activity caused, police responses varied across the United Kingdom. Following 
widespread disorder in East London on 4 October 1936, as 100,000 ant-fascists took 
to the streets to prevent the BUF’s fourth anniversary march, the Government took 
action and the Public Order Act 1936 was passed, which gave the authorities wider 
powers to manage or prohibit public processions. 
The current historiography that analyses the legal challenge presented to the 
authorities by the public processions of the BUF has been led by Richard Thurlow 
and the collaborative work of Keith Ewing and Conner Gearty.3 Thurlow highlighted 
that under Home Office advice, the Metropolitan Police were more cautious in 
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policing the BUF than some provincial police forces. He argued that, despite the 
Home Office view that the police had no power to interfere with legal public 
processions, the interference of Chief Constables outside of the Metropolitan Police 
district had ‘only avoided legal setback because no one had challenged their 
instructions.’4 Therefore, it was this underestimation of the preventive powers of the 
police and the Home Office’s knowledge of Mosley’s legal ability and his dedication 
in defending his ‘rights’ that made them more cautious in their policing of his 
activism. In contrast Ewing and Gearty argued that the Home Office tolerated BUF 
activism and violence and supported the police who were, ‘prepared to go to 
considerable lengths to protect the freedom of the fascists.’5 They argued that the 
Government only took legislative action to prevent provocative fascist activism after 
the Battle of Cable Street because their ‘hand was forced by popular resistance.’6 
This chapter counters Ewing and Gearty’s notion that the Government were tolerant 
of fascist activism and the police were pro-fascist. Therefore, in order to illuminate 
the historical and legal context of these official responses to fascist processions in 
the 1930s, this chapter will identify and analyse the key legal developments and 
debates which preceded them. Firstly, the legal definitions of ‘public assembly’ and 
‘public procession’ are clarified and evaluated. Subsequently, Beatty v Gillbanks,7 
which established the first common law judgment regarding the freedom to organise 
public processions is analysed. The drafting of the Processions (Regulations) Bill 
1932, which was a response to the activities organised by the NUWM is then 
examined. Two years later, the Public Order Bill 1934 was drafted as a response to 
the continued activity of the NUWM, but it also reflected measures to eliminate the 
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escalating disorder caused by the BUF. Legislation was finally enacted two years 
later following an escalation of BUF related violence which included the Battle of 
Cable Street on 4 October 1936. The resulting s3 Public Order Act 1936 was 
mandated to counter the problem of disorder associated with public processions. 
The political debates which preceded this legislation are then assessed and the 
implications of the statute are analysed. Finally, the legacy of this Act in the 
immediate post-war era is evaluated with reference to Mosley’s Union Movement.  
By analysing the responses to public processions before the 1930s and in the post-
World War Two period, the facilitation or proscription of BUF activism can be seen as 
part of a wider narrative of inconsistent police action which reveals more about the 
nature of police discretion and the vagueness of the breach of the peace doctrine 
than arguments concerning political partiality. Furthermore, Government responses 
demonstrate an ebb and flow of commitment towards civil liberties which was largely 
dependent on the perceived threat to national security, yet by the post-war period 
this was eclipsed by a commitment to collective security.    
2) Legal Definitions 
2.1) Public Assembly 
 
By its nature a public procession is a form of public assembly, and is therefore 
subject to the same common law authority under the breach of the peace doctrine 
which regulates what would deem an assembly to be either lawful or unlawful. In 
Beatty v Gillbanks, Field J quotes Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown, s. 9: 
An unlawful assembly according to the common opinion is a disturbance of 
the peace by persons barely assembling together with the intention to do a 
thing which if it were executed would make them rioters, but neither actually 
executing it nor making a motion toward the execution of it… But this seems 
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to be much too narrow a definition. For any meeting whatever of great 
numbers of people, with such circumstances of terror as cannot but endanger 
the public peace and raise fears and jealousies among the king's subjects, 
seems properly to be called an unlawful assembly, as where great numbers, 
complaining of a common grievance, meet together, armed in a warlike 
manner, in order to consult together concerning the most proper means for 
the recovery of their interests; for no man can foresee what may be the event 
of such an assembly.8 
Under this definition, the threat of any potential disorder comes from within those 
assembled, placing an important emphasis on the purpose and conduct of the 
assembly itself in judging whether it should be considered either lawful or unlawful. 
Unless the conduct of the members of a public assembly violates any statutory law, 
then their assembly must be considered lawful. The freedom to assemble in public 
was not legally enshrined as a right before the Human Rights Act 1998 and the 
incorporation of the ECHR, but through the concept of residual freedom, people were 
at liberty to form public assemblies provided the conduct of its members remained 
lawful. No statutory law to restrict public assemblies existed until the Public Order 
Act 1986. Under s14 of this Act, the senior police officer can impose certain 
conditions upon public assemblies provided certain tests are met. 9  However, a 
procession is more than just an assembly of persons and further legal consideration 
of what constitutes a procession is necessary.  
2.3) Public Procession 
 
When debating the Party Processions (Ireland) Bill in the House of Commons in 
1832, the problem of defining party processions was highlighted by Tory MP Sir 
Robert Peel who stated, ‘we can tell well enough, in common parlance, what is the 
meaning of those words, but it would be extremely difficult to point out the meaning 
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 Cited by Field J, in Beatty v Gillbanks [1881-1882] LR 9 QBD 308, at 314, Hawkins' Pleas of the 
Crown (1716-1824). 
9
 See Introduction for legal definitions on ‘public assemblies’ and ‘breach of the peace’.  
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in an Act of Parliament.’10 The Party Processions (Ireland) Act 1832 was designed to 
eliminate the disorder caused by the escalating culture of parading which included 
the numerous Protestant processions of the Orange Order and Catholic processions 
of the Ribbonmen. These parades became a trigger for sectarian violence and the 
1832 Act carried the repressive measure of banning such processions. Although this 
Act did not definitively state what a procession was, it defined what type of 
procession could be prohibited. This included:  
‘any Body of Persons who shall meet and Parade together, or join in 
Procession, for the purpose of celebrating or commemorating any Festival, 
Anniversary or Political Event relating to or connected with and Religious 
distinction or difference, and who shall bear, wear, or have amongst them 
any Firearms or other offensive Weapon, or any Banner, Emblem, Flag or 
Symbol, the display whereof may be calculated or tend to provoke animosity 
between His Majesty’s Subjects of different Religious Persuasions, or who 
shall be accompanied by any Music of a like nature or tendency, shall be and 
be deemed an unlawful Assembly,’ 
 
This elaborate description was drafted in order to permit other innocent processions 
to proceed unaffected by the Act. When legislation was introduced to England, 
Wales and Scotland, to counteract the disorder caused by public processions, under 
the Public Order Act 1936, the definition provided was more general and far-
reaching. The definition of ‘public procession’ in s9 Public Order Act 1936 was 
unconstructively termed ‘a procession in a public place’. The same definition was 
again offered in s16 Public Order Act 1986. While further interpretation is given to 
‘public place’, no definition of ‘procession’ exists in statute. In legal terms, 
‘procession’ can therefore embrace an extensive range of conditions.11 At common 
law, there has been further debate on the definition of procession in relation to an 
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appeal by UM member Alfred Flockhart who was charged with organising a public 
procession during the duration of a s3(3) ban. This is discussed later in the chapter. 
With such a wide legal definition that incorporates any manner of people proceeding 
in orderly succession or moving along a route, processions can take the form of a 
ceremonial or military style march, a commemorative parade with music and 
banners, or a mobile demonstration or protest. It incorporates all political and 
religious organisations and movements as well as social groups and clubs. This wide 
ranging description has continued to cause controversy as regional bans on 
processions have also affected groups and clubs whose processions would not 
typically pose any threat to public order. This presents the question of whether it can 
be morally justified to ban all processions, rather than those likely to provoke 
disorder? 
3) Beatty v Gillbanks: A Common Law Solution to Regulating Processions?  
The Salvation Army was formed in 1865 by the former Methodist preacher William 
Booth, and is a protestant movement which was modelled on military lines with 
uniformed members receiving rank as either officer or soldier. With a musical band, 
they marched in formation playing music and singing Christian songs as they fought 
a moral crusade against alcohol, gambling and vice. In the early 1880s the Salvation 
Army’s activities came to prominence across Britain after many of their marches 
ended in violence following the organised disruption of the Skeleton Army. The 
Skeleton Army was a national movement which was often led in different 
communities by disgruntled landlords and brothel owners who were hostile towards 
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the Salvation Army’s crusade.12 In Beatty v Gillbanks, the Skeleton Army are simply 
described as, ‘another organized band of persons… who also parade the streets, 
and are antagonistic to the Salvation Army and its processions.’ 13  In November 
1882, the Bethnal Green Eastern Post reported that the Skeleton Army consisted of 
‘publicans, beersellers and butchers… [and] a large percentage of the most 
[consummate] loafers and unmitigated blackguards London can produce.’14 
In several regions the Justices of the Peace took the preventative measure of 
securing public order by prohibiting the processions of the Salvationists. One of the 
towns that issued a public notice signed by the Justices of the Peace was Weston-
super-Mare. Following a succession of violent incidents at Salvation Army 
processions the public notice stated that, ‘we do therefore hereby require, order, and 
direct all persons to abstain from assembling to the disturbance of the public peace 
in the public streets.’15  Despite the Justices’ public notice, William Beatty led a 
Salvation Army procession through the town’s public thoroughfares. After refusing a 
police sergeant’s order to disperse, Beatty was arrested and charged with ‘unlawfully 
and tumultuously assembling with diverse other persons… in a public thoroughfare… 
to the disturbance of the public peace, and against the peace of the Queen.’16 No 
statutory authority was stated at the Petty Sessions held at the Weston-super-Mare 
Town Hall, and the case hinged on the authority of the Justices’ public notice and the 
duty of the police to keep the peace. For the defence, Mr Sutherst ‘contended that 
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 The Salvation Army International Heritage Centre, 
http://www1.salvationarmy.org.uk/uki%5Cwww_uki_ihc.nsf/stc-vw-
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there had been a very gross violation of constitutional rights,’ and insisted that it was 
the duty of the police to protect the defendants during their procession. He continued 
by rejecting the legality of the public notice by stating, ‘The proclamation was so 
much waste paper’ and illustrated this by tearing the document into fragments. He 
continued, ‘if the magistrates convicted these men they would act in an exceedingly 
unconstitutional manner.’17 Nevertheless, the magistrates considered that the police 
did not exceed their duty but acted with a great amount of discretion. Beatty and 
others were ‘severally bound in their own recognizances, with two sureties, to keep 
the peace and be of good behaviour for the term of twelve calendar months, and in 
default to be imprisoned for three calendar months, or until they should comply with 
such order.’18 Following this conviction, Beatty and two other leaders of the Salvation 
Army were granted an appeal at the Queen’s Bench Division. 
The serious disturbances at Weston-super-Mare were not isolated. Opposition to the 
Salvationists’ marches from the Skeleton Army and local communities caused 
disorder across England and formed the basis of questions in the House of 
Commons to Sir William Harcourt, Liberal Home Secretary and former Solicitor 
General, on how to manage the increasing disturbances. Harcourt tentatively 
advised local magistrates to preserve the peace as they thought right, but highlighted 
that the issuing of proclamations to forbid processions had been successful in 
Exeter, Stamford, and Salisbury. However, he also ambiguously added: 
I may say that those people cannot be too strongly condemned who attack 
persons who are only meeting for a lawful and, I may say, laudable object; 
but, on the other hand, I cannot but condemn the imprudence of those who 
encourage these processions, which experience has shown must lead to 
disorder and violence.19 
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In one instance Harcourt’s advice was to prohibit processions if they were likely to 
cause a breach of the peace. Despite this, he then continued to defend those who 
met for a lawful and laudable object, and condemned those who attack the 
processions. This indecisiveness prompted a deriding letter to the Morning Post, 
signed by ‘One of the Stupid Party’20 urging Harcourt to clarify the position of the 
magistrates. The author enquired whether the magistrates should stop the 
processions, or allow them to continue and stop the roughs, questioning whether the 
Home Secretary only proposed ‘to declare the magistrates to be wrong whichever 
course they pursue?’21  
It is within this context of ambiguous Home Office advice regarding public 
processions that placed such importance on the outcome of Beatty v Gillbanks. At 
the Queen’s Bench Division, Field and Cave JJ, held that the appellants could not be 
rightly convicted of unlawful assembly as there was no authority for the proposition 
that, ‘a man may be convicted for doing a lawful act if he knows that his doing it may 
cause another to do an unlawful act.’22 Although this ruling seemed to have set a 
new legal precedent which potentially provided legal protection to lawful public 
assemblies, such as public meetings or processions, the vagueness of the judgment 
has been criticised by academic lawyers such as Harry Street who declared: 
The court did not make clear… whether they were laying down a general rule 
that if others committed the disturbance those who held the meeting were not 
guilty, or whether they merely found on the facts of the case that the accused 
                                               
20
 This was a sarcastic signature by an anonymous member of the Conservative Party. It refers to the 
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did not cause the disturbance because it was not the natural and probable 
consequence of their procession that the Skeleton Army should create the 
commotion.23 
In practice, subsequent judgments, such as Wise v Dunning24 in 1902, have taken 
further individual factors into consideration. George Wise was a Protestant lecturer in 
Liverpool whose speeches regularly caused an obstruction of the highway, as well 
as disorder between his own supporters and his Catholic opponents. It was 
recognised that he ‘used gestures and language which were highly insulting to the 
religion of the Roman Catholic inhabitants’ and on one occasion he told his 
supporters that the Catholics were going to bring sticks to the next meeting, thereby 
prompting his own supporters to reciprocate.25 Lord Alverstone CJ, citing Beatty v 
Gillbanks and R v Londonderry JJ,26 deduced that, ‘there must be an act of the 
defendant, the natural consequence of which, if his act be not unlawful in itself, 
would be to produce an unlawful act by other persons.’27 The ‘natural consequence’ 
element was clarified by Channell J: 
the law does not as a rule regard an illegal act as being the natural 
consequence of a temptation which may be held out to commit it… The 
proposition is correct and really familiar; but I think the cases with respect to 
apprehended breaches of the peace shew that the law does regard the 
infirmity of human temper to the extent of considering that a breach of the 
peace, although an illegal act, may be the natural consequence of insulting or 
abusive language or conduct.28 
Here, the acts of Wise and Beatty can be distinguished. Although the Salvation 
Army’s procession may have ended in violence, the disorder could not be judged to 
have been a natural consequence of the procession itself. In contrast, any disorder 
resulting from the insulting and abusive public lectures delivered by Wise and his 
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incitement to violence regarding the use of sticks must be considered as a natural 
consequence of these actions. This judgment strengthened the breach of the peace 
doctrine, recognising that public disorder could be the natural consequence of 
conduct or language that does not necessarily contradict any statutory law. 29 
Therefore, a public assembly does not become unlawful simply because some other 
body threatens to disturb it, but if it is considered that the natural consequence of an 
assembly is for it to incite disorder then its prohibition would be supported by the 
judiciary. Assessing whether disorder is the natural consequence of someone’s 
conduct is highly discretional which ultimately means that such judgments will often 
be inconsistent.  
In Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, which was last amended 
by the author in 1908, constitutional theorist, A V Dicey, defended the liberty of a 
group of people to assemble and process together in the public streets by stating:   
if the right of A to walk down the High Street is not effected by the threats 
of X, the right of A, B, and C to march down the High Street together is not 
diminished by the proclamation of X, Y, and Z that they will not suffer A, B, 
and C to take their walk.30  
Dicey advocated two limitations towards the freedom of A, B, and C to assemble in 
public. First, he stated that if the conduct of members assembled was in any way 
unlawful and provoked a breach of the peace then that would constitute an unlawful 
assembly; second, he stated that if the conduct of those assembled was lawful, but 
had provoked a breach of the peace, and the magistrates or constables decided that 
it was impossible to restore order by any other means, then they have the power to 
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disperse them and any failure of the crowd to disperse would then constitute an 
unlawful assembly.  
The first limitation requires further clarification. For example, what statutory offence 
may be violated by the members of an assembly to make it unlawful? Although 
riotous and tumultuous behaviour of members of an assembly would deem it 
unlawful, the authorities have also frequently utilised statutes relating to the 
obstruction of the highways to supress processions that are otherwise law abiding.  
4) Obstruction of the Highway: The use of Existing Legislation to Regulate 
Processions 
Since Beatty v Gillbanks, the authorities frequently regulated public processions by 
invoking legislation such as s72 Highway Act 1835 and s28 Town Police Clauses Act 
1847. These provisions both deal with the wilful obstruction of the passage of 
footways or public thoroughfares, yet they were enacted to prevent obstruction 
caused by livestock, carts or carriages.  
The powers relating to processions addressed in s21 Town Police Clauses Act 1847 
provide that: 
The commissioners may from time to time make orders … for preventing 
obstruction of the streets within the limits of the special Act in all times of 
public processions, rejoicings, or illuminations, and in any case when the 
streets are thronged or liable to be obstructed,  
A deputation between the Manchester Watch Committee and the Home Office in 
1936 revealed that powers relating to the regulation of processions in s213 
Manchester Police Act 1944 (a counterpart of the provisions in s21 Town Police 
Clauses Act 1847 and s52 Metropolitan Police Act 1839) were ‘not so valuable as 
they may on the surface appear to be.’ The deputation’s resulting memorandum 
declared that the experience of the police authority was that there was ‘often some 
84 
 
attempt on the part of the promoters of the procession to disregard the regulations 
laid down.’31 It has also been highlighted by Ewing and Gearty that these provisions 
were more concerned with keeping the thoroughfares clear than with political 
protest.32 As these provisions could be utilised against public assemblies, they were 
equally effective when directed to disperse or prohibit either public processions or 
public meetings.   
The danger of selective law enforcement is highlighted by such legislative measures 
relating to obstruction of the highway being regularly invoked to disperse socialist 
meetings. An early example of a prosecution was of W B Barker, who appeared at 
Thames Police Court, London, in 1885. He was charged with ‘causing an obstruction 
by addressing a crowd of persons in a public street’, and in reply claimed that, ‘it was 
the right of every Englishman to speak in a public street.’ 33  The application of 
ambiguous or inappropriate statutory powers that infringe the liberty of the subject 
created the danger that they would be inconsistently applied, which effectively 
provided opportunities for the police to exercise political partiality and selectively 
enforce the law. The magistrates at Thames Police Court even demonstrated such 
bias as they declared the socialist defendant was ‘preaching a very mischievous 
doctrine’ despite the fact that he was not on trial for what he said, but for the 
obstruction that he caused.  
In 1886, Llewellyn Atherley-Jones, a radical Liberal MP and son of the prominent 
Chartist Ernest Jones, questioned the Home Secretary on the recent prosecutions of 
socialist lecturers for the alleged obstruction of certain streets in London. The 
Conservative Home Secretary, Henry Matthews, responded that the Home Office 
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had not given any special instruction to the police regarding meetings in the street 
and that the ‘instructions of the Chief Commissioner seem to me to be quite proper 
and in accordance with the law’.34 The police had therefore found a legal, albeit 
questionable, method of maintaining public order regarding ‘lawful’ public 
assemblies. Although, as such powers were not specifically directed towards 
maintaining public order at public assemblies, they were highly discretional and 
susceptible to selective utilization. 
5) Responses to the Processions of the Far-Left 
5.1) The Emergency Powers Act 1920 
 
The rise of far-Left activism in the period following the First World War presented a 
significant challenge to public order and national security. One of the first peace time 
reactions to this threat was the Emergency Powers Act 1920 which authorises the 
proclamation of a state of emergency if: 
at any time it appears to His Majesty that any action has been taken or is 
immediately threatened by any persons or body of persons of such a nature 
and on so extensive a scale as to be calculated, by interfering with the supply 
and distribution of food, water, fuel, or light, or with the means of locomotion, 
to deprive the community, or any substantial portion of the community, of the 
essentials of life,  
The proclamation could remain in force for one month and another proclamation 
would need to be issued to extend the state of emergency. Following the 
proclamation being made, s2 provides that ‘it shall be lawful for His Majesty in 
Council, by Order, to make regulations for securing the essentials of life to the 
community’. Richard Thurlow asserted that the use of this state power, which could 
‘censor news, direct labour, detain or restrict movement of individuals without due 
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process of law’, represented the real ‘extremism of the centre’. 35  Among the 
regulations that suppressed civil liberties and political freedom was Emergency 
Regulation 22, which provided chiefs of police with the power ‘to prohibit meetings 
and marches with the approval of the Home Secretary if they feared disorder would 
arise’.36 This power found favour from Metropolitan Police Commissioner William 
Horwood in 1926, after the Emergency Powers had been in force during the General 
Strike. In a letter to the Home Secretary, he argued that this power should be 
embodied in the general law.37 This law provided the police with wide discretion to 
prohibit political activism on the basis of an anticipated breach of the peace. These 
wide powers were naturally opposed by the political Left. Labour MPs Ernest Thurtle, 
David Grenfell, James Hudson, John Bromley and Henry Thomas all advocated for 
the removal of Regulation 22 in Parliament in May 1926.38 Thurtle’s attack on the 
Regulation was also accompanied by a condemning evaluation of the magistrates by 
challenging their political partiality: 
the magistrates are drawn from political parties hostile to the Labour Party, 
and… it is inevitable that their political prejudice or partisanship will come into 
play and they will deliberately make use of the power conferred upon them by 
this regulation to prevent perfectly legitimate Labour and Socialist meetings 
and processions.39 
The motion to delete Regulation 22 from the enforcement of the Emergency Powers 
Act during the 1926 General Strike was easily defeated with only 89 votes in favour 
and 299 against.40 
5.2) The Hunger Marchers 
 
                                               
35
 Thurlow, The Secret State, p. 9. 
36
 Morgan, Conflict, p. 254. 
37
 Ibid. Referenced from HO 144/8014/49455/14, ‘Commissioner of Metropolitan Police to Home 
Secretary, 8 Oct 1926.’ 
38
 HC Deb 06 May 1926 vol 195 cc453-597, 507-8, 516, 540-1. 
39
 Ibid. at c508. 
40
 Ibid. at 550. 
87 
 
In addition to other Left wing activism, the NUWM organised a series of hunger 
marches around Britain. The NUWM, which was formed in 1921, was not a political 
organisation but members of the CPGB played a prominent role in its administration. 
Their first national march was staged in 1922 when the British unemployed from 
cities as far apart as Glasgow and Plymouth marched to London and requested a 
deputation with the Conservative Prime Minister Bonar Law. The largely 
Conservative press had first ignored the marches, but as the processions 
approached London, NUWM organiser Wal Hannington recalled, ‘the whole of the 
capitalist press became hysterical, and news columns were filled with scare articles 
about “Secret meetings of the marchers,” “Bolshevik gold,” “Firebrand leaders,” and 
so on’. He continued to recall an article from the Pall Mall Gazette entitled ‘The Red 
Plot’ in which, ‘The marchers were accused of bearing firearms, and the leaders 
were made out to be rogues and scoundrels of the worst type, and of course, in the 
pay of Bolshevik Russia.’41  
An example of how disorder was sparked occurred during the fourth national hunger 
march in October 1932. 100,000 demonstrators descended on Hyde Park, London, 
the number of police on duty was 2,600, including 136 mounted police and 750 
special constables. The hostile hunger marchers at the Marble Arch end of Hyde 
Park were reported to have been abusive to the special constables stationed by the 
gates. Accounts state that the special constables became resentful to ‘the general 
attitude of the rabble’ and struck out at them with their batons. Unable to then hold 
their position the special constables were supported by a mounted baton charge.42 
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Two independent observers43 recorded that the unemployed were booing the police 
but that there was no sign of disorder or disturbance. They declared that ‘People 
were forced to run for their lives in order to escape being trampled upon by the police 
horses or beaten by staves.’44 17 arrests had taken place and Hannington claimed 
that there was a general impression within the press that the fighting at Hyde Park 
and another incident at Trafalgar had been caused by the special constables. Even 
the Police Review stated:  
An excellent fellowship exists, [between the constable and the special] but 
there is a feeling that in this difficult time the appearance of the special is 
calculated to cause trouble rather than avoid it. At the meetings and hunger 
marches, the special is an irritant, rather than an antiseptic. 
This striking admission regarding the defectiveness of the special constables and a 
retrospective analysis of the cause of disorder during this incident demonstrates that 
the hunger marchers were not necessarily the instigators of violent clashes between 
themselves and the police. Historian Jane Morgan argued that the police’s statutory 
powers relating to public processions were weak and their methods may have been 
found to have had no legal basis if they were contested in court. She stated that 
although they could deal with disorder, they could not do so beforehand and could 
only act when disorder arose. Additionally, when the behaviour of the marchers was 
not riotous, there was difficulty in proving it to be an unlawful assembly.45 This led 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner Lord Trenchard to write to the Home Secretary 
declaring: 
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I consider that there is a very reasonable case for prohibiting all processions 
(other than ceremonial processions, the Lord Mayor’s show etc.) in the 
central area at any rate on all days but Saturday and Sunday.46    
This demonstrates that Trenchard believed that the limits of his discretion in dealing 
with public processions did not extend to the preventive power of proscription and he 
used his influence to persuade the Home Secretary that new legislation was needed. 
Furthermore, Morgan’s assessment of the uncertain legal capacity to regulate or 
proscribe public processions in the period before the Public Order Act supports 
Thurlow’s belief that the Home Office were more cautious when managing with the 
BUF’s activism because of Mosley’s ability to mount a legal challenge to oppressive 
or unlawful police tactics.47 However, the shortcomings of legislative powers relating 
to public processions were considered before the era of the BUF and were 
significantly considered in response to the NUWM.  
 
5.3) The Processions (Regulations) Bill 1932 
 
The frequent disorder, and sporadic fighting that broke out between the hunger 
marchers and the police, prompted the drafting of the Processions (Regulations) Bill 
1932. The Bill was drafted by representatives of the Home Office, the Director of 
Public Prosecutions, representatives of the Scottish Office, the Ministry of Health, the 
Ministry of Labour, and the Metropolitan Police Commissioner. These records reveal 
the Cabinet Committee’s debates and several drafts of the proposed Bill. 
Clause 1 was directed to supress the national hunger marches of the NUWM. It 
provided that: 
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If the Secretary of State is satisfied that arrangements are about to be made, 
or are being made, or have been made, for concentrating persons outside the 
areas in which they ordinarily reside, or for causing persons to go in 
procession to any place outside the area in which they ordinarily reside, and 
that the concentration or procession is likely to result – (a) in serious disorder; 
or (b) in such abnormal demands being made upon poor law authorities as to 
cause serious derangement in the administration of public assistance, he 
may by order prohibit the concentration or procession; and, accordingly, any 
concentration or procession so prohibited shall be unlawful. 48  
The implications of clause 1 were more extensive than just supressing the hunger 
marches and it potentially provided the authorities with far reaching powers to 
prohibit any public assembly in which a breach of the peace could be anticipated, or 
participants travelled to outside their normal area of residence to take part.   
Clause 2 provided local police authorities with the power to temporarily ban either all 
processions or selected processions, following a successful application to the 
Secretary of State. The Home Office Memorandum which accompanied the 
Processions (Regulations) Bill, authored by Permanent Under Secretary of State for 
the Home Office Sir Russell Scott, recognised that the power to prohibit particular 
processions could potentially be criticised for unfair discrimination on political 
grounds. Despite this, Scott declared, ‘if no action were possible short of total 
prohibition of all processions, even the most innocent, the power would be so drastic 
as to restrict its use within unnecessarily narrow limits, and its usefulness would be 
seriously impaired.’49  
The draft Bill demonstrated the dangerous escalation of legal powers that the Home 
Office were prepared to take in order to prohibit a recurrence of the hunger marches. 
It was also admitted in the Memorandum that there was an opportunity in the drafting 
of new legislation, to not just counter the problem faced by the hunger marchers, ‘but 
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also with the control of processions in London itself and in other populous areas.’50  
Such provisions as those mentioned in clauses 1 and 2 had the potential to curtail 
civil liberty, but would also have been open to political abuse, discrimination and 
selective enforcement. Of those involved in its drafting, only the representative from 
the Ministry of Labour had voiced concerns whether such legislation would be either 
practical or effective. The Attorney General declared that the prohibition of 
processions by the Secretary of State would lead to ‘intolerable political difficulty’ and 
suggested that the existing law regarding processions was already adequate. In 
consideration of the laws regarding the obstruction of the highways, he declared that 
‘Any new powers to grant or refuse orders for processions should be taken on traffic 
grounds alone.’51 In December, 1932, the Cabinet decided that ‘further legislative 
measures should not be contemplated until an extended trial had been given to the 
method of asking courts of summary jurisdiction to bind over the organisers 
beforehand.’52  
This tactic was utilised the same month as NUWM organizers Tom Mann and 
Emrhys Llewellyn were bound over  to keep the peace and be of good behaviour in 
order to prevent an attempted deputation with the Prime minister. At Bow Street 
Police Court on 17 December 1932, prosecuting on behalf of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions, Mr Wallace recited letters sent from Llewellyn to the Prime Minister 
and several articles from the Daily Worker which, ‘showed clearly that a mass 
meeting was to take place to enforce the receiving of the deputation mentioned.’53 
The prosecutor cited s23 Seditious Meetings Act 1817, which prohibited meetings of 
50 persons or more within a mile of Westminster Hall when Parliament was sitting, 
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demonstrating that the meeting promoted by the NUWM would be illegal. 
Furthermore, other NUWM activity had also caused concern for the authorities over 
the legality of their activism.  
The month before Mann and Llewellyn were bound over, Sid Elias of the NUWM was 
sentenced to two years imprisonment for unlawfully soliciting and inciting Llewellyn 
and Hannington ‘to cause discontent, dissatisfaction, and ill-will between different 
classes of His Majesty’s subjects and to create public disturbances against the 
peace.’54 The letter, which Elias had sent from Moscow, contained instructions to 
Llewellyn and Hannington promoting different courses of agitation and activism. 
Additionally, although the special police were in part culpable of some of the disorder 
at the NUWM demonstration in Hyde Park on the 28 October, this did not mean that 
the authorities took the view that the demonstrators were entirely innocent. Many 
media reports of the disorder mention incidents of stones, mud and coal being 
thrown from different parts of the crowd which smashed shop windows and struck 
police vehicles. There were also accounts of several crowd surges from the 
demonstrators which were reported to have crushed female shoppers.55 Moreover, 
reports from Special Branch informants had revealed that the marchers were 
encouraged to make the march ‘as spectacular as possible [with] as many clashes 
with the police as possible’. The march leaders also advocated that they should 
create disturbances at Public Assistant Committees, at the Houses of Parliament 
and at embassies, and to create ‘as much trouble as possible for the police’. In 
addition, it was instructed that ‘trade union banners [were] to be used at 
demonstrations and then used in open conflict with the police.’56 The evidence here 
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suggests that activists from the NUWM had recently and willfully engaged in disorder 
and were encouraged to do so by their leaders. In consideration of this, the 
authorities’ anticipation of further disorder may not have been so questionable. 
Despite the recent NUWM disorder, Mann and Llewellyn still wanted to present the 
petition to Parliament. In anticipating further potential disorder, but this time in the 
form of an unlawful assembly outside Parliament, the magistrate Sir Chartres Biron 
‘ordered both defendants to be bound over in their own recognisances in £200, and 
to find two sureties in £100 each to keep the peace and be of good behaviour for 
twelve months.’ They refused and were each imprisoned for two months.57 Here, the 
actions of the Home Office and the magistrates demonstrate the extent of their 
discretion in preventing an anticipated breach of the peace. Scholars such as Ewing 
and Gearty keenly identified the injustice to Mann and Llewellyn while dismissing 
elements of the legal argument used against them in an effort to prove that the 
National Government’s intension was to imprison the four leaders of the NUWM as 
they were losing patience with the hunger marchers.58  
The Home Secretary defended the action by stating:  
I believe that we were within our rights, that what we did was calculated to 
cause less disturbance—it was done for that reason and that reason alone—
and that these men could have given the undertaking, which was no 
outrageous undertaking and one which they could have given without any 
dereliction of their position, without giving away any right of proper free 
speech or attendance at political meetings. They refused to do it, and they 
have suffered the consequences.59 
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This defence needs to be questioned on two counts. Were the powers used 
consistent with other binding over orders? And, were the authorities concern for a 
potential breach of the peace legitimate?  
The binding over of Mann and Llewellyn was partially consistent with Wise v Dunning 
and Lansbury v Riley.60 In each of these cases, the binding over order was issued 
against speakers who had encouraged violence or illegal behaviour. Wise, as 
discussed above, had encouraged his supporters to bring sticks to the next meeting 
in anticipation that his Roman Catholic opponents would also bring weapons. While 
campaigning for female suffrage in 1913, George Lansbury, who had resigned his 
Labour seat in 1912, advocated that the suffragettes continued to use militancy and 
tactics which involved breaking the law. Where these differed from the Mann and 
Llewellyn’s binding over, is that it was not proved that Mann and Llewellyn were 
involved with the previous disorder or of advocating it. Here, it was their association 
with the NUWM that gave cause for the magistrate to anticipate that their actions 
would result in a breach of the peace and why sureties were deemed necessary. 
While this point seems particularly oppressive, it must be remembered that the 
‘power to bind over a person before the court to keep the peace or to be of good 
behaviour does not depend on a conviction’.61 As a form of preventive justice, it is 
employed to prevent breaches of the peace rather than to serve as a punishment. 
However, Harry Street stressed that the requirement to enter into recognizance and 
find sureties can indeed be a punishment in itself, especially in the case of Lansbury 
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who was unable to pay the sums fixed by the magistrate and in default of paying, 
was imprisoned for three months.62  
Whether Mann and Llewellyn were victimized because of their political allegiances or 
because of a potentially exaggerated fear of disorder, their martyrdom gave their 
cause great publicity. Including the other arrests of Hannington and Elias, historian 
Peter Kingsford reflected that the trials aroused middle-class Labour sympathisers 
and the conflicts had ‘contributed to a three day debate on unemployment and the 
Government had made a concession with meaning for many unemployed.’63  It was 
just fifteen months till the next national hunger march, but this time the NUWM 
discarded their former communist slogan of ‘Class against Class’, and attempted to 
create a ‘People’s Front’ in opposition to the rise of European fascism. Although the 
Labour Party and the Trade Unions ignored this call for unity, they successfully 
harnessed the support of the ILP. The Home Secretary claimed that it was because 
of the support of four MPs that the 1934 hunger march differed from the previous 
one. This is reflected in subsequent policing of the 1934 and 1936 hunger Marches 
as they were stated to have acted with ‘more restraint’.64  Even Lord Trenchard 
commented in 1936 that the ‘meetings were in every case orderly and the conduct of 
the unemployed marchers beyond reproach.’65  
It was against this backdrop of violent clashes between hunger marchers and the 
police, the selective application of the Highway Act 1835, and the ambiguous 
interpretations of the common law authority of Beatty and Wise, that members of the 
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BUF donned their Blackshirts and began a propaganda campaign marching in the 
streets of towns and cities across Britain. 
6) The Marching Blackshirts 
As a newly formed political movement in 1932, Sir Oswald Mosley’s BUF aspired to 
convey the new radical doctrine of fascism to the people of Great Britain via various 
propaganda techniques. During their public processions, members paraded in tight 
formation wearing the Blackshirt uniform which gave the appearance of a military 
styled march. The displaying of banners and the inclusion of a musical band were 
also incorporated in some BUF processions. The importance of effective propaganda 
methods to the contemporary democratic system was highlighted by jurist Ivor 
Jennings in 1937. With a newly franchised electorate, Jennings declared that Burke’s 
doctrine of representative government was no longer adequate and that publicity 
was essential to true democracy. Nonetheless, he continued to state that, as the 
press and newsreel companies were essentially partial, old forms of political 
propaganda such as the public street corner meeting, which was instrumental in the 
rise of socialism, held a cardinal position in democratic government. Moreover, the 
techniques of publicising such meetings to ensure the largest audience were also 
imperative. 66 In a similar practice to the Salvation Army, the BUF processions were a 
particularly effective technique of gathering an audience and gaining the movement 
extensive publicity, yet the military character and appearance of the Blackshirts 
caused concern over the legality of their processions. 
Although the precedent set by Beatty v Gillbanks may have reinforced the liberty of 
the fascists to organise processions in public places, the judgment of Wise v 
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Dunning added a further dimension to powers relating to the preservation of the 
peace. The Blackshirt processions frequently attracted hostile opposition, but it is 
necessary to question whether or not the resulting disorder was the ‘natural 
consequence’ of the BUF’s actions. At common law, this consideration would 
ultimately determine if the judgment of Beatty or Wise should be adopted and 
whether the BUF should be permitted the liberty to organise public processions.  
As members of the BUF were under strict orders to stay within the law and obey the 
police, the disorder that resulted from their processions was usually instigated by 
their political opponents, drawing a similarity with the Salvation Army marches and 
Beatty v Gillbanks. Conversely, when considering the Blackshirts’ reputation for 
violence and brutality, their praise and emulation of European fascist regimes, their 
aggressive anti-communist policy, and the adoption of an open anti-Semitic policy 
from late 1934, the level of confrontational opposition to them must be measured in 
the context of Wise v Dunning. Therefore, it must be considered whether the 
disorder at BUF processions was the natural consequence of the provocation 
presented by the fascists or not.  
An early example of a large Blackshirt procession occurred in July 1933, when 1,000 
members of the BUF, including over 100 female fascists, marched through the West 
End of London. The procession, which was headed by a band and a standard bearer 
carrying the Union Jack, was for recruitment purposes and was witnessed by 
thousands of people. It was reported that a detachment of police accompanied the 
procession and there was no interference or obstruction. Mosley declared that the 
march would be followed by others in all the great cities of England.67 An adequate 
police presence at such events was a necessary public order measure, yet the duty 
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of the police to preserve order at fascist activities, which would involve protecting 
fascists from attack or interference, could ultimately be perceived or criticised as pro-
fascist policing, rather than preserving public order. 
6.1) The ‘Battle of Stockton’ in 1933 
 
In September 1933, the BUF had organised a procession at Stockton-on-Tees which 
was preceded by an outdoor BUF meeting that had attracted hostile opposition. 
Blackshirt stewards had attempted to remove some hecklers which resulted in a 
brawl. Their actions had incensed the audience, and during the evening the crowd 
grew to consist of approximately 3,000 people. The hecklers were reported to be 
mainly communists and members of the NUWM. Order was briefly restored by seven 
police officers, but as the situation remained unstable, the police requested that the 
speaker, Captain Collier, close the meeting. Collier reflected the fascist leaderships’ 
attitudes in adhering to police instruction and closed the meeting. This view was 
subsequently reproduced in an interview with the Northern Echo as he stated that, 
‘the Fascists were determined to obey law and order and help the police as much as 
possible.’68  
During the 70-80 man procession back to BUF headquarters, escorted by the police 
who had cleared a way through the crowd, several Blackshirts broke ranks and 
attacked those who had been hostile. The crowd retaliated and Blackshirts were 
chased in different directions, several melees ensued within a space of 300 yards. 
The report of the Chief Constable of the Durham County Constabulary declared that, 
‘The Fascists appeared to be keen on fighting and we had to give them a sharp 
reminder to get moving and get away out of the town before any further damage was 
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done.’69 The police then proceeded to escort them away from the hostile crowd, 
which had completely blocked all traffic, taking them to Thornbury and arranging for 
their buses to pick them up from there. The police report does not describe the 
extent of the violence in detail, except to say that one fascist was ‘slightly injured 
about the head’ and received hospital treatment and other injuries reported from the 
crowd were bruises to the face consistent with being struck by bare fists. The press 
reports were more theatrical. The Northern Echo described how several of the 
Blackshirts carried one of their wounded during their procession and suggested that 
more disorder would have resulted if they wanted to ‘retaliate in sympathy with the 
injured man’.70 Other details also emerged through the press, which detailed how the 
Blackshirts were spat at, attacked with staves, sticks and pick axe handles, and 
bombarded by bricks and potatoes studded with razor blades. One of the injured 
Blackshirts, Edmund Warburton, was also said to have lost the sight in one eye after 
being struck by a rock. 71  The recording of the events at Stockton-on-Tees 
dramatically change between the police reports and the local press coverage. The 
police were naturally keen to demonstrate that they competently and successfully 
handled a difficult situation, while the press were keen to sell papers and 
sensationalise the events. While the reality may lie somewhere in the middle of these 
accounts, local contemporary accounts of the ‘Battle of Stockton’ ardently subscribe 
to the more violent version in order to demonstrate the local residents’ rejection of 
fascism and the event itself is remembered as a precursor to the more famous Battle 
of Cable Street.72    
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Nevertheless, despite the skirmishes that undoubtedly occurred, the relatively few 
injuries that were recorded suggests that the Durham County Police had prevented 
serious disorder in difficult circumstances by closing the BUF meeting and escorting 
them out of the town. However, no arrests were made and the fascist retaliation 
towards their hecklers, as well as the violent actions of the anti-fascists, remained 
unpunished. The police report makes it clear that the fascists were accountable for 
the start of the disorder and emphasised that the BUF members were drawn from 
various neighbouring districts and counties. The discretion used by the leading 
officer reflected the greater need to restore order at the expense of making arrests. 
This decision to quickly escort the Blackshirts out of the town, rather than evoking 
the full extent of the law and apprehending those on either side that had committed a 
criminal offence, was further helped as there were initially only seven police officers 
on duty at the time who had to react to a crowd of 2,000-3,000 people who were 
hostile to the BUF.   
6.2) The Debate on the use of the Unlawful Drilling Act 1819 
 
In the House of Commons in May, 1933, Labour MP David Grenfell asked the Home 
Secretary, Sir John Gilmour, if he could share any information on organisations 
which were drilling adult males on semi-military lines. Gilmour refused to name any 
organisation stating that:  
unauthorised meetings of persons for the purpose of being trained or of 
practising military exercises are prohibited by law and I have no reason to 
suppose that appropriate action under the provisions of the Unlawful Drilling 
Act, 1819, will not be taken should occasion arise.73  
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Grenfell’s question was a blatant allusion to the BUF’s uniformed processions. In 
response, an article in the Blackshirt stated that the BUF were well aware of the 
1819 Act and stated that, it was: 
frequently impressed on all organisers the necessity of adhering to pure 
physical training, and of never in any sense stepping outside these limits... 
[adding] Demonstration marching, or practice in such marching, is in no way 
practising military exercises’.74  
The difficulty of mounting a prosecution under the Act was highlighted by Gilmour 
who stated that, ‘It is difficult to say when physical exercises are really drilling or not. 
The law is directed against military training.’75 
In the spring of 1934, the question of the BUF’s quasi-military appearance was 
deliberated by Sir John Gilmour. The necessity to deal with the issue was exposed 
following violence at a BUF meeting and procession in Bristol in April 1934. Gilmour 
stated that,  
I think there is no doubt that this disorder was largely due to the adoption of 
semi-military evolutions by the Fascists, their marching in formation, and their 
general behaviour, which was regarded by the crowd as provocative.76 
Following the Home Secretary’s comments on the disorder, Sir Oswald Mosley wrote 
to Gilmour asking him to clarify how the BUF were provocative. He continued to state 
that the only violence that he was aware of was when ‘two negroes attempted to 
attack me and were knocked down by Fascists. One of these men carried and raised 
a knife in his hand.’ Regarding Gilmour’s accusation towards the military character of 
the BUF, Mosley declared that, ‘To march in column of three is not a ‘semi-military 
evolution,’ and the right to march in procession is clearly permissible under the law of 
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this country.’77 In Gilmour’s reply, he stated that such an attack with a knife on 
Mosley was not witnessed by any police officer but it was reported that one: 
half-caste Communist… protested to the Fascists, as they marched away 
from the hall, against the way in which some of his associates had been 
treated at the meeting, but no assault or threat with a knife by him was 
observed by the police.  
On Mosley’s explanation that marching in formation was necessary to protect 
individual known fascists from attack, Gilmour candidly suggested that ‘if members of 
the British Union of Fascists did not wear a uniform they would not be ‘well known to 
be Fascists’’78  
 
Figure 2.1 Showing an example of a uniformed BUF march being witnessed 
by the public.79 
 
Processions do offer greater physical protection for political activists as there is 
safety in numbers and such events usually have a large police presence. Their true 
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value is the publicity and spectacle that they create (illustrated in figure 2.1). A 
uniformed march is even more effective, psychologically, on both the participant and 
the spectator. Jennings asserted that uniforms create a feeling of security to those 
that wear them, and feelings of insecurity in those who see them, claiming that both 
ingredients are necessary for the establishment of a dictatorship.80 
With no effective legal means to prohibit demonstrations, it became the duty of the 
police to maintain public order by regulating processions to prevent obstruction and 
preserve the peace. This was achieved by relying principally on s72 Highways Act 
1835, s52 Metropolitan Police Act 1839 (or s21 Town Police Clauses Act 1847) and 
the breach of the peace doctrine. However, when utilizing breach of the peace 
powers, it is required to prove that disorder had been either actual or imminent as 
discussed in Chapter 1. Therefore, a large police presence at BUF meetings and 
processions became a necessary police tactic to preserve order considering the 
hostile and organised disruption their activities provoked. A major problem with this 
police tactic was the appearance that they were protecting the Blackshirts. This was 
reflected at the highest level by Trenchard who, in a letter to the Home Office, 
demonstrated his desire for ‘doing away with the Fascists’: 
The large number of police which it has been found necessary to employ to 
keep the peace at Fascist demonstrations is creating the impression among 
anti-Fascists that Sir Oswald Mosley’s semi-military organisation is being 
permitted to develop under police protection.81  
 
6.3) The Blackshirts March to the Albert Hall, 1934 
 
In 1934, a strong police presence was assembled when the BUF planned a public 
meeting at the Albert Hall. The meeting took place on 28 October, and police 
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preparations included regulating the Blackshirt procession to the meeting. Police 
duties included stationing police officers inside the Albert Hall where an estimated 
6,000 audience members were present, keeping order outside the Hall where 
between 300-600 anti-fascists staged a protest, and monitoring a meeting at Hyde 
Park, where the Co-ordinating Committee of Anti-Fascist Activities lectured to 1,200 
audience members. The BUF march to the Albert Hall was estimated to have 
consisted of 1,200 Blackshirts.82 More than 1,000 police were on duty that evening, 
which included a detachment of two inspectors, five police sergeants, 100 police 
constables, one mounted inspector and ten mounted officers to accompany the 
Blackshirt procession. Other duties included the forming of cordons around the 
Albert Hall to exclude the passage of all but ticket holders, fascists and residents. 
The police on duty here included five inspectors, 12 police sergeants, 170 police 
constables, one mounted inspector and 10 mounted officers. The police operation 
was considered to have been sufficient in the Special Branch summary which stated 
that there were just three arrests, no serious disorder and advocated that police 
arrangements everywhere were adequate.83  
The police report for the BUF meeting at the Albert Hall on the 28 October revealed 
that the CPGB and other unnamed anti-fascist organisations disagreed with what 
methods should be employed to demonstrate their opposition. It stated: 
Springhall, the London organiser, wished to employ force, some were in 
favour of a peaceful demonstration, whilst others considered that the Fascist 
movement was not making progress, and a counter demonstration would 
help the British Union of Fascists by giving more publicity to their aims.84 
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The combined anti-fascist organisations planned a meeting in Trafalgar Square to 
protest against the Incitement to Disaffection Bill85 under the auspices of the NCCL, 
but further plans to march a poster parade past the Albert Hall, and for a meeting to 
be held at Alexandra Gate, Hyde Park, had to be abandoned. Lord Trenchard 
informed the organisers that the demonstration could not be held in that part of Hyde 
Park and that no procession could be permitted within a half a mile radius of the 
Albert Hall.86  There is no mention in the report whether these instructions were 
issued by statutory provision or common law. Legislation that could be applied to 
processions of people, such as s52 Metropolitan Police Act 183987 may offer some 
validation for his orders, yet as the procession and meeting were restricted from 
taking place within a half a mile radius of the Albert Hall, and this provision is limited 
to preventing obstruction, such an action would be disproportionate. If the common 
law duty to prevent a breach of the peace was employed, Trenchard’s strategy also 
seemed extreme, as such orders should only be applied when disorder was 
imminent. The Commissioner’s authoritarian approach to managing public order also 
came under criticism from the NCCL when he prohibited all meetings or 
demonstration of unemployed persons from taking place near Labour Exchanges. 
When challenged by Kidd on what authority Trenchard issued these instructions, the 
Commissioner replied that he did not, ‘regard it as part of his duty to discuss with the 
Council for Civil Liberties the propriety of the measure or its legal sanction.’88  
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6.4) The Public Order Bill 1934 
 
Throughout 1934 there was significant Blackshirt activity and widespread disorder 
across the country. The increasing rate of fascist-related disorder contributed 
towards the discussion of new legislation. In July 1934 the Home Secretary debated 
the existing public order law with the Chief Constables of England and Wales. In his 
resulting memorandum for the preservation of public order, Gilmour recorded that 
the Chief Constables were practically unanimous in their desire to see: 
that the police should be given the power to prohibit processions which are 
likely to lead to a breach of the peace or to intimidate other persons, and to 
regulate the route of processions so as to prevent undue interference with 
traffic.89  
Although, under the Town Police Clauses Act 1847, this power was available to the 
magistrates and local authorities, the Chief Constables stressed that for public order 
to be kept effectively these functions should be held by the police. At this time the 
Home Office were already becoming aware that the standing joint committees and 
watch committees in some areas were becoming politically unreliable. It has been 
importantly stated by Chris Williams that during this period the rising influence of the 
Labour Party in local government had already ‘led to an increase in political battles 
between police authorities and their chiefs.’90 The interwar period was a critical time 
regarding the independence of the local police authorities and the Home Office’s 
battle for centralisation. The period saw a change in definitions used by the Home 
Office which was highlighted by Permanent Secretary Sir John Anderson who stated 
in 1928 that ‘the policeman is nobody’s servant… He executes a public office under 
the Law’.91  Therefore, the Chief Constables request for local autonomy in regards to 
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regulating processions found favour from the Home Office and this was reflected in 
the drafting of the new Bill.   
By October 1934, the Public Order Bill 1934 92  was drafted but, as with the 
Processions (Regulations) Bill 1932, it did not reach Parliament. The discussion of 
the committee that drafted the proposed Bill does, however, reveal the steps that 
they were willing to take to maintain public order to the detriment of civil liberty. In 
addition to this, the Bill also neglected the local authorities and the provisions 
provided the Secretary of State and the Chief Constables with wide-reaching powers.  
Clause 3 of the draft Bill proposed a wide increase in the powers of the Secretary of 
State, who would be able to prohibit processions or concentrations of people if he 
was satisfied that they may either lead to serious disorder or create abnormal 
demands on the poor law authorities. Such a prohibition would make the procession 
unlawful and those taking part would be guilty of an offence.93 Interestingly, this 
clause replicated clause 1 of the failed Processions (Regulations) Bill 1932, and the 
proposed power lay solely with the Secretary of State and did not require a request 
from a Chief Constable. This marks a slight departure from the similar power held in 
Emergency Regulation 22, which placed the onus on chiefs of police to prohibit the 
processions with the approval of the Home Secretary. This departure is likely to 
reflect that these Bills were primarily mandated to prevent the Hunger Marches 
which would have traversed through different local authorities and provincial police 
forces. This would have given the Home Secretary comprehensive control over 
prohibiting these marches and declaring them as unlawful assemblies without relying 
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on the action of individual local authorities, especially as some had previously shown 
political support for the hunger marchers. 
The police were also to have their powers increased by legislation, rather than 
relying on the questionable use of common law powers or statutory powers relating 
to traffic obstruction. Clause 4(1) provided that, ‘All processions shall follow such 
route as may be directed by or by authority of the chief officer of police.’ This far-
reaching power was supplemented by clause 4(2)(3) which provided the further 
power to impose restrictions on the time and destination of the procession as long as 
he is satisfied that such processions may either lead to serious disorder at a public 
meeting, or interference with the work of a government department or authority.94  
With a decline in fascist related public disorder, the urgency to introduce the Bill had 
diminished. In January 1935, the BUF had entered a period of reorganization that 
concentrated on the recruitment of ideologically committed members and 
constructing new electoral machinery. 95  In summarising BUF activity and 
membership in 1935, historian Stephen Dorril stated that the movement had, 
‘degenerated into an organisation increasingly dependent on a localized campaign 
playing on populist anti-Semitism.’ Yet, by the end of the year Dorril estimated that 
paying membership had tripled to around 15,000. 96  By late 1935, organised 
opposition to the BUF had resurfaced, Blackshirt propaganda now included a 
provocative anti-Semitic doctrine, and in 1936 new legislative public order measures 
were again discussed by the Home Office. 
7) The Resurgence of Disorder and the Battle of Cable Street 
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Opposition towards BUF marches became more prominent in 1936.97 When the 
political violence resurfaced the Liberal MP, Sir John Simon, was now Home 
Secretary and former Air Vice Marshall of the Royal Air Force, Sir Philip Game, the 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner.  
Mosley’s fascist campaign now exploited nationalist ideology with anti-Semitism and 
had gathered momentum in East London. During October 1936, the resources of the 
authorities were severely tested regarding three high profile processions. The first 
was the BUF’s fourth anniversary march in East London, which met large scale anti-
fascist resistance causing widespread violence and disorder, resulting in the Battle of 
Cable Street. Secondly, there was the NUWM’s hunger march which consisted of 
unemployed workers from Scotland, Northumberland, Durham, Lancashire, 
Yorkshire, Nottinghamshire, Derby, Coventry and South Wales. The third march was 
of 200 unemployed men from Jarrow, which had suffered abnormally high 
unemployment following the closure of the shipyard the previous year. With the 
exception of the Jarrow Crusade, which was organised by the Jarrow Council, the 
relationship to political extremism by the former marches led to considerable debate 
by the authorities in how to manage the expected disorder.98 
The first contingents of the 1936 hunger march commenced from Scotland on 5 
October, and were expected to assemble with the other marches in London on 8 
November. A memorandum from the Home Secretary to the Cabinet revealed that 
the march was organised by the Communist Party and the NUWM, who 
unsuccessfully attempted to procure sponsorship for the march from the Labour 
Party and the Trades Union Congress, but managed to secure support from local 
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Trades Councils. Simon declared that the organisers were keen to hide the fact that 
the march was organised by the NUWM and the Communist Party as they did not 
want a ‘communist’ label attached to it. The memorandum demonstrated that 
although there was no legal method of prohibiting the march, every effort was made 
to hinder and discredit the organisers. Simon reiterated some of the arguments used 
following the national hunger marches of 1932 and 1934. In particular, this included 
attempting to alienate public sympathy by using the National Publicity Bureau to 
discredit the march. He wanted to demonstrate that the unemployed were being 
exploited by the communist organisers because the march could not have any 
constitutional influence on Government policy. Simon stated, ‘It is the settled practice 
that Ministers of the Crown should refuse to receive deputations from such 
demonstrations.’99  
The BUF also faced obstacles in organising their own brand of political activism. 
Their application for a public procession in Manchester on 19 July 1936 was initially 
and controversially declined by the Manchester Watch Committee under s213 
Manchester Police Act due to the provocative nature of the Blackshirt uniform. The 
BUF then tested the reason for the prohibition of their procession by responding that 
they would march without their uniform, an unusual incident which is discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 5. A similar condition was considered by the Hull Chief 
Constable and Watch Committee when the Blackshirts organised a procession 
there.100 These examples demonstrate that different local authorities were prepared 
to take steps to limit the disorder caused by fascist processions. The uniform ban 
attempted to remove a proportion of the provocation associated with BUF 
processions. While some regions attempted to limit such provocation, the 
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Metropolitan Police made little effort to regulate their fourth anniversary march 
through prominent Jewish communities. 
On 4 October 1936 the BUF planned a large rally in East London. It was scheduled 
to commence at Royal Mint Street where the Blackshirts were to assemble and be 
inspected by Mosley. They then planned to march through East London and divide 
into four different marching columns, which would each advance to separate open air 
meetings located at Shoreditch, Limehouse, Bow and Bethnal Green. Mosley 
intended to speak at each meeting. The anxiety and insecurity generated in East 
London before the Blackshirt rally was highlighted in the national press. The tabloid 
newspaper the Daily Mirror ran headlines such as, ‘Fascist march plans make 
Jewish Quarter uneasy’101 and ‘Thousands in terror of great fascist march in East 
End of London’.102 
Various forms of action were taken by the affected communities regarding the 
proposed march. The Mayors of Bethnal Green, Hackney, Poplar, Shoreditch and 
Stepney were received by a Home Office official who referred their request to 
prohibit the march to the Home Secretary. Mrs Roberts, the Mayor of Stepney, who 
had previously sent a request to the Home Secretary to ban the march, argued, ‘I 
think the march is extremely provocative’.103 George Lansbury, Labour MP for Bow 
and Bromley, wrote, asking him to divert the march. In a statement to the press, 
Lansbury stated, ‘What I want is to maintain peace and order and I advise those 
people who are opposed to Fascism to keep away from the demonstration.’104 The 
Jewish Peoples Council submitted a petition to the Home Secretary, which 
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reportedly contained over 100,000 signatures, in an attempt to prohibit the march 
because of the fear that it would lead to violence. A member of the deputation, 
headed by the Labour MP James Hall, argued that, ‘racial incitement and 
propaganda are likely to cause great disturbance.’105  
When considering the BUF’s motives and actions during this period, whose anti-
Semitic propaganda included a policy for the deportation of Jews who do not put 
‘Britain first’,106 the legal protection for lawful public assemblies that was attained at 
common law through Beatty v Gillbanks loses its relevance. Taking into account the 
level of provocation directed by the BUF at the Jewish communities in the East End, 
the judgment of Wise v Dunning must be applied. In that case Lord Alverstone CJ, 
referred to the ‘essential condition… that there must be an act of the defendant, the 
natural consequence of which, if his act be not unlawful in itself, would be to produce 
an unlawful act by other persons.’107 Although the Blackshirt march through Jewish 
communities was not unlawful in itself, a strong argument can be made that the 
‘natural consequence’ of such an act of provocation would result in a breach of the 
peace. Attention should also be paid to s52 Metropolitan Police Act 1839 which 
provided the police with the power to regulate the route of processions when 
occasion required for keeping order and preventing obstruction. Regardless of these 
legal powers, Sir John Simon informed the deputation that he could not intervene.108 
In addition to the uncertainty on the lawful use of such powers, Simon also believed 
in upholding the tradition of free speech which he described as ‘a grand 
characteristic of British political life… [which] involves a willingness to let others 
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express opinions which we abominate.’ 109  Ewing and Gearty dismissed the 
proposition that any inaction by the Government during the era of the BUF could 
represent their commitment to political liberty as they had also passed the Incitement 
to Disaffection Act 1934 which created strict limitations on political freedom. However, 
this statute related to subversion in the armed forces and addressed a perceived 
threat to national security which can be greatly contrasted with the public order 
problems created by the BUF.110  
Ronald Kidd, of the NCCL, rejected Simon’s claim that he could not intervene with 
the Blackshirt procession. He declared that the 1839 Act had been utilised to prohibit 
a Labour march down Oxford Street in the autumn of that year. In addition, on 22 
March the Commissioner regulated an anti-fascist procession by ordering that it 
would not be allowed within a half mile radius of the BUF meeting at the Albert Hall. 
His deduction was that: 
A word from Sir John Simon to the Commissioner of Police, therefore, would 
have been sufficient to cause Sir Philip Game to exercise his powers under 
the Metropolitan Police Act and forbid the Fascist procession to march 
through the Jewish quarter.111   
The inaction of the authorities was starkly contrasted by the anti-fascist response 
which mobilised to prevent the Blackshirt march. Communist Phil Piratin recalled the 
arrangements that they made at the 1991 Witness Seminar on the Battle of Cable 
Street.112 As the route of the march was not published they created contingency 
plans and used cyclists and motorcyclists to rely information regarding any fascist 
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movement. Additionally, at the sites where Mosley planned to speak, such as 
Victoria Park Square, two members of the Communist Party occupied the site from 
five in the morning until the night. Piratin stated that, ‘they kept on speaking and 
reading books out a bit with two police standing by their side as evidence that they 
were there all the time.’113 Therefore, if Mosley’s procession had been successful, he 
would not be able to hold a meeting as the Communist meeting would have already 
been in progress. It is interesting to note that Piratin recalled that two policeman 
were present to evidence that the Communist meeting had occupied the site first. He 
also spoke favourably of a police inspector who was ‘more or less amiable to us at 
that time’ who gave them information on the day regarding Mosley’s preferred 
route.114  
The events that followed became known as the Battle of Cable Street, as 
widespread fighting broke out between anti-fascist groups who mobilised to prevent 
the BUF procession and the police who attempted to disperse them. Contemporary 
writer and journalist Frederic Mullally reported: 
Never was a more formidable concentration of police seen in London. Six 
thousand constables, together with the whole of the mounted division, were 
posted between Tower Hill and Whitechapel, lining the streets or assembled 
in large groups at strategic points.115 
 
Following the erection of barricades along the route by anti-fascists, several baton 
charges were made by the police to clear the way for the BUF. To prevent further 
disorder Sir Philip Game prohibited the Blackshirt march. The fascists were 
redirected along the Embankment, away from the East End and dispersed. Some 
Blackshirts regrouped in Trafalgar Square causing minor disorders. The Front page 
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of the Daily Mirror recounted the previous day’s disorder with the headline ‘84 arrests 
as thousands stampede in London Riots: Stones meet police batons: 268 injured’. It 
continued: 
BATON CHARGES . . . RIOTING CROWDS . . . LORRIES 
OVERTURNED . . . PAVING STONES TORN UP . . . GIRLS AND MEN 
CRASHING THROUGH PLATE GLASS WINDOWS . . . 
DEMONSTRATORS WIELDING TRUNCHEONS BOUND IN BARBED 
WIRE . . . 5,000 FASCISTS MASSING TO PARADE HEMMED IN BY A 
CROWD OF l00,000, INCLUDING THOUSANDS OF ANGRY JEWS AND 
COMMUNISTS SHOUTING, “THE FASCISTS SHALL NOT PASS."116 
 
Other incidents reported included lighted fireworks and marbles being thrown at the 
hooves of charging police horses. An illustrative example of the disorder caused by 
the anti-fascist road blocks can be seen in figure 2.2.  
 
Figure 2.2 The Battle of Cable Street. Permission to reproduce this image has been 
granted by the Bishopsgate Institute 
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As well as contending that the Metropolitan Police Act could have been exercised to 
prevent the BUF procession on the 4 October 1936, Kidd also highlighted the 
preventative powers that could have been exercised when a breach of the peace 
was threatened. He questioned why Mosley was not brought before a magistrate ‘to 
show cause why he should not be bound over to be of good behaviour and to keep 
the peace, when he was in fact threatening so serious a disturbance of the peace.’117 
In comparison, Kidd argued that this was the action taken against Tom Mann, the 
nominal head of the hunger march in 1932, despite the situation being less critical 
than it was regarding the fascist march. Despite not agreeing with the action of 
preventive justice in principle, he questioned why the authorities did not show as 
much zeal against Right wing speakers who deliberately threatened the peace, as 
they did against Left wing speakers, such as Katherine Duncan, 118  who did not 
threaten the peace in any way.119  
Although Kidd’s argument was used to demonstrate pro-fascist partiality, this 
simplistic comparison is not entirely applicable to the situation. The origin of the 
anticipated breach of the peace at the processions organised by Mann and Mosley 
reflect this. As described above, at NUWM processions, it was the conduct of the 
marchers themselves that caused the authorities concern, while at BUF processions 
disorder was likely to have been caused by their political opponents. Yet, while it 
must also be acknowledged that the Home Office did actively attempt to reduce 
support for, and participation in, NUWM activities the discussion above highlighted 
that organizers had actively encouraged marchers to engage in disorder with the 
police and, despite the criticism of the special constables, members of the march 
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had engaged in violent disorder. Additionally, although the incidents were only four 
years apart, the binding over of NUWM organizers was a particular strategy used at 
the time which was tested in order to prevent or limit further disorder. As Mann and 
Llewellyn generated publicity from their imprisonment and became martyrs for their 
cause, the use of this tactic to control public processions was redundant by 1936.  
The legal basis for any prosecution of Mosley ahead of the 4 October demonstration 
would have been highly contentious. For instance, what law was his proposed action 
breaking? Because of the potential that his proposed public assembly may be 
attacked did not in itself make it unlawful. Even if Wise v Dunning were to be applied 
and it was argued that the ‘natural consequence’ of his actions would be a breach of 
the peace, there would have been no evidence to suggest that Mosley would have 
encouraged his supporters to reciprocate as Wise had done. Furthermore, the 
authorities were more apprehensive about securing convictions along the lines of 
anti-Semitism, especially after the unsatisfactory outcome against Arnold Leese, 
head of the IFL.120   
Perhaps the most significant factor in no action being taken by the authorities to 
prevent the march was Game’s under-estimation of how serious the disorder would 
be. He advised the Home Office that there would probably be ‘the usual few arrests 
for minor disturbances but I do not anticipate any serious trouble’.121 Historian Janet 
Clark suggested that there may have been other motivating factors as Game had 
privately welcomed the ‘showdown’. Game had written to a friend the day before the 
proposed fascist march stating, ‘I expect there will be some fun and a few broken 
heads before the day is out. I shall be glad if it brings things to a head as I hope it 
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might lead to banning processions all over London’.122 Here the discretion shown by 
Game to try and facilitate the BUF procession demonstrates the ability of superior 
police officers to create situations on the ground in order to advocate wider 
objectives. He also declared that he was not in favour of binding over leaders of 
political groups as he did not want them to become martyrs to their cause if they 
were subsequently sent to prison.123 The disorder in East London on 4 October 1936 
may have been ‘the straw that broke the camel’s back’,124 but it was not entirely 
unexpected, and it became a convenient catalyst in which cross party support could 
be drawn upon to pass new legislation. For Sir Philip Game, this had expediently 
opened the door for his powers to be increased regarding the regulation and 
prohibition of public processions.    
8) The Debate on Clause 3 Public Order Bill 1936 
The legacy of the Battle of Cable Street was the hastily passed statute; the Public 
Order Act 1936. The Act itself should not be seen solely as a result of fascist 
disorder, as it also encompasses suggestions and provisions advocated from 
Emergency Powers Act 1920 Regulation 22, the Processions (Regulations) Bill 1932 
and the Public Order Bill 1934 in response to communist activity and the NUWM. In 
introducing clause 3, Simon opposed the general prohibition of processions by 
stressing their importance as ‘an old and well-established method of exhibiting a 
point of view’ although he did concede that they ‘may not always be very 
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effective’.125 The necessity for local authorities to be able to regulate the route of 
processions was clearly explained by Simon: 
At present the power is to be found in some rather ancient Statutes. In the 
case of the Metropolis it is in an Act of 1839; in the Provinces it is in an Act of 
1847. The Statutes are in somewhat archaic words. They were passed 
before the full establishment of modern police forces. They are applied with 
some little difficulty. It does seem to me that it is much better to put into this 
Bill a plain provision on the subject.126 
As enacted s3(1) provided the chief of police with greater powers to control or 
regulate public processions. These included the power to prescribe the route of the 
procession or prohibit it from entering a specified public place. Under s3(2) the chief 
of police may apply to the council of the borough or district for an order to prohibit all 
public processions or a of any class of public procession for a period not exceeding 
three months, and following the consent of the Home Secretary, the order may be 
made. A similar provision under s3(3) provided the Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner the power to prohibit public processions with the consent of the Home 
Secretary, bypassing the need to apply to any local Council. The power to prohibit 
processions could only be imposed if there were reasonable grounds for 
apprehending that a procession may occasion serious public disorder and the 
powers under s3(1) were not sufficient in preventing the anticipated disorder.  
These powers provided wide discretion for the authorities to restrict political activism 
and public protest. They echoed Emergency Regulation 22 which also provided 
chiefs of police with the power to prohibit processions with the consent of the Home 
Secretary if they anticipated disorder. Yet, this power became more extensive as 
Regulation 22 could only be used when a state of emergency had been declared 
under the Emergency Powers Act 1920. As mentioned above, the general Labour 
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antipathy to the use of this power was demonstrated in 1926 during the General 
Strike. Yet, ten years on, the Public Order Bill was supported by the Labour Party, 
although they would still seek some amendments. This change was in part due to 
the Labour Party’s commitment to opposing fascism. Historian Matthew Worley 
affirmed that Labour had maintained its stance in opposing fascism by advocating 
reasoned argument and constitutional procedure rather than participate in the anti-
fascist activism which was largely organised by the far-Left. By the 1930s Labour’s 
political arena had been established inside Parliament and city hall, in contrast to the 
street politics of the BUF.127 In part, this contributed to Labour’s reluctant support of 
the Bill in order to control the violence associated with the BUF’s street politics. The 
apprehension was that in doing so the liberty of other groups, including those on the 
Left, would be restricted in the process. 
The statutory powers provided to Chief Constables under s3 were the most 
controversial of the Act. Even the powers under s3(1) had significantly increased the 
power of Chief Constables, leading Morgan to reflect that their ‘actions in controlling 
and routeing processions were now, in effect, subject to no extra-judicial control 
either through local authorities or police authorities or through parliament itself.’128 
The provisions under s3 which gave the authorities the formal power to ban 
processions in advance remarkably ‘survived Parliamentary scrutiny with no 
substantive modifications.’129  
Despite this, there were still forceful objections recorded in the House of Commons. 
Labour MP Mr Buchanan challenged clause 3 stating:  
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The Bill was meant to deal with that problem of the Fascist movement and 
the shocking ill-treatment of the Jews, but this Bill gives the Home Secretary 
far wider powers, powers to deal with trade disputes and innocent 
demonstrations and agitations, and I fear that it will put the population of this 
country in a worse position than they were in before… [as the Bill] may well 
be used, not against the Fascist movement, but against the legitimate 
aspirations of very poor people.130 
 
These concerns on the restrictions of civil liberties were prevalent in the debate. 
Labour MP for Jarrow, Miss Ellen Wilkinson, made reference to the Chief Constable 
of York who hindered the hunger marchers’ procession through the town and 
prevented them from receiving their provisions. She declared that this clause would 
‘legalise the present position of these bullying police constables’ and criticised the 
proposed safeguard that the Chief Constable would need his case sanctioned by the 
local council as inadequate in certain areas: ‘the difficulty will arise when there is a 
Chief Constable and a Council of the same political colour, as happens a very great 
deal in the Northern districts. In such cases there is [n]o safeguard.’131 Independent 
Labour Party (ILP) member, George Buchanan, agreed and stated that Chief 
Constables should not become involved in making political or religious decisions. 
Communist MP, William Gallacher made the most outspoken attack stating, ‘this is 
one of the most dangerous attacks on democracy that has ever been made in this 
country’.132 He reminded the House that the Labour Party had developed with the 
use of demonstrations and processions, and that the Liberals were also responsible 
for very wild and turbulent demonstrations of their own. He expressed his 
astonishment that other members could consider ‘such an attack on the democratic 
rights of the people in such an easy manner… [we should never] make concessions 
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that mean the sacrifice of democratic rights.’133 However, not all members from the 
Left disagreed. Labour MP, Herbert Morrison, declared that clause 3 was necessary, 
as clauses 1 and 2 would not prevent the mobilisation of fascist groups entering the 
East End and causing disruption and provocation, or the organisation of another 
crowd with the purpose of rioting with them.134  
During a discussion on clause 1, which dealt with the prohibition of uniforms, Captain 
Ramsey proposed an amendment that would also prohibit the carrying of a ‘flag or 
banner bearing a provocative device or inscription’. Relating this proposal to 
processions he described a scenario where Orangemen might march through a 
Roman Catholic Borough, or a Mohammedan procession could march through the 
Hindu quarter in India, and hoped that some words would be added ‘to cover a 
provocative inscription or device carried in a public procession through the 
streets.’135 With reference to the example of Orangemen marching into a purposely 
provocative area, Labour MP for Liverpool, Scotland,136 David Logan proposed that 
there was no need for the amendment. With reference to his own constituency he 
stated, ‘If people had not the common sense to know that they were hurting the 
feelings of people in a particular neighbourhood by doing that, they would be taught 
a lesson and would not go again.’ He added to this scenario of self-policing, ‘There 
would be no need for an Act of Parliament to teach them.’137 
Effectively, the powers offered Chief Constables with wide discretion that could 
restrict freedom of expression and assembly with very little safeguards. Furthermore, 
it inevitably entangles the Chief Constables with making decisions which affect 
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political activism. While the political impartiality of the police may be a fine ideal, 
Jefferson has highlighted that it is an ‘impossible mandate’.138 In addition, Lustgarten 
stated that the 1970s and 1980s witnessed the growing politicisation of the police as 
they became involved in attempting to influence legislation and policy. This 
constitutional shift changes the role of the police from ‘executors of parliamentary 
command’ to the fundamentally politicised role of being significantly responsible for 
‘the content of the criminal law’. 139  The influence that the Metropolitan Police 
Commissioners and Chief Constables tried to exert in the 1930s over public order 
policy established above demonstrates that this politicisation was clearly present in 
the interwar period. The political convictions of a Chief Constable together with their 
police authority, therefore, had the ability to influence their discretion, consciously or 
unconsciously, and potentially affect the liberty of political activists. 
9) The Application of s3 from 1937-1939 
In practice the subsequent s3 Public Order Act 1936 obstructed both fascist and 
communist processions. In 1937 the BUF made an application to hold a procession 
on 4 July from Limehouse to Trafalgar Square, which would pass through the main 
Jewish quarter of the East End of London. The new Home Secretary, Sir Samuel 
Hoare, announced in the House of Commons that under s3(3), a complete 
prohibition on political processions would be in effect for six weeks in a particular 
area in the East End of London. This decision was made because Game was of the 
opinion that prescribing the route of the procession under s3(1) would not be enough 
to prevent serious public disorder. The BUF subsequently organised a procession 
from Kentish Town to Trafalgar Square which was outside of the prohibited area. 
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Hoare emphasised that the prohibition only affected political processions, 
irrespective of party, and would not be applied to other organisations such as the 
Salvation Army or non-political trade disputes.140   
The BUF procession on 4 July 1937 passed without any serious disturbances. The 
Times estimated that 6,000 fascists had assembled for the march, but this number 
was ‘dwarfed by the crowd which collected in the locality.’141 Order was maintained 
by the 2,383 police officers who were on duty in connection with the fascist 
demonstrations that day and 19 arrests were made.142 The majority of those arrests 
related to s5 Public Order Act offences for insulting words and behaviour. At the 
Clerkenwell Police Court, the language used by the anti-fascist protestors 
demonstrated their contempt towards the police and their duty to protect the BUF 
procession. Among the chants for which protestors were arrested and charged were, 
‘The police are as bad as Mosley,’ and ‘Down with the coppers; smash Mosley’s 
body-guard’.143  
When the ban expired in August 1937, it was renewed for a further six weeks. In 
September, it was subsequently renewed for three months, the maximum duration 
under the Act. The three month ban on political marches in the specified area was 
continually renewed every three months until the proscription of the BUF in 1940 
under Defence Regulation 18B.144 
An editorial in the Times defended the imposed prohibition of processions in the 
proscribed area stating that it ‘only puts a restraint on the freedom of demonstration 
in an area where political licence has threatened to extinguish liberty. It is licence 
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that is restrained in order that larger liberties may be preserved.’145 Hoare defended 
the action stating: 
In those parts there is concentrated a large number of Jews whose memories 
of racial persecution make them particularly sensitive, and a Fascist 
procession in centres where these special conditions exist would, in the 
judgement of the Commissioner and of myself, inevitably have led to serious 
public disorder.146 
As the ‘special conditions’ were not applicable to other parts of London, Hoare was 
apprehensive to sanction s3(3) elsewhere. On 3 October 1937 the BUF organised 
their fifth anniversary procession in London. Following the renewal of the ban in East 
London, the new route was to take the BUF through Bermondsey and South London. 
A deputation to the Home Secretary, led by Labour MP Ben Smith, to prohibit the 
procession failed. Hoare stated that the extension of the prohibition to every area 
that had a ‘strong feeling of opposition to a procession demonstrating some 
unpopular political creed would be contrary to the spirit of the Public Order Act, 
1936.’147 
Hoare’s approach to regulating BUF processions under the Public Order Act 
acknowledged the sensitivities of different communities in reference to fascist 
provocation. In recognising that ‘special circumstances’ existed in certain East End 
districts, Hoare’s actions were in line with the Wise v Dunning judgment that an 
unlawful act may be the ‘natural consequence’ of a legal act in which the language or 
conduct was insulting or abusive.148 By sanctioning BUF processions outside of the 
Jewish communities of the East End, Hoare’s decision conceded that prohibiting 
them would amount to political discrimination. In that case, any attempt to disrupt a 
BUF procession where the ‘special circumstances’ did not exist would, therefore, 
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align with Beatty v Gillbanks. The distinction between the two judgments is prevalent 
in Hoare’s application of the Public Order Act. A BUF procession can be permitted in 
one area, but prescribed in another, because of the different circumstances in which 
a breach of the peace may be occasioned.  
The BUF procession on 3 October 1937 was met with hostile political opposition and 
created widespread disorder. The Times dramatically claimed ‘the scenes of disorder 
yesterday seem to have been quite as bad as those in the East End which induced 
Parliament to pass the Public Order Act.’149 When disorder broke, the report stated 
that the police ‘painfully shepherded [the procession] to the place appointed for the 
Fascist meeting amid a continuous series of clashes’.150 Following the procession, 
Game capitalised on the disorder by recommending to the Home Secretary that the 
s3(3) ban should be applied to the whole Metropolitan Police District. He went further, 
advocating that new legislation should be considered that would make ‘processions 
of all kinds in the streets illegal once and for all’.151 This pragmatic proposition which 
focused on police resources rather than the liberty of the subject remained in his 
Annual Report for 1937. He stated that the Public Order Act has had a positive effect 
on the conduct of political meetings and demonstrations but had not reduced their 
number. He recorded that out of the 11,804 meetings and processions that were 
policed in 1937, over 7,000 of these were either fascist or anti-fascist. The BUF 
marches on the 4 July and 3 October each required the deployment of 2,500 police 
officers. Game linked the number of police required to regulate processions with the 
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general increase in crime for the year as an argument to forward the prohibition of all 
political processions in the Metropolitan Police District.152  
In September 1938, the BUF application to hold another anniversary procession was 
not authorised so they held a public meeting in Lime Grove, Hammersmith 
instead.153  This widened the previous use of the s3(3) ban as the route of the 
proposed BUF procession did not enter the previously prescribed area. In order to 
preserve order, the Police Commissioner and the Home Secretary sanctioned the 
procession ban despite the previous use of s3(3) only being justified  in areas where 
a ‘special condition’ existed; namely the large Jewish communities situated in the 
East End. This signalled that, despite Hoare’s previous acknowledgement of the 
‘spirit of the Public Order Act’,154 the potential to widen its application and further 
restrict the liberty of groups to hold public processions existed. This decision was 
criticised in the BUF’s newspaper Action, which in reference to the communist 
appeals to have the procession prohibited, noted: 
The simple fact is that certain persons having openly threatened to break the 
law, a democratic chief of police prefers to penalise the law-abiding rather 
than arrest the known criminals… The agents of Moscow have now 
discovered that they can obtain what they want from Sir Philip simply by 
threatening criminal violence if it is not given to them.155 
Yet, the ban seemed to find favour among many of the residents which were 
regularly affected by the processions. The Conservative Under-Secretary of State for 
the Home Department, Geoffrey Lloyd, stated that he believed that the ban had 
general approval in East London, adding, 
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I would cite only one opinion, that of Dr. Mallon, Warden of Toynbee Hall, 
who knows the conditions in the area as well as anybody. He says: I do know 
the factors here, and I say that the extension of the prohibition is both 
desirable and necessary.156 
The new powers available under the Public Order Act had effectively denied the BUF 
one of their most powerful propaganda tools in the years leading up to the Second 
World War. Despite this, some success was managed by virtue of their peace 
campaign which attracted an audience of over 20,000 at Earl’s Court on 16 July 
1939.157 The last national hunger march was staged in 1936 although it was not the 
enactment of the Public Order Act that led to its demise. Kingsford argued that other 
factors drew the far-Left away from organising another great march on London. He 
stated that there were shifts in the patterns of unemployment, a lack of a unifying 
issue to campaign for, the energies of many members were focused on the Spanish 
civil war, and the movement was also forced to economise due to its ailing 
finances.158 After war was declared on 3 September 1939, public processions and 
meetings were now subject to Regulation 39E under the Defence of the Realm Act 
1914. In October 1939 the principle of whether this was necessary was questioned 
by Dingle Foot. The Liberal MP and barrister Frank Griffith, also questioned the 
necessity of Regulation 39E, following the passing of the Public Order Act. His 
concern was that the powers of the Secretary of State could be conferred to any 
mayor, justice of the peace or chief officer of police, in relation to banning 
processions and public meetings.159 However, for the BUF the liberty to form a public 
procession was eclipsed by the interment without trial of many of its leading figures 
including Mosley in May 1940 under Defence Regulation 18B. Two months later, the 
BUF was declared a proscribed organisation. 
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10) Post-War Legacy of s3 
In the years following the Second World War Mosley revived his political ambitions 
with Union Movement (UM). Although he never replicated the success of the BUF in 
terms of membership, the activities of UM still provoked its share of public disorder. 
Mosley continued his anti-Semitic politics which were also now merged with the 
promotion of a racially white Europe. During the initial stages of Mosley’s new 
movement, the Metropolitan Police utilised different tactics in minimising the disorder. 
In response to UM’s proposed march from Ridley Road to Tottenham, the 
Commissioner utilised his powers under s3(1) to reroute the march. He deliberately 
waited until the morning of the procession to inform the organisers so the new route 
could not be advertised. In addition, he also prohibited the use of banners and loud 
speaker vans to minimise the provocation. Despite this, there was still considerable 
disorder and it was reported that 35 arrests were made and 23 people were 
charged.160 The Labour Home Secretary, James Chuter Ede, declared that his role 
comprised of two public duties of equal importance. These were to maintain order 
and to preserve traditional liberties, and he showed regret that in attempting to 
balance the two, sometimes he had to suspend liberties that had previously been 
enjoyed.161 When Chuter Ede was questioned on the provocation caused by the 
procession, he responded: 
The people who attended at the Home Office did regard the procession as a 
provocation, but I think that in this country we have to learn both to hear and 
to see things with which we do not agree, without feeling that we have been 
unduly provoked.162 
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He also intimated that he was of the opinion that if their opponents did not turn up 
and excite interest from passers-by, then UM would die a natural death as there had 
not been more that 150 present at any of their demonstrations.163  
On 11 September 1949, UM marched through North London and faced anti-fascist 
opposition at Dalston. There were stones and wood thrown at the procession, and 
one anti-fascist, James McLeod, broke through the police cordon and attempted to 
encourage others to do so and fight the members of UM shouting, ‘Down with 
Fascism. Let’s get at them. We fought six years against this and we must stop it 
now.’ He was charged with using threatening behaviour. The magistrate reminded 
McLeod that the procession was perfectly legal, declaring, ‘This is English law. It is 
not Jewish law or Communist law or Fascist Law.’ Here, the magistrate reinforced 
the authority of the law, attempting to demonstrate that it does not recognise race or 
political creeds and applies equally to everyone. Despite this, in relation to McLeod’s 
alleged remarks, the magistrate asked him what fighting he did in the war. Following 
the response of ground crew with the RAF, he stated, ‘Do you call that fighting? You 
will go to prison for six weeks.’164 However, he later demonstrated his discretion by 
calling McLeod back and altering his sentence to a £5 fine. Twelve people were 
charged in connection with the disturbance for offences which included carrying 
offensive weapons such as a knife and stones, obstruction of a police officer and 
assault.     
Following the continuation of public disorder associated with Mosley’s politics, it was 
not surprising that a month later, on 4 October 1949, UM’s proposed march through 
the East End of London was proscribed. The date and location, being the 
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anniversary of Cable Street, was provocative in itself. The Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner, Sir Harold Scott, requested a ban on all political processions for 
three months under s3(3) as he believed his powers under s3(1) were insufficient in 
preventing serious disorder. Upon this being granted by the Home Secretary, the UM 
response echoed BUF propaganda by claiming that the government had ‘bowed to 
mob violence… [and deprived] the people of London their traditional rights of public 
demonstration.’165 
The use of the s3(3) banning order continued to be an effective weapon against the 
provocative public processions of the far-Right. 166  Yet, the definition of a public 
procession under this provision was still vague. Described by s9 Public Order Act 
1936 as ‘a procession in a public place’, the question still remained on how a 
procession may be differentiated from a body of people walking to the same 
destination. On 15 October 1949, UM assistant secretary Alfred Flockhart, was 
charged with organising a public procession while the s3(3) ban was in effect. He 
had led some members from a newspaper sales drive in Knightsbridge to 
rendezvous with other officials at Hyde Park Corner. From there, the 150 members 
of UM walked to Piccadilly. It was reported that Flockhart gave signals directing the 
members following him and as they approached Piccadilly political slogans were 
shouted. Following a conviction at Bow Street Magistrates Court, Flockhart’s appeal 
at the King’s Bench Divisional Court centred on what constituted a procession. In 
Flockhart v Robinson,167 Lord Goddard CJ placed the emphasis of a procession as 
being a ‘body, of persons moving along a route’. This particularly wide definition was 
countered by Finnemore J who found that the number of people who proceeded 
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along the same route in loose formation only became a public procession when their 
ranks closed up due to the traffic at Piccadilly as they then embodied an orderly 
formation. The magistrate’s judgment was held and, as Flockhart had directed the 
procession, he was judged to have been the organiser. The judgment was held 2:1 
and Finnemore J dissenting found that the procession had formed spontaneously 
and Flockhart could not be classed as the organiser because to organise ‘meant 
something in the nature of planning or arranging.’168  
The position regarding the policing of public processions remained as laid down for 
half a century. However, before the enactment of the Public Order Act 1986,169 the 
s3 power to ban any class of procession was significantly challenged in the Court of 
Appeal in 1981. Following serious disorder in Brixton, the Home Secretary 
sanctioned an application from the Metropolitan Police Commissioner to issue a 
blanket ban on all processions within the Metropolitan Police district, except those 
traditionally assembled on 1st May to celebrate May Day and those of a religious 
character customarily held. In Kent v Metropolitan Police Commissioner, 170  The 
General Secretary of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), Bruce Kent, a 
Roman Catholic priest, made an affidavit in support of the application to declare the 
ban null and void in order to entitle the CND to conduct a procession. Lord Denning 
MR affirmed the ban, but his judgment demonstrated the scope of such a wide 
power. The ban covered 786 square miles and prevented community based 
processions such as the charity carnival procession through the streets of Fulham 
which would have contained 80 floats on a three-mile route. Other processions that 
fell within the ban included ‘a march of students to the House to protest about cuts: 
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and the marches of jobless people who wish to see their Member of Parliament to 
bring their claims to him.’171 As the Home Secretary refused to waive the ban to 
allow the Fulham carnival procession, Lord Denning judged that, ‘He must have 
thought that there was a reasonable fear that hooligans and others would attack the 
police and also perhaps the peaceful people taking part in that charity carnival.’ All 
three judges dismissed the appeal. Although Ackner LJ recognised that, 
Blanket bans on all marches for however short a time are a serious restriction 
of a fundamental freedom, and the courts will always be vigilant to see that 
the power to impose such a ban has not been abused… 
It is common knowledge that in the last five years since that judgment 
[Hubbard v Pitt172] things have grown steadily worse. In this situation it is 
inevitable that to prevent bloodshed and loss of life there must be occasions 
when some of our rights and privileges have temporarily to be restricted. It 
would be gross irresponsibility if those who have the power to impose the 
restrictions did not exercise that power where there is good reason to 
anticipate the possibility of serious public disorder.173 
The overwhelming significance of Kent v Metropolitan Police Commissioner is that 
when serious disorder is reasonably anticipated, the police and the Home Secretary 
had the power to impose drastic measures at the cost of fundamental liberties, and it 
was supported by the courts. Since this judgment, the statutory law relating to public 
processions has also been largely increased by the Public Order Act 1986. 
In addition, Lord Denning emulated Finnemore’s definition by referring to the 
dictionary definition of ‘procession’ as, ‘proceeding of body of persons… in orderly 
succession.’174 This wide interpretation indicated that ‘any procession was likely to 
be covered by the definition.’ Yet, the phrase ‘body of persons’ indicates that a 
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procession must be more than one person. Lawyers John Marston and Paul Tain 
highlighted that although an individual may not constitute a procession, it may still 
create disorder if others gather to support or obstruct the person’s passage and 
other provisions to prevent disorder would need to be invoked.175 By definition it is 
possible that two people may form a procession.  
11) Conclusion 
Throughout this analysis of public processions it has been established that gradual 
shifts in the attitudes and practices of the Government and the police have occurred 
from the late nineteenth century to the mid twentieth century. In the centre of this 
period, the Public Order Act 1936 marked a significant shift in police procedure 
regarding public processions. Before this Act, police practice was inconsistent 
throughout the country due to the ambiguity and uncertainty of the legal powers they 
possessed. This was highlighted by William Harcourt’s confusing and indecisive 
advice he gave to Chief Constables during the era of disorder associated with the 
Salvation Army. Also, several Metropolitan Police Commissioners including Horwood, 
Trenchard and Game asserted their influence on their respective Home Secretaries 
for an increase of powers relating to the preservation of order on the occasion of 
public processions. It has also been highlighted how Hunger Marchers and the BUF 
all experienced different levels of police interference across the provinces. This is 
potentially linked to the political influence of local watch committees and standing 
joint committees over their police forces. Yet, despite the potential that political 
partisanship had hindered both fascist and far-Left activism in different parts of the 
country, the differences in police tactics were largely only possible because of the 
wide discretion available to them. The Government’s reluctance to act in both 1932 
                                               
175
 J. Marston and P. Tain, Public Order: The Criminal Law, (2001), p.147. 
135 
 
and 1934 when Bills were drafted to regulate public processions demonstrated a 
tactful hesitation which saw the concerns over both the hunger marches and the 
Blackshirts fade without introducing oppressive new legislation, albeit only 
temporarily.  
The enactment of the Public Order Act and the introduction of s3 indicates a 
significant shift in the Government’s attitude regarding the individual liberty of the 
subject and the collective security of the community. This shift is demonstrated by 
the subsequent use of s3 to prohibit fascist processions and the substantial legal 
shift from the principle declared in Beatty v Gillbanks. Although the BUF’s politics 
attracted and provoked widespread opposition, they were still a lawful political 
movement. On the occasion of their processions, members of the BUF were typically 
law-abiding and any violent disorder was, by and large, instigated by their opponents. 
The contrary interpretation to this argument would contend that the prime objective 
of the BUF was to insult local Jewish communities and incite racial hatred against 
them. Therefore, the BUF must take responsibility for any violent disorder associated 
with their political activities, deeming it as the ‘natural consequence’ of such 
deliberate provocation; therefore aligning it with Wise v Dunning. Yet, the provisions 
introduced in s3 Public Order Act 1936, made any application of previous common 
law judgments obsolete. The only prerequisite that a Chief Constable needed to 
impose regulations on public processions, or make an application to prohibit them in 
a particular area, was that they must have reasonable ground for apprehending that 
the procession may occasion serious public disorder. This chapter has demonstrated 
that since the continued disruption of BUF processions in London, which continued 
in the post-war era of UM, the power to proscribe them was increasingly utilised. The 
continual use of the s3 ban, which was initially applied in East London and then 
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across the Metropolitan Police District, demonstrated that far-Right activism was 
significantly falling from the safeguard of political liberty that they had previously 
enjoyed. The new legislation provided the authorities with a clearer legal provision 
which they could utilise against political activism that threatened the security of the 
community with very little fear of the order being legally challenged. Ewing and 
Gearty claimed that the government, by their inaction, tolerated BUF activism and 
disorder and only acted in 1936 in response to the ‘weight of popular opposition to 
them and the message of Cable Street’.176 While this may have been a factor that 
influenced the legislation, it neglects other elements that preceded the statutory 
response. For instance, successive commissioners and Chief Constables had 
advocated for an increase in powers relating to public processions in the wake of 
BUF disorder. Also, the legal astuteness of BUF activism had often impeded the use 
of preventive measures or restrictive responses, which contrasted with the activism 
of the far-Left who openly contested police and government authority.     
While it was common for local councillors and Mayors to campaign against 
provocative far-Right activism, it was anti-fascist opposition on the streets which 
caused concern for the police in maintaining order. This dual anxiety contributed to 
the acceptance of the wide powers under this Act which also effected other political 
movements. However, as mentioned above, many Chief Constables had advocated 
for more powers to control or prohibit public processions prior to the Public Order Act, 
and Sir Philip Game went even further in his disliking of BUF processions by 
endorsing a prohibition on all processions. Moreover, when applications for a s3 ban 
on processions had been submitted to the Home Secretary they had been 
consistently sanctioned, and when challenged in the courts, as in Kent, they have 
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been supported by the judiciary. This marks a significant shift, not only from the 
principles of Beatty v Gilbanks, but also to Sir Samuel Hoare’s description of the 
‘spirit of the Public Order Act’ which acknowledged the existence of special 
conditions that made proscription of far-Right activism necessary in some areas but 
not in others. In practice, the s3 ban was greatly expanded because of the anti-
fascist activism that continued to hinder the BUF. Section 3, therefore, became a 
useful statutory provision that could prohibit a procession independent of whether the 
disorder was anticipated from the marchers of their opponents.   
The legislative developments concerning public processions, initiated in the time of 
increasing conflict and disorder between the politically extreme movements of the 
interwar period, placed a heavy emphasis on the philosophy of preventative 
measures. Powers were made available to the police to impose conditions on 
processions to prevent disorder, and if these powers were not deemed as sufficient, 
the power to prohibit the procession was ultimately available. These provisions 
provided Chief Constables with wide discretionary powers over the liberty of political 
activists and protestors, as it was ultimately their opinion on the level of anticipated 
disorder which directed them to apply to the local council to request a sanction from 
the Home Secretary to proscribe all processions or any class of processions for a 
period up to three months. The powers that became available to restrict public 
processions under the Public Order Act are also closely linked to the freedoms of 
assembly and expression. These freedoms can also be manifested in the form of a 
public meeting. The next chapter will analyse the concept of freedom of speech and 
the legal restrictions placed upon it in relation to public meetings and the 
preservation of public order.   
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Chapter 3 
The "Englishman's right of Free Speech"
177
: Public 
Meetings in Public Places 
 
[I]t is difficult for the present administration of the law to preserve even a 
pretence of impartiality.178 
 
1) Introduction 
Many public meetings have resulted in considerable disorder in Britain. Before the 
era of the BUF, a combination of judicial law-making and Acts of Parliament had 
evolved, informing the provincial police constabularies how to regulate disorder, or 
the anticipation of disorder, at public meetings. This produced varying results across 
the country. There is a significant association between meetings and processions 
with regard to the law of public assembly and obstruction of the highways, which has 
been examined in Chapter 2. There is also an overlap within individual events, as 
public processions were commonly held directly before and after public meetings. 
Therefore, examination of police responses at public meetings will intermittently 
need to consider tactics applied during a procession, in order to contextualise a 
specific series of events. This chapter examines the policing of public meetings, and 
the traditionally held belief in the ‘right’ of freedom of speech.  
Firstly, this chapter evaluates the legal definitions relating to public meetings and 
freedom of speech. Significant events that motivated legal developments at both 
statute and common law level prior to the 1930s are then examined. The use of 
police discretion in response to both fascist and communist speakers and the judicial 
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decisions that followed are analysed, as well as the contemporary notions of the 
‘right to free speech’. The Parliamentary debates during the reading of the Public 
Order Bill 1936 are assessed, and the subsequent implications to the policing of 
public meetings are then considered. Finally, the application of this Act in the post-
war period, with reference to the continued use of anti-Semitism by the far-Right is 
then examined. 
For Ewing and Gearty, the developments at common law during this period, such as 
Thomas v Sawkins and Duncan v Jones, provided the police with the power to select 
‘apparently on an ad hoc and entirely unprincipled basis’ which meetings to permit 
and which to close, with the only requirement being based upon the suspicion of 
future behaviour.179 While it cannot be denied that these judgments increased the 
power of the police in respect of public meetings, it is necessary to examine wider 
factors which may have led to the disproportionate arrest of the opponents of 
fascism rather than the fascists themselves. For instance, in an argument to support 
the notion of police partisanship, Ewing and Gearty state, ‘A protest at an open-air 
fascist rally in Bristol led to nine arrests, all apparently of demonstrators rather than 
of fascists.’ 180  There is no evidence provided to suggest that the fascists had 
engaged in any criminal activity, or that the anti-fascist protest was law-abiding and 
undeserving of such police action. Similarly, an example of disorder at Plymouth 
highlighted that two anti-fascists had been jailed for assaulting a police officer in the 
execution of their duty during the police’s attempt to disperse an anti-fascist protest 
which involved a crowd of 1,000 demonstrators congregating outside the fascist 
headquarters.181 Again, Ewing and Gearty do not discuss the behaviour of the crowd. 
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Therefore, these incidents can only serve as evidence of police action against anti-
fascist activism which does not necessarily prove that any partiality was involved. 
Furthermore, additional examples of the Plymouth Police’s action regarding fascist 
activism at Market Square in this chapter and at Plymouth Drill Hall during a meeting 
addressed by Mosley in chapter 4, demonstrates that there was no particular 
partiality towards the fascists on the part of the Plymouth police.  
Assertions by historians Richard Thurlow and Gerald Anderson that the policing of 
political extremism during the interwar period was hindered by the problems of the 
interpretation of the law at street level and that the police frequently faced the 
challenge of keeping the extreme movements apart, provide a more balanced 
assessment of policing in this era, yet more in-depth historico-legal analysis is 
required to support this.182 This chapter, therefore, provides an analysis on the wide 
use of police discretion regarding public meetings and freedom of speech from the 
suppression of socialist activism at Trafalgar Square in the 1880s to the continued 
use of anti-Semitic propaganda by the far-Right in the 1940s and 1950s. This 
analysis will show that not all policing of fascist or anti-fascist activism can be 
accurately understood as demonstrating political partiality and the use of discretion 
in selecting when to take assertive action or not has many other pertinent factors. 
2) Legal Definitions: Public Meetings and Freedom of Speech 
In the interwar period no provision existed in the substantive criminal law to prohibit 
the forming of lawful public assemblies.183 Furthermore, despite the various claims 
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made by public speakers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to the 
Englishman’s ‘right’ to free speech, no legal protection of this notion existed in 
constitutional terms.184 The fundamental duty of the police is to preserve the Queen’s 
Peace and uphold the law. In respect of maintaining order at public meetings, the 
police held wide discretionary powers in order to keep the peace. Therefore, the 
policing of public meetings was necessarily based on individual factors, such as their 
existing intelligence on the speakers and the anticipated likelihood of disorder. Once 
these elements had been analysed, it would be utilised to inform police tactics, such 
as how many police officers were needed to be on duty and whether note takers 
were required. When public meetings were in progress the police were also faced 
with the dilemma of who should action be taken against in the anticipation of disorder; 
an aggressive or persistent heckler from the crowd, or from a provocative speaker 
who incited discontent and potential violence from the audience? The police 
subsequently had wide discretionary powers under the breach of the peace doctrine 
at their disposal in order to keep the peace. For criminologist Tony Jefferson, the 
wide discretion involved in regulating situations such as this necessarily meant that 
public order policing involved making subjective and, therefore, partial decisions 
which ultimately ‘exposed a hidden politics of policing’. 185  Yet, it is not just the 
potential of political partiality that needs to be analysed in this context. David 
Waddington asserted that the very act of invoking legislation could potentially create 
further problems for the police, requiring the need for police tactics to be measured, 
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and the potential consequences of their actions to be calculated. 186  Peter 
Waddington added that ‘an arrest for a minor offence could spark off a riot in which 
damage and injury result and an inquiry that threatens careers.’187 It is in these 
cases where the police officer has to utilize their discretion in deciding when it is 
appropriate to take assertive action. The resulting history is a continuous narrative of 
allegations towards the police of partisanship and brutality.   
Like public processions, public meetings are also a form of public assembly and, 
therefore, subject to the same conditions that would consider such an assembly to 
be unlawful.188  This includes statutory and common law offences, such as laws 
relating to obstruction of the highways, 189  sedition,190  or the use of threatening, 
abusive, insulting words or behaviour.191  Other common law offences related to 
unlawful assembly were riot, rout and affray.192 The current legal definition for ‘public 
meeting’ is found in s9 Public Order Act 1936, which was not repealed by the 1986 
Act. Firstly, a meeting is defined as ‘a meeting held for the purpose of the discussion 
of matters of public interest or for the purpose of the expression of views on such 
matters’. S9 subsequently defines public meeting as ‘any meeting in a public place 
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and any meeting which the public or any section thereof are permitted to attend, 
whether on payment or otherwise’.  
Before the HRA, English law provided no protection to the right of free speech. It 
only existed as an absolute ‘right’ and privilege in Parliament guaranteed by Article 9 
of the Bill of Rights 1689, which gave MPs unconditional freedom of expression. 
Outside of Parliament, freedoms were protected by the common law through the 
concept of residual freedom, whereby people were free to say what they liked except 
where the substantive law made it unlawful. As with the claim to free assembly, 
under the notion of residual freedom, people were free to say what they pleased, but 
only to the extent that their words or behaviour did not violate any law. Before the 
Public Order Act 1936, legislation was in force in many parts of Britain restricting 
what language or behaviour could be deemed as unlawful. This included s54(13) 
Metropolitan Police Act 1839 which made it an offence to use ‘any threatening, 
abusive or insulting words or behaviour with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, 
or whereby a breach of the peace may be occasioned’. Outside the Metropolitan 
Police district, the situation was even more problematic as there were similar bye-
laws and local Acts in different regions which had inconsistent penalties or 
procedures. These Acts also required the police to utilise their discretion to decide 
whether the nature of the words were ‘threatening, abusive or insulting’, and whether 
there was the likelihood of a breach of the peace occurring. 
3) The Historic Claim to the ‘Right’ of Public Meeting 
3.1) Public Meetings at Trafalgar Square 1886-88   
 
In the mid-1880s, during a period of severe depression, large groups of unemployed 
men began to camp in Trafalgar Square. This congregation of disgruntled and 
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workless men became a receptive audience for radical political groups such as the 
Social Democratic Federation (SDF), whose meetings attracted the attention of the 
authorities. Richard Vogler described this period of suppression of public meetings 
as being ‘the hallmark of careful and strategic planning [by the Home Office and the 
Metropolitan Police].’ 193  His analysis highlighted the appointment of Sir Charles 
Warren, who had a military background, as Metropolitan Police Commissioner in 
1886, and the Tory Home Secretary, Sir Henry Matthews, as being ‘ready to deal 
with the SDF and the unemployed demonstrators.’194 Vogler also emphasised the 
importance of the two magistrates selected to preside over cases brought against 
any person arrested in connection with the disorder at either Trafalgar Square or 
Hyde Park. They were ‘almost the oldest serving Metropolitan Magistrates… and had 
a record of loyalty to the police.’195  
On 8 November 1887, Warren issued a public notice informing that until further 
intimation, ‘no public meetings will be allowed to assemble in Trafalgar Square, nor 
will speeches be allowed to be delivered there.’196 The police subsequently made 
several arrests of men who attempted to address a crowd. This included one man 
who was arrested for waving a red handkerchief. Also, the arrest of two journalists, 
including the well-known war correspondent Bennett Burleigh, who were charged at 
Bow Street Police Court for being, ‘loose, idle, and disorderly persons, disturbing the 
public peace with intent to commit a felony’ and ‘obstructing and resisting the police 
while in the execution of their duty in Trafalgar Square’ caused some controversy.197 
Burleigh refused to be bound over to be of good behaviour for six months with 
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sureties of £100, arguing that the magistrate Vaughn did not even listen to the 
defence. In response, Vaughn replied that he expected the defendant to ‘be “pleased” 
to get off in this way, and remanded him for a week.’198 Burleigh was granted bail 
and was discharged a week later. Bodkin Poland, prosecuting, apologised to 
Burleigh on behalf of the Treasury for his arrest, stating that he had been arrested by 
mistake.199  From his analysis, Vogler determined that that the Metropolitan Police 
were able to exercise independent authority over the magistracy and the military 
leading up to and including the Trafalgar Square Riot of 13 November 1887, which 
contrasted the experience of the provincial police force during the disorder at 
Featherstone in 1893. However, the legal and political discussions that arose in this 
period, as a result of Warren’s excessive tactics of suppressing the radical speakers 
in Trafalgar Square, were critical because they addressed the claim of a ‘right’ of 
public meeting. 
Following Warren’s prohibition, the Pall Mall Gazette suggested that:  
[S]omething must be done… to defend the legal liberties of the Londoner 
from the insolent usurpations of Scotland-yard… The right of public meeting 
is one of the most sacred rights which freemen possess. Together with trial 
by jury, it is the parent of all our liberties.200  
Many contemporary newspapers referred to the ‘right’ of public meeting, despite no 
such legal right being encoded within UK constitutional law. People were at liberty to 
form a lawful assembly for the purpose of addressing a public meeting as no law had 
specifically stated that they could not. Despite the liberty to hold public meetings not 
being a constitutional right, the language utilised by newspapers, politicians and 
street lecturers demonstrate that there was a traditionally held belief in the ‘right’ of 
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public meeting. Correspondingly, if the police prohibited a public assembly, their 
actions must also be legally justified; critics of Warren claim his actions were not. 
The Pall Mall Gazette continued, ‘in Central London there is practically but one open 
space where the poor man can hold a public meeting… [But] that one open space is 
to be now closed against him – not by law, but the arbitrary edict of a policeman.’201 
Trafalgar Square was a popular place for public meetings in London as speakers 
could address large crowds without causing significant obstruction of the highway. 
Following the Trafalgar Square riot of 13 November 1887, Cunninghame Graham, 
the socialist Liberal MP, and John Burns, who formed the Battersea branch of the 
SDF, ‘were indicted for a riot, an unlawful assembly, and an assault upon William 
Blunden and John Martell, police-constables, in the execution of their duty.’202 A 
crucial part of this case was whether or not Warren’s proclamation had any legal 
authority. If the assembly formed by Graham and Burns was found to be lawful, then 
the proclamation issued by Warren would be void. In cross-examination by Asquith, 
Warren stated that he ‘suppose[d]’ he issued the proclamation under the common 
law. Counsel also referred to the Trafalgar Square Act 1844, which ‘empowered the 
Commissioner of Works to make proper regulations for the use of the square’, yet 
the proclamation was made by the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, and not the 
Commissioner of Works. It was also contended by the counsel that if Warren used 
his authority from s52 Metropolitan Police Act, ‘that it was ultra vires, as the power 
given by this section was for making regulations for carriage routes and for the 
preventing obstruction in the streets… The proclamation went far beyond anything of 
                                               
201
 Ibid. 
202
 Old Bailey Proceedings Online (www.oldbaileyonline.org, version 7.0, 22 May 2012), January 1888, 
trial of ROBERT GALLINGAD BONTINE CUNNINGHAME GRAHAM JOHN BURNS (t18880109-223). 
147 
 
that kind, as it prohibited meetings and speeches.’203 In advising the jury, Charles J, 
confirmed that while Warren’s public notice did not necessarily make a meeting 
unlawful, he declared: 
[T]he fact that Sir Charles considered a gathering there would be dangerous 
to the public peace justified his issue of the notices, and the constables did 
their duty in dispersing people who assembled there. But if the gathering 
there had been for a lawful object that would have been no justification for 
the riotous conduct of those who acted against the police.204 
Warren’s public notice prohibiting public meetings was only justified under the 
common law. This was a preventative action to avert a breach of the peace despite 
there being no imminence of disorder, and the defendants had a history of 
addressing numerous peaceable meetings. Regardless of this, the jury found them 
guilty of unlawful assembly, but not the more serious charges of riot, or for the 
assault upon the police offices. Charles J concurred with the verdict and sentenced 
Graham and Burns to six weeks imprisonment without hard labour.205  
The legal authority of Warren’s notice was also subject to the hearing of Mr W 
Saunders, who was charged with disorderly conduct for addressing a crowd in 
Trafalgar Square, at Bow Street Police Court on 17 November 1887. Mr Poland, 
prosecuting on behalf of the Treasury, stated that the Government withdrew the 
prosecution because there was ‘no penalty attached to the disobedience of the 
proclamation.’ The defence pressed for a conviction in order for the case to be 
carried into another court. Ingham J, discharged the defendant, stating that there 
was nothing he could do to forward his views.206  
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Edward Lewis, a solicitor who had previously defended many of the accused at Bow 
Street Police Court, directly attacked the prohibition of meetings held in Trafalgar 
Square by tendering information in support of his application for summonses against 
Warren and the Home Secretary, Sir Henry Matthews, ‘for having used violence and 
intimidation with a view to prevent citizens from holding public meetings in Trafalgar 
Square, for a lawful purpose, without legal authority.’ The magistrate, Vaughn 
declared that he could not grant the summonses stating: 
It may be bad law, and if so, you can go to the high court and get the whole 
of it reviewed and my refusal to grant you summonses considered. If the 
court says that your judgement is correct, then, of course, I shall be 
compelled to grant you the summonses.207 
 
This led to the hearing Ex parte Lewis.208  Two of Lewis’s complaints were that 
Matthews and Warren had conspired: 
by unlawful violence and other unlawful means to prevent divers of Her 
Majesty’s subjects from exercising their constitutional and lawful rights… [and 
to] endanger the public safety and peace, and to injure, annoy, and disturb 
the public in the enjoyment of their civil rights.209 
Lewis’s claim to establish peaceful public assembly and protest at Trafalgar Square 
as a constitutional right through the common law failed. However, in his judgment, 
Wills J stated, ‘a great deal was said about the right of public meeting – 
unnecessarily – inasmuch as it is a right which has long passed out of region of 
discussion or doubt.’210 This ambiguous statement has potentially two very different 
interpretations. It is commonly seen as a judgment which recognises the ‘right’ to 
public meetings. In 2010, Peter Thornton QC referenced this quote when he argued 
that, ‘The Law has long recognised the right of public meeting, ‘a right which has 
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long passed out of the region of discussion or doubt’.’211 Yet, Wills J’s summery is 
not consistent with this interpretation. It is more likely that when he stated that ‘it is a 
right which has long passed out of region of discussion or doubt’ he was merely 
summarising  Lewis’ argument, which is evidenced by the first clause of his sentence, 
‘a great deal was said about the right of public meeting’. Therefore, in its full context, 
Wills J’s quote summarises his view that the argument promoting the right of public 
meeting by Lewis was irrelevant and ‘unnecessarily’ said. This interpretation is later 
reinforced in Wills J’s summary, when he states that there is ‘no trace in our law 
books’ of such ‘rights’, and referring to Lewis’s argument that these rights rested 
upon ‘dedication’, Wills J confirmed that:  
The only “dedication” in the legal sense that we are aware of is that of a 
public right of passage, of which the legal description is a “right for all her 
Majesty’s subjects at all seasons of the year freely and at their will to pass 
and repass without let or hinderence… [and continued to state that a claim to 
the right of public assembly is] in its nature irreconcilable with the right of free 
passage, and there is… no authority whatever in favour of it.212   
Furthermore, Dicey’s assessment of the perceived ‘right’ to public meeting also 
supports this view. He stated, ‘it can hardly be said that our constitution knows of 
such a thing as any specific right of public meeting.’213 In ensuing case law this 
stance is again reiterated.214  
With regard to meetings at Trafalgar Square, a further point lay in reference to an Act 
of Parliament which established that ‘the Commissioners of Works have a right to 
say whether or not it shall be so used.’ 215  Incidentally, the Works Office later 
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delegated these powers to the Commissioner of Police in 1892.216 Following the 
defeat at common law level to establish the right of public meeting, two Bills were 
later introduced to Parliament in an attempt to guarantee such rights under statute. 
The Trafalgar Square (Regulation of Meetings) Bill 1888 was omitted from the Royal 
Speech in 1889, and an amendment was made to express regret that legislation ‘to 
safeguard the long accustomed right of public meeting in Trafalgar Square’ had been 
discounted.217  
In July 1888, Cunninghame Graham introduced the Public Meetings in Open Spaces 
Bill which was directed to declare and regulate the right of public meeting. Clause 1 
stated that where the public had at any time used or enjoyed any open space for the 
purpose of public meetings in the last 20 years, then the public shall be ‘deemed for 
all purposes to have acquired an absolute and inalienable right to the user thereof for 
the said purposes.’ The penalties stipulated under this Bill, demonstrate the intention 
of its drafters to protect free speech and assembly. Clause 3 states that the penalty 
for a breach of the regulations of the Act would be a fine not exceeding £5. Clause 4 
provides that, for the unlawful interference, disturbance or molestation of a public 
meeting, or use of violence or intimidation against a procession, persons, or a 
person proceeding to a meeting, ‘shall be guilty of a misdemeanour, and liable on 
conviction thereof, on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, 
or to a fine, in the discretion of the Court.’ The Bill did not progress past its second 
reading. Despite the increased debate on public meetings following the Trafalgar 
Square riots, attempts to secure a constitutional right through both the courts and 
Parliament failed, leaving the police and local authorities free to utilise the 
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ambiguous and ill-defined powers under the breach of the peace doctrine. The wide 
discretion this ultimately provided for the police subsequently led to inconsistent 
practice being applied across the country. 
3.2) The Unemployed Manchester Marchers 1908 
 
Before the First World War, the practice of provincial police constabularies relating to 
public meetings was often inconsistently applied. This is demonstrated by the 
different receptions received by the unemployed workers of Manchester who 
marched through the Midlands on route to hand in a petition to Parliament in London 
in 1908. The contrasting responses of the Birmingham and Coventry police 
authorities could not be more prominent. Firstly, the Manchester men arrived at 
Birmingham and were warned by the police that they could not walk in processional 
order through the streets in the centre of the city, or hold an open air meeting there. 
The newspaper reportage does not record what legal authority was utilised, or 
question the legality of the police action, but it can be deduced that the police order 
was a ‘loose’ interpretation of the common law power to prevent a breach of the 
peace. Despite the police order, the leaders, Stewart Gray and Jack Williams, 
declared their ‘intention of asserting their rights of free speech.’ They wanted to 
address a crowd at Chamberlain Square and following the ban Gray was reported to 
have said to a Police Inspector, ‘I tell you frankly that there will be a meeting.’218 An 
attempt by Gray to meet with the Mayor to resolve the issue was also reported to 
have been hindered by the police who refused him entry to Mansion House. 
Undeterred, the procession which consisted of flags, banners and a hand cart 
carrying the petition for local people to sign proceeded and was met by a ‘strong 
force of police.’ After unsuccessful negotiations, the unemployed began to advance, 
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the police obstructed their progress, and ‘a scene of extraordinary violence 
ensued.’219 The Manchester Courier was in no doubt who to attribute the cause of 
the violence to declaring ‘A riot, which nearly attained the most serious proportions, 
occurred… owing to the aggressive attitude which was displayed by the body of 
Manchester unemployed.’220 
When it became clear that the unemployed could not break the police cordon, many 
of them began to march to Coventry. The others attempted to break through the 
police lines and four men were arrested during the disorder. Two of which were 
released on the undertaking that they would leave the city, and the other two men 
were charged with disorderly conduct at the police court. They were subsequently 
discharged by the magistrates under the assurance that they would leave the city 
and join the rest of the group. When the unemployed men reached Coventry on 
Saturday evening they were ‘well received by local labour men.’ They were provided 
with sleeping quarters for two nights at the Clarion Club and given three meals on 
Sunday, including one hot meal. The police were also hospitable, and allowed the 
unemployed to hold public meetings, and make collections.221 These contrasting 
examples illustrate the extent of police discretion available in response to facilitating 
public meetings in two towns just 20 miles apart.222  
The previous examples of policing public meetings in 1888 and 1908, demonstrate 
two key complexities that marked public order policing. Firstly, there was the 
autocratic police response regarding Trafalgar Square, which heavily relied upon 
their discretionary powers under the common law to close public meetings and 
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disperse an assembly, or to prohibit public meetings in advance for an undisclosed 
period of time. The Trafalgar Square incidents also demonstrate the willingness of 
the courts to approve of such police action. The second example from the West 
Midlands demonstrates how the practice of public order policing varied from one 
police authority to the next. Both problems can be seen as the result of wide 
discretionary police powers under the breach of the peace doctrine, and 
demonstrates the susceptibility of these powers to political partiality and 
discrimination. It is these considerations that must be acknowledged when 
considering the various police practice utilised in the era of the BUF and their anti-
fascist opponents.    
4) Mosley and Trenchard on Freedom of Speech 
In a similar manner to the examples given from the 1880s and 1908, BUF 
propaganda also frequently referred to the ‘established British right of free 
speech.’223 This terminology was used to justify the necessity of using force against 
political opponents. Mosley initiated this principle when he formed the New Party in 
1931. Arguing that they had experienced organised disruption of their meetings he 
declared, ‘We are going to defend the right of free speech in this country and will not 
tamely submit to methods of violence and intimidation.’ Referring to his organisation 
of stewards trained to deal with violent interruption, which the Western Daily Press 
dubbed an ‘army’, Mosley stated, ‘The only methods we shall employ will be English 
methods. We shall rely on the good old English fist.’224 When Mosley formed the 
BUF a year later, these organised stewards became known as the Fascist Defence 
Force.  
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Mosley’s concept of freedom of speech was later formulated in an article published 
in Action in 1936. It was a scathing attack on the ‘failing’ democratic system that, 
instead of dealing with the assailants of free speech, the Government used the law 
against the defenders of free speech. Mosley recorded: 
bricks were still whistling freely through the air, and round us, on the ground, 
were unconscious Blackshirts, savagely mauled by a highly organised Red 
mob because they had ventured to maintain an "Englishman's right of Free 
Speech" at their own meeting.225  
Mosley’s reference to free speech as an ‘Englishman’s right’ was an effective 
propaganda tool, used to justify the use of Blackshirt violence, and to discredit 
communism as an alien threat to English values. Mosley still referred to free speech 
as a ‘right’ in his 1968 autobiography, My Life. He mentioned the organised minority 
who attempted to deny the right of free speech to the people, and even claimed of 
his Blackshirts that, ‘These devoted young men saved free speech in Britain.’226  
Countering Mosley’s definition of freedom of speech, the Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner, Lord Trenchard, stated that free speech did not mean that people 
could express their views without interruption from political opponents, but that 
people were free to air their views without official interference from the Government, 
or the police acting on their behalf.227 However, as free speech was not a legal right, 
the police did have the common law duty to prevent people from addressing a crowd 
if it was reasonably anticipated that it would result in a breach of the peace.  
In Justice of the Peace and Local Government Review, the concept of English ‘rights’ 
was addressed in relation to public meetings in public places. It stated that such a 
right did not exist in legal terms, but it existed as a ‘quasi-constitutional right’ based 
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on ‘practice of very long standing [that was] not lightly to be interfered with’. The right 
to public meetings in public places was ‘only subject to the overriding right of His 
Majesty’s subjects to move freely about the highways… and to the duty of the police 
to prevent breaches of the peace’.228 This reveals that such freedoms had meaning 
and importance to the people and the state in principle, but as unwritten rights, they 
had no legal protection. 
5) The Police at BUF Meetings 
When the Blackshirts became a recognisable presence on the streets of Britain, the 
occupation of public space by fascist and communist speakers regularly caused 
conflict and disorder. BUF meetings frequently attracted opposition from anti-fascist 
opponents, who responded to their provocative political doctrine by constantly 
interrupting speakers by cat-calling, singing or throwing missiles. The question of 
provocation at public meetings raises the same issues discussed in Chapter 2 above. 
The judgments of Beatty v Gillbanks and Wise v Dunning determine that there is a 
significant point when the disorder that results from the provocation of an individual 
or group can be deemed to be a natural consequence or not, and subsequently 
identify who was culpable and who the police should direct their action towards. 
Although anti-Semitism was not part of official BUF policy from the outset, their 
militaristic appearance, association with the dictatorships of Italy and Germany, 
disapproval of the political system and desire to set up the corporate state, 
outspoken hatred of communism, and fast growing reputation for political violence, 
generated widespread political opposition. Opposition to BUF activism, whether 
organised or spontaneous, was a regular feature of their meetings and became a 
particular feature for the police in devising a strategy that minimised the risk of 
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disorder. This was particularly resonant in the preparations for the policing of a large 
BUF rally and anti-fascist demonstration at Hyde Park in 1934. 
5.1) Hyde Park 1934 
 
Correspondence between the Home Office and the Metropolitan Police reveals the 
difficulty in policing large scale BUF meetings that were advertised in advance. The 
BUF usually cooperated with the police authorities when planning large scale 
meetings and demonstrations. In 1934, the BUF had planned a great rally in 
London’s White City arena which had the capacity to hold between 80,000-90,000 
people. This was later relocated to Hyde Park and rescheduled for 9 September. 
Martin Pugh attributes this to the deliberate stifling of BUF activity by Hugh 
Trenchard, stating that ‘he intervened to insist that the owners allow police inside.’229 
This was a reaction to the disorder witnessed at the Olympia hall when the police did 
not enter the arena despite hecklers being evidently assaulted by Blackshirt 
stewards which is discussed in the next chapter. BUF propaganda declared that the 
change in venue was due to the potential damage to the running tracks ahead of the 
Empire Games staged there the following day.230 The relocated demonstration, now 
being in a public place meant that the Metropolitan Police had more control in 
maintaining order, and Blackshirt stewards had no authority to remove or eject 
interrupters from a meeting held in a public place. With the anticipation of booing and 
cat-calling amongst the audience, Frank Newsam, a leading civil servant, declared 
that it was ‘no part of the duty of the Police to preserve quiet at open air meetings, 
and it is submitted that the Police should not attempt to deal with such conduct, 
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unless disorder arises as a result of it.’231 Newsam was appointed by the Home 
Office in 1933 to ‘address the problems caused by the disorders resulting from the 
activities of the British Fascists’.232 
The Metropolitan Police and the Home Office were attentive to the threat of 
organised disorder from anti-fascist organisations who had advertised their 
opposition to the BUF meeting in Hyde Park with pamphlets declaring, ‘Answer the 
Fascist Challenge in Hyde Park’, with emotive reminders of the violence utilised by 
the Blackshirts at Olympia.233 A major consideration that the authorities contended 
with in planning the policing of this event was the possibility of large numbers of anti-
fascists assembling with the intention of preventing the fascists reaching their 
platforms. The BUF were already granted permission from the Commissioner of 
Works to hold a meeting in Hyde Park, with the only stipulation that the police should 
dictate where their vans, which they use as speaking platforms, should be placed. 
Newsam had already warned Trenchard and Gilmour that it was likely that the police 
would be called upon by the fascists to assist them in clearing a path through the 
crowd to reach their meeting point.234 He advised that it could only be seen as the 
duty of the police to prevent an obstruction of the thoroughfares and paths of the 
park, and not across the grass to their platforms. In this circumstance, it was the 
fascists’ responsibility to get through the crowd without creating disorder. He added 
that the police should not interfere unless the fascists attempted to launch an attack 
on the crowd to reach their destination, and that if there was a densely packed crowd 
around the fascist platform, then the fascists should be informed that the police 
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would not allow them to force their way through. Alternatively, Newsam argued that if 
Mosley made plans for his supporters to arrive early to keep the path open, then it 
would be the duty of the police to prevent any hostile elements from jostling them off 
the ground. This, he stated, could be justified as such action would be likely to lead 
to a breach of the peace.  
Responding to Newsam’s memorandum, Trenchard declared that it would be 
‘ludicrous’ if following the permission granted by the Commissioner of Works and the 
stipulation given by the police on the location of the platforms, that the BUF were 
prevented from reaching their meeting place because of their political opponents. 
Gilmour also acknowledged this situation and defended the decision that the police 
would assist the fascists by clearing a path through to the platform, if necessary, 
giving several reasons. One was that inaction on behalf of the police would only 
inflame the fascist propaganda that free speech was unattainable in this country. He 
also compared the situation to May Day demonstrations and insisted that the police 
would not allow that to be obstructed by Labour supporters. Finally, he added that if 
the police did not act to prevent the anti-fascists from surrounding the fascist 
platform, then serious disorder may occur. Regardless of this, Newsam remained 
opposed to direct police involvement and argued that any view that the police were 
facilitating the fascists arriving at their platforms may only precipitate disorder.235 
The debate over how to police the demonstration at Hyde Park between the Home 
Office and Lord Trenchard demonstrated the scope of discretion available with the 
competing potential outcomes considered. Despite the view that police facilitation of 
the BUF meeting would inflame anti-fascist protesters, Trenchard’s tactic had 
succeeded and the Hyde Park meeting itself passed without serious incident. The 
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problem of anti-fascists crowding the BUF platform was averted by a cordon of police 
who kept the area clear. The Special Branch report acknowledged that while the 
opposing meetings were in progress, speakers from each meeting urged their 
supporters not to go to each other’s meeting. It was also reported that all of the anti-
fascist speakers, located at four points around Hyde Park, emphasised that ‘the 
counter-demonstration had not been organised as a display of violence, but to show 
a mass working class opposition to fascism’.236 The BUF held five separate speaking 
platforms in Hyde Park until Mosley’s address, and the separate audiences 
congregated together around platform four to hear him speak. It was also recorded 
that the noise generated by the booing and singing made it impossible for anybody 
outside of the police cordon to hear the speeches, and added the majority of the 
20,000 audience members were hostile to the BUF. The total number of those who 
attended Hyde Park was estimated to have been between 100,000-150,000.237 At 
the close of the proceedings, the police cleared a way through the crowd and 
escorted the BUF members back to their headquarters, while a crowd of 3,000 
followed the procession and booed the Blackshirts. The crowd was then dispersed 
by the police and no arrests were made. In Hyde Park, 18 arrests were made for 
offences including using insulting words or behaviour, obstructing the police and 
assault. 
Newspaper reportage highlighted the use of new technology utilised by the police. 
The Western Morning News reported that a police autogyro hovered at 1,500 feet for 
observational purposes and police cars ‘fitted with wireless’ circled the crowd.238 
There was also significant praise for the police operation. The Western Daily Press 
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claimed that the demonstrations passed off peaceably enough, not because of the 
conduct of the demonstrators, but because of the police, ‘who were present in 
sufficient force to overawe the unruly and quell any incipient attempt to create 
disorder.’239 The proficient police operation and the condemnation of the activities of 
the fascists and anti-fascists was satirised in the Daily Express the day after the 
Hyde Park rally. The cartoon depicted the rival political movements which were intent 
on creating disorder being overcome by the strength of the police and is illustrated in 
figure 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1 Daily Express, 10 September 1934. Permission to reproduce this image 
has been granted by Express Newspapers/Express Syndication. 
At the Marlborough Street Police Court the following day, the 18 charges were heard 
by magistrate Boyd. One significant charge was brought against a fascist who 
allegedly threw a stone at a police officer which struck him below the eye. The fascist 
Hugh Hare, an actor, directing his evidence towards the police officer in question, 
enquired, ‘Did it occur to you that I was giving the fascist salute?’ and ‘Do I look like 
the type of person who would wantonly throw a stone?’ Following the evidence of 
Hare and others, Boyd was satisfied that there had been a mistake and Hare was 
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discharged. Another fascist, Thomas Collins, was treated more seriously by Boyd. 
Following a guilty plea on the charge of using insulting words and behaviour, the 
magistrate said that to impose a fine would be ridiculous and bound him over for 12 
months with a surety of £10.240 The newspaper reports do not declare the political 
allegiance of Collins, but the Special Branch report claimed him to be the same 
Thomas Collins who was arrested during the Suffolk Tithe dispute and was convicted 
with 19 other members of the BUF for conspiring together to effect an act of public 
mischief.241 Interestingly, he was bound over for two years following this charge, but 
the binding over order was not mentioned by Boyd following the Hyde Park 
demonstration.  
The Home Office files reveal the tension between Trenchard, Gilmour and Newsam 
on how to police the fascist event. The tactics utilised by the police to ensure public 
order were successful and achieved the praise of the press. Newsam’s concern that 
if the police actively aided the fascists it would precipitate disorder did not materialise. 
Yet, the event proved to be a useful propaganda tool for the anti-fascists’ claims of 
pro-fascist police partiality. The communist newspaper, the Daily Worker used the 
police operation at Hyde Park to demonstrate political bias of the authorities: 
The British Union of Fascists carries on its activities only by gracious 
permission of Lord Trenchard and His Majesty's Government… Mosley was 
only able to appear in Hyde Park because the entire London police was 
mobilised in his defence. For every Blackshirt there were three or four 
policemen. And from all over the country comes the same story of police 
protection for Blackshirts.242 
From the Home Office discussions in preparation of the fascist and anti-fascist rallies 
at Hyde Park, the conflict in defining appropriate police tactics was a delicate 
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balancing act. The main element of negotiations was to reduce the risk of disorder, 
although this involved ensuring the fascists were not prevented from holding their 
meeting. It was also considered vital that the police action did not give fuel to fascist 
or communist propaganda. Yet, in their desire to avoid fascist criticism that free 
speech was unattainable, it became inevitable that communist propaganda would 
criticise the police for being pro-fascist. The large scale events allowed the 
authorities the time to organise police tactics, liaise with the respective groups and 
make contingency plans in the event of anticipated disorder. Yet, around the country 
Blackshirts took to the soap boxes on a regular basis to attract the attention of local 
residents and passers-by. The responses by different police officers on the spot 
varied between the regions and questions the extent to which free speech was 
attainable.   
5.2) Plymouth 1934: “Go on boys, get stuck into them.”243 
The typical image of Blackshirt meetings, as portrayed by BUF propaganda, is of 
fascist speakers lawfully endeavouring to attain a hearing amid the organised 
disruption of a minority of communists. This heroic stance was also depicted on BUF 
cartoons, illustrated in figure 3.2.  
Although disruption was commonplace at fascist meetings, it was not always 
organised, and in turn, the behaviour of the fascists was not always lawful. At a 
meeting in Plymouth Market Square on 11 October 1934, the actions of four 
Blackshirts resulted in them being charged at the City Police Court. Three of the 
defendants, William McIntye, George Clarke and Kenneth Davis, were found guilty of 
committing a breach of the peace and assault and sentenced to six weeks hard 
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labour. The other, Michael Goulding who was the speaker at the meeting, had his 
charge of inciting a breach of the peace dismissed.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 BUF postcard advertising Mosley’s Fascism booklet, 1936.  
 
It was reported that 20 Blackshirts arrived at the Market Square in a closed van on 
11 October when a Trades and Labour Council meeting was already in progress. 
The crowd was estimated by one witness to have been 7,000-8,000 strong. 244 
McIntyre, Clarke and Davis were in plain clothes and walked amongst the audience. 
Giving evidence, police officer Mitchell stated that Goulding spoke on the roof of the 
van, surrounded by Blackshirts for ten minutes. The crowd remained noisy and then 
Goulding instructed McIntyre, Clarke and Davis to attack the crowd by raising his 
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hand and commanding, ‘Go on, boys, get stuck into them’.245 He then described how 
the three fascists then struck out and hit anyone within their reach. Other statements 
describe the particularly brutal nature of the attacks. Chief Constable William 
Johnson stated that one man, who was struck several times, rushed into the 
doorway of Woolworths where he was, ‘further knocked about until he was in a state 
of collapse.’246 The three fascists wore insulating tape around their knuckles and all 
admitted to having reputations as competent boxers. They claimed that they 
expected disorder and the tape would protect their ‘fragile’ hands. In the witness box, 
Police Superintendent Hutchings stated that the tape would ‘increase the force of a 
blow [as the tape would] harden through perspiration.’247 
It was alleged that Goulding attempted to join in the disorder after giving his 
instruction but was stopped by the police. For the defence, barrister Fearnley-
Whittingstall argued that the disorder started after a brick, which was thrown from the 
crowd, narrowly missed Goulding, and another man struck Davis on the back. The 
provocation towards the fascists was not enough justification for the assaults 
committed by McIntyre, Clarke and Davis. The presiding magistrate ruled: 
[W]e have no doubt that they came to Plymouth that night with the intention 
of fighting – at any rate, prepared to do so – on the least provocation. In 
addition, it has to be remembered that they were all expert boxers… Conduct 
of this sort cannot be tolerated in this city,248 
This incident highlights the trouble that the BUF had in attaining a hearing at public 
meetings. It also demonstrates the competition for public space. In this case, the 
Trades Union meeting was already in progress when the Blackshirts arrived, but as 
there was no way of reserving public space, the competing movements could easily 
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hinder each other’s meetings. At Plymouth, the police used their discretion to allow 
the fascists the opportunity to address the public, despite an opposing political 
meeting already being in progress. Although this action promoted the values of free 
speech, the jeers, cat calls and singing from the crowd which hindered the Blackshirt 
meeting also prevented the trade union meeting from continuing. The Western 
Independent, which was critical of fascism, declared that the ‘right to freedom of 
speech was being denied by the holding of these meetings not by their banning.’ 249 
Yet, as soon as disorder occurred the police responded quickly and the BUF meeting 
was closed. The Trade Unionists were said to have ‘remained quiescent on their 
rostrum’ during the Blackshirt disturbance and ‘composedly resumed their speeches’ 
when the fascists had vacated their position.250  
5.3) Mosley Acquitted of Riotous Disorder at Worthing 1934 
The BUF meeting in Worthing on 9 October resulted in Mosley, William Joyce, 
Charles Budd and Bernard Mullans being summonsed on the charge of riotous 
assembly.251 Mosley and Mullans were also charged with individual cases of assault.  
The five necessary elements for the common law offence of riot were summarised by 
Phillimore J in Field v Metropolitan Police Receiver252 as: 
(1) number of persons, three at least;  
(2) common purpose;  
(3) execution or inception of the common purpose;  
(4) an intent to help one another by force if necessary against any person 
who may oppose them in the execution of their common purpose;  
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(5) force or violence not merely used in demolishing, but displayed in such a 
manner as to alarm at least one person of reasonable firmness and 
courage.253 
 
Mosley had conducted an indoor meeting at the pavilion on the sea front, a building 
he described as ‘a large tin tabernacle of flimsy construction.’254 He alleged that the 
tin sides of the pavilion were struck by sticks and stones during the meeting. 
According to the prosecution, the crowd which had assembled outside had been 
orderly and good humoured and it was the actions of the fascists that had incited 
disorder. Prosecuting at Worthing Police Court, John Flowers KC alleged that the 
four defendants, and other members of the fascist movement acting under their 
encouragement, walked up and down outside the pavilion and assaulted inoffensive 
and law-abiding citizens. He continued the prosecution’s case, stating, ‘there was 
taking place a perfectly disgraceful and intolerable state of things. Violence was 
being used by the members of the defendant’s party against all and sundry.’255  
The defence responded with the typical BUF stance of being victims of disorder 
rather than the instigators. He stated, ‘If ever a thing has been proved to the hilt 
before a Court of Law it is this – that they were more sinned against than sinning.’ 
He then appealed to the bench not to ‘stretch the law against freedom of speech, the 
freedom of expression, and against minorities.’ 256  The prosecution’s argument 
countered this by stressing the orderly nature of the crowd and considered that the 
reason that the BUF dress in uniform and travelled to Worthing with bodyguards and 
ambulance men was to meet violence with violence.257  
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In one instance, Mosley was alleged to have struck a member of the crowd. In 
addition, a female witness also alleged she was hit on the head by a Blackshirt. 
Police witnesses also highlighted the orderly conduct of the crowd and stressed the 
unprovoked use of force by the Blackshirts.258 Much of the disorder was said to have 
occurred as Blackshirts violently pushed their way through crowds at either a café, 
where Mosley had supper, or Warwick Street, outside the local BUF headquarters. 
Mosley had received reports that an angry mob where ‘beleaguering’ their 
headquarters with women inside and on arriving there himself general fighting 
ensued and some Blackshirts came out of the office to assist them. The prosecution 
highlighted that the Blackshirts had taken a fighting attitude to the orderly crowd. An 
example of the unprovoked attacks included the assault of a solicitor’s clerk who was 
just passing through Warwick Street after posting a letter was struck on his head, 
nose and jaw by Blackshirts which left him unconscious and covered in blood. 
Mosley also claimed that he stayed on the streets until order was restored because 
he did not want to endanger the females within the headquarters. In his 
autobiography, Mosley’s recollections of the event glorify the retribution of the 
Blackshirts, recalling that the ‘Reds had arrived in coaches from far away, but after 
protracted debate left in some disorder… [and on the disturbance at Warwick Street 
stated] the Reds were surprised to see us… and again they got the worst of it.259 The 
police court proceedings lasted for 5 days before the Bench retired and commit all 
four defendants for trail at the Lewes Assizes. 
Prosecuting, John Flowers KC stated that this was not a political prosecution but one 
brought by the West Sussex Police to deal with ‘a very disgraceful, discreditable and 
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violent state of affairs in the streets of Worthing.’260 It was also stressed by the 
prosecution that none of the witnesses that were assaulted had any particular 
political views and their evidence was supported by ‘respectable persons… without 
any political axe to grind.’261 Mosley had alleged that the prosecution was brought 
about by the Government of the day who he claimed controlled the police. It was for 
this reason he stated that the police evidence was ‘contradictory and false’.262 Under 
cross-examination, the police tactics to control any anticipated disorder arising from 
the BUF meeting was exposed. Firstly, the evidence that the crowd was orderly was 
challenged by the declaration that things from the crowd, including tomatoes, were 
thrown through the windows of the café which hit waitresses in the face. Furthermore, 
the crowd were also alleged to have been booing and shouting at women and 
chasing them through the streets. None of the police officers called to testify 
witnessed these scenes. In addition, only four police officers were originally stationed 
in the vicinity of the BUF meeting despite notification from Budd that they expected 
organised disorder from their opponents. It was argued for the defendant that the 
police did ‘practically nothing’ in preparation for the meeting despite the crowd 
numbering the same as that of a general election. 263  Branson J rejected the 
prosecutions argument that the common purpose in this case which constituted riot 
was the holding of the meeting and parading the streets. He stated, 
It is not suggested here that anything which happened before the events in 
Warwick Street constitutes a riot. I cannot find any evidence of any common 
purpose or object with regard to which they can be inferred to have agreed to 
use violence.264  
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Furthermore, the violence that had occurred at Warwick Street broke out in the 
absence of the four defendants. Branson J instructed the jury to find a verdict of not 
guilty. The defence applied for costs against the police. However, Branson J 
responded,  
I do not think that the police have always given evidence in this case with the 
fairness I am accustomed to find from the police all over the country. But I do 
not think it is a matter of which I ought to take so much notice as to make 
them pay the costs.265 
 
The use of the common law charge of riotous assembly at Worthing demonstrated 
that some legal authorities did attempt to restrict BUF activism. If Mosley’s 
accusation that the charge was initiated by the Government was true, then this can 
be seen as an effort at national level to find a legal precedent to restrict the disorder 
associated with the BUF. However, as no other evidence supports this notion, at the 
very least this trial demonstrates that at a local level, there were provincial police 
forces that did not demonstrate the pro-fascist stance. For instance, the officers on 
duty did not take any action against those members of the crowd who did cause 
disorder by throwing objects and using threatening behaviour such as chasing 
women in an intimidating way. The officers on the ground and their superiors who 
proceeded with the charge directed their powers against the BUF. Despite evidence 
suggesting that some members of the crowd used illegal methods to show their 
contempt of the fascists’ meeting, the police used their discretion to overlook some 
aspects of the crowd’s behaviour as they regarded the BUF as the instigators of the 
disorder. 
5.4) Freedom of Speech for the Speaker or the Heckler? 
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At public meetings, both the speaker and the heckler have claimed that they are 
entitled to share their views. Yet, does the claim for free speech refer to the freedom 
to attain a hearing free from interruption, or the freedom to speak unconditionally and 
without consequence? The legal position regarding the extent free speech could be 
claimed was recorded in 1932 at the Birmingham Quarter Sessions. John Trotter, a 
labourer who addressed a public meeting, claimed the right to free speech when he 
was accused of inciting people to steal, assault the police, damage property, engage 
in unlawful assembly and riotously to assemble together. The Recorder stated in his 
summing up, ‘There is no such thing in a civilised community as the right of free 
speech… You are allowed to express your opinion as far as you keep within the law 
and no further.’266 At BUF meetings, the fascist speaker or the anti-fascist heckler 
could both be charged for expressing opinions, if a police officer reasonably 
suspected that their words or behaviour were threatening, abusive or insulting with 
the intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or whereby a breach of the peace may 
be occasioned.  
While it could be argued that fascist speakers incited disorder or encouraged 
violence through provocative and anti-Semitic speeches, it appears more common 
that it was audience members who heckled and showed their contempt for fascism 
to end up before a magistrate. One incident was reported in The Times. At 
Leytonstone, Greater London, Joseph Bennett, a bookshop manager, shouted ‘Go 
back to Germany and eat German sausage’ and ‘Fascism means hunger and war’ at 
a BUF meeting. 267 In the opinion of the Metropolitan Police, this was likely to cause 
a breach of the peace and the heckler was arrested and marched to the police 
station. At Stratford Police Court, the defendant denied that he intended to break up 
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the meeting but simply wished to express his disapproval of fascist principles, which 
he declared he was entitled to do. If it was found that his intention was to break up 
the meeting then he could have been fined a maximum of £5 or up to one month 
imprisonment under the Public Meetings Act 1908. Bennett was charged with using 
insulting words contrary to s54 Metropolitan Police Act 1839 and was subsequently 
fined 40 shillings with an additional £2 and two shillings costs. 
At an outdoor BUF meeting at the Plymouth Market in February 1934, the Western 
Morning News reported that the BUF area propaganda officer, Arthur Cann, was 
subject to ‘constant interruption, and many unpolite and unprintable remarks’, and 
the ‘majority of the three hundred or so who attended the meeting made every 
possible endeavour to drown Cann’s voice with their constant jeers.’ The meeting 
was well attended by the police, and despite the disruption and the local 
newspaper’s claim that the ‘hecklers became so persistent that a clash between the 
Socialist element and the Blackshirt guard which surrounded the lorry seemed 
imminent’ the police did not interfere with the verbal disturbance of the meeting.268 
This is arguably an example of good police practice as although angry words were 
exchanged, physical hostility did not did materialise and order was kept. 
In contrast to the incident at Leytonstone, the exact nature of the heckling at the 
Plymouth meeting was not reported, and the reader is left to reflect on what the 
‘unprintable remarks’ were. The question that separates these two examples is, at 
what point should the police act to prevent a breach of the peace? As the actions 
used by the police in both of these examples were lawful it demonstrates the extent 
of police discretion in deciding when and when not to act. It also establishes how 
police practice can vary between provincial forces which reveal inconsistencies in 
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law enforcement between different regions. The quote from Trenchard has already 
established that it was not the role of the police to protect speakers in public places 
from interruption that was caused by their political opponents. However, the police 
did have a responsibility to act when order was threatened or when threatening, 
abusive or insulting words or behaviour were used with the intent to provoke a 
breach of the peace or where a breach of the peace may be occasioned. Although 
the situation at the BUF meeting in Plymouth was highly inflammable, and the police 
could have justified an action of dispersing the crowd or arresting hecklers under the 
anticipation that a breach of the peace may occur, the meeting ended without 
incident demonstrating that some meetings, despite hostile opposition, do not require 
direct police interference. The police tactics of monitoring and surveillance employed 
at Plymouth ensured that freedom of expression was maintained and the police 
presence, rather than police action, was enough to ensure that public safety was 
preserved. 
A further option available to the police was to arrest the speaker, yet this happened 
less frequently at fascist meetings as opposed to the meetings of the far-Left. At one 
meeting in London, known Jew baiter and auctioneer John Penfold, was arrested to 
avert serious disorder after he stated, ‘The Jews are taking this country from us by 
their filthy methods and sweated labour. They are nothing more than usurers and 
parasites.’ He continued to call for the removal of Jews from England.269 At the Old 
Street Police Court, Police Constable Gibbs stated that Penfold was addressing 250 
people. When the crowd became hostile and started to move towards Penfold, Gibbs 
stated that he arrested Penfold because he saw that ‘a very grave disorder was 
                                               
269
 Nottingham Evening Post, 28 Aug 1936. 
173 
 
about to take place.’270 Penfold claimed that the prosecution was instigated by the 
Jews and stated that he was against the magistrate hearing his case and wanted the 
case to be committed to 12 of ‘his countrymen’. The magistrate, Mr F. O. Langley, 
fined Penfold 40 shillings and ordered him to find a surety of £50 to be of good 
behaviour for 12 months. 
These three responses demonstrate the general range of the police officer’s actions 
at public meetings. Their discretion could be used against the speaker, the heckler, 
or to decide not to interfere. The arrest of Joseph Bennett for the comments made 
during the BUF meeting at Leytonstone was inconsistent in comparison to the 
Plymouth meeting, and it also needs to be questioned whether police action was 
appropriate and proportionate. Bennett believed that he was ‘entitled’ to demonstrate 
his disapproval of the speaker’s principles. 271  Although heckling was usually 
tolerated at outdoor meetings, police discretion was used to take action when it was 
anticipated that the words or actions of a heckler were thought to result in a breach 
of the peace. These discretionary powers were also employed to prevent speakers 
such as Penfold from addressing a meeting if it was anticipated that it would lead to 
a breach of the peace. However, the law relating to breaches of the peace were 
significantly wide which left police officers on the spot to rely on their discretion in 
each individual situation. Nevertheless, Ewing and Gearty’s claim that BUF speakers 
were shown a ‘remarkable indulgence by the police’ must be recognised and the 
reasons for this considered.272 It has already been argued that official BUF activism 
promoted lawful behaviour and the obedience of its members to police instruction. 
Yet, the abhorrent use of anti-Semitism as a political policy presents a more difficult 
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proposition for the frequent use of inaction by the police at fascist meetings. Thurlow 
has highlighted that there were difficulties in prosecuting anti-Semitic speakers 
because the ‘fascists had developed the technique of criticizing the Jewish people as 
a whole rather than those present at meetings.’273 The use of police discretion to act 
against BUF speakers was therefore impeded by the knowledge that the chance of a 
successful prosecution was minimal. Indeed, even the prosecution of the fanatical 
anti-Semite Arnold Leese of the IFL, who had printed offensive and antagonistic 
attacks on the Jews, must be seen as a failure as he was acquitted of the most 
serious charges.    
5.5) The Trial of Arnold Leese 1936 
In August 1936, Arnold Leese of the Imperial Fascist League appeared at Bow 
Street Police Court, with printer Walter Whitehead, on charges of seditious libel and 
creating a public mischief relating to an article, he wrote in his Party’s paper The 
Fascist. Eustace Fulton, for the Director of Public Prosecutions, read some extracts 
of the article which he alleged was ‘intended to incite illwill and hostility between the 
Jewish subjects of His Majesty and other.’ He recited:  
The Jews are not wanted anywhere on earth. Unfortunately, they are on the 
earth and all over it, destroying everything good and decent by their 
contaminating interference… The alternatives are (1) to kill, (2) to sterilise, or 
(3) to segregate, and our policy is the last one, conducted and maintained at 
their own expense.274 
 
In the article recited by Fulton, Leese also claimed that the Jews practiced the ritual 
murder of Christians in order to obtain blood for use in their ceremonial Passover 
bread. They were committed for trial at the Central Criminal Court and Leese 
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conducted his own defence. Much of his defence was dismissed by Greaves LJ as 
irrelevant, and after the first day suggested that Leese sought legal advice in order to 
save time and the patience of the jury.275 However, the jury found the defendants not 
guilty of the more serious charges relating to seditious libel, but guilty of effecting of 
a public mischief. In sentencing Leese, Greaves stated, 
That the public wellbeing can be served by the publication of stuff of this kind-
and I call it ‘stuff’ advisably- I cannot imagine. Nothing can be more harmful 
to the public weal than that… [He continued] There is one thing you have 
completely forgotten, and that is that the law of England is available to every 
subject with equality.276 
 
Leese was sentenced to six months imprisonment after refusing to pay the fine. Yet 
the significance of this outcome was that he was acquitted of the more serious 
charges. Richard Thurlow highlighted that the Home Office viewed this verdict as a 
precedent; its effect was that the authorities refused to prosecute anti-Semitic or 
racist libel unless it could be proved that it had provoked disorder.277 Furthermore, 
this condition also involved the difficulty of proving that such statements were the 
cause of the disorder. Although this case was related to printed material, its relation 
to freedom of speech at public meetings is also critical. In 1939, former BUF member 
A K Chesterton was not prosecuted after he was alleged to have called for Jews to 
be strung up on lamp-posts at a Nordic League meeting. Thurlow related this 
decision to the failure to convict Leese three years before, but also added that the 
authorities wanted to avoid giving the small movement any publicity. 278  This 
demonstrates the importance of discretion at all levels in deciding whether to initiate 
a prosecution. Police officers are more likely to make an arrest when there is a 
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greater likelihood of a conviction and selective law enforcement inevitably becomes 
standard practice. Even the DPP needs to consider various factors, other than the 
express enforcing of the law, such as the need to avoid giving small extremist groups 
the value of publicity, or a martyr for their radical cause. Also, when Leese published 
another anti-Semitic article titled My Irrelevant Defence on his release from jail he 
was not charged because ‘a further acquittal might be misunderstood by the 
public.’279 The decision making process at all levels of the criminal justice system 
therefore relies on a variety of factors and is inevitably more complex than 
understanding police action as overtly pro-fascist. Ewing and Gearty criticised the 
police stating that there was ‘fragrant discrimination against the Left… [While the 
police] were prepared to go to considerable lengths to protect the freedom of the 
fascists’.280 Yet, this chapter has highlighted the difficulties in achieving a successful 
prosecution of fascists whose own methods of activism are calculatingly conscious of 
legal boundaries. In contrast, although Ewing and Gearty present a valuable 
argument for the political discrimination of the Left in this period, the confrontational 
methods they frequently employed against the police and their frequent promotion of 
unlawful practices presented extensive reasons for legal action. In addition to the 
differences in the methods of activism utilised by the far-Left and Right, it must also 
be remembered that the BUF were not seen as a threat to national security until 
1940. In this respect, Thurlow stated, the BUF were ‘an irritant… not a serious threat 
to the establishment.’281   
6) Policing Communist Activism  
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6.1) Communists and seditious publications 
 
In a significant case at the Central Criminal Court in 1933, four communists were 
charged with conspiring to seduce soldiers from their duty and allegiance to his 
Majesty. The four Welsh minors had attempted to distribute The Soldier’s Voice, a 
newsletter described as the organ of the Communist Soldiers, to servicemen at 
Newport Barracks. It was argued for the defence that communists had as much right 
to express their views as anybody else. Although this was not an isolated case 
regarding communists distributing potentially seditious material,282 its importance lies 
in the definition of the limitations of freedom of speech offered by Humphreys J: 
A person has the liberty to say that the constitution of the country or the 
religion of the country should be changed… that we ought to have no King, 
that we ought to have a Republic, or any other kind of Government. A person 
may go as far as that. So long as he does not offend against the law nobody 
can stop him. What persons cannot do, of course, is in the course of 
criticisms or suggestions to alter the constitution or the law to advise that they 
should be done by force or terrorism.283 
Humphreys dismissed suggestions that the prosecution was based upon the police 
or the DPP’s dislike of the Communist Party as ‘ridiculous’. The judgment relied on 
whether the communists advocated changes by constitutional means, if so then 
suppression via a criminal prosecution must fail. If they were found guilty of offences 
against the Incitement to Mutiny Act 1797, their membership of any particular 
political party was immaterial. All four men were found guilty and their individual 
punishments ranged from 12 months hard labour to three years penal servitude.284  
The activities of extreme communists were treated seriously by the authorities 
because offences, such as sedition and incitement to violence, were perceived as 
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threats to national security. Communist publications made frequent calls for a class 
based civil war. In May 1932, the Soldiers’ Voice claimed, ‘Let us use the knowledge 
of arms which they give us, when the opportunity presents itself, to overthrow their 
rule, and, in unity with our fellow-workers, to establish a free Socialist Britain’, and in 
May 1933, the Red Signal, the organ for communist sailors, exclaimed ‘If war does 
come, then it must be turned into a civil war against the capitalist warmongers and 
their bankrupt system.’ 285  These examples were given by the Attorney General 
during the second reading of the Incitement to Disaffection Bill, and concern was 
raised that the outcome of recent prosecutions of distributers only had the effect of 
driving the chief offenders underground, which created a ‘somewhat sly and almost 
skulking breed of inciter… [that] are too shy or too cowardly to put their names and 
addresses to the literature which they are in the habit of producing.’286 
6.2) The Trenchard Ban and Duncan v Jones287  
 
In November 1931, Lord Trenchard issued instructions that forbade public meetings 
that were held in close proximity to employment exchanges. The Home Secretary 
defended this action in Parliament stating that, ‘recent experience has shown that 
meetings held in such circumstances are liable to lead to breaches of the peace. 
There has been in the past, and there still is, ample opportunity for holding meetings 
elsewhere.’288 Following these instructions, meetings all over the Metropolitan Police 
District were broken up by police, some ending in serious disorder.289 The legal 
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authority that Trenchard used to make this order was vague. Even in the House of 
Commons, Labour MP and barrister Denis Pritt declared that the ban was:  
wrapped in obscurity and secrecy that it is almost as difficult to discover what 
it is, as it is to discover what are the decrees of the Nazi Government… 
[adding] Lord Trenchard had no more right to do that than I had. He had no 
right at all, and no sort or kind of justification.290  
The ban was reminiscent of Warren’s prohibition of meetings in Trafalgar Square in 
the 1880s. A major difference in this scenario, however, was that in Ex Parte Lewis, 
it was established that an Act of Parliament had given the power to the 
Commissioners of Works to declare how the space at Trafalgar Square shall be used. 
Yet, disregarding this technicality, Wills J had reversed the onus on Lewis to provide 
that there was a right to public assembly. As Lewis failed to provide this, Wills J 
concluded that there were no grounds for charging the Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner or the Home Secretary with a criminal conspiracy or misconduct. 
Despite criticism of the Trenchard ban from the NCCL, a legal challenge to this 
authoritarian response to disorder also failed.  
Katherine Duncan, a member of the NUWM, attempted to hold a meeting outside a 
training centre in 1934. Inspector Jones requested that she moved her meeting, and, 
on refusing and continuing to speak she was arrested and charged with obstructing 
the police in the execution of their duty. The NCCL sponsored her failed appeals to 
the London Quarter Sessions and the Divisional Court. At the Divisional Court, the 
appellant was represented by Labour MP Denis Pritt KC and Liberal MP Dingle Foot; 
both were vice-chairmen of the NCCL. They argued that it was not unlawful to hold a 
public meeting on the highway and that the police officer was not acting ‘in the 
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execution of his duty’ when he was obstructed by Mrs Duncan.291 Citing Beatty v 
Gillbanks,292 he continued to argue that the appellant could not be found guilty of a 
legal act because of the apprehended illegal actions of others.  
Lord Chief Justice Hewart dismissed the appeal and clarified that there was no ‘right’ 
to public assembly, and it was ‘nothing more than a view taken by the Court of the 
individual liberty of the subject.’293  He concluded that the policeman was acting 
within the execution of his duty and, therefore, the appellant did wilfully obstruct the 
respondent and dismissed the appeal. Pritt raised the issue in the Commons, stating 
that ‘it is extremely easy for the police to take repressive measures and find that 
often they are approved of by the courts.’294 Thomas Kidd argued that the decision 
established a precedent that: 
[T]he police have power to ban any political meeting in streets or public 
places at will… [and are arbiters] of what political parties and religious sects 
shall and shall not be accorded the rights of freedom of speech and freedom 
of assembly – two civil rights which even the judges of earlier times were 
jealous to protect.295 
The judicial support for the authoritarian and preventative police tactics highlighted in 
Duncan v Jones 296  and other leading cases of this era such as Thomas v 
Sawkins,297 subsequently strengthened the breach of the peace powers utilized by 
the police, widening the parameters of their discretion, and providing more 
opportunity for partial or inconsistent police practice.  
6.3) The Baton Charge at Thurloe Square 1936 
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Thomas Kidd was also at the heart of another incident involving the police treatment 
of an anti-fascist meeting at Thurloe Square, London. Their protest was a response 
to a BUF meeting held in the Albert Hall on 22 March 1936. The anti-fascists 
assembled half a mile away from the Albert Hall, in accordance with an instruction 
from the Metropolitan Police Commissioner. After the meeting had been in progress 
for 50 minutes, 20 police officers arrived, some mounted and others on foot and they 
allegedly proceeded to disperse the crowd without warning using batons and staves. 
Following several allegations about police behaviour, Dingle Foot pressed the 
Government to open an official enquiry. Sir John Simon declared that there was no 
need for an enquiry, and highlighted that the crowd had formed a cordon around the 
meeting meaning that the police could not approach the chairman to request that he 
close the meeting.298 The NCCL held an unofficial commission of inquiry which they 
hoped would bring the evidence to the public and Simon would be induced into 
ordering an official inquiry. This approach failed but the findings recorded that the 
‘crowd was perfectly peaceable and orderly’ and the police would have had no 
difficulty in approaching the speakers. More significantly, it reported that the crowd 
offered no resistance to the police and: 
[T]here was no necessity whatever for a baton-charge, that the baton-charge 
was carried out with a totally unnecessary degree of brutality and violence, 
that serious injuries were caused and that fatal injuries might have been 
caused.299 
The responses of the Home Office and the Metropolitan Police to the NCCL’s call for 
an inquiry has been carefully analysed by historian Janet Clark. She noted the 
contempt that Sir Philip Game had for the organisation, and this is illustrated by his 
opinion of the NCCL as ‘a self-constituted body with no authority or statutory powers, 
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whose principal activity is to criticise and attack the police’. He responded to the 
report of the inquiry declaring, ‘[a] more biased judgement I have never read’.300 
Clark highlighted that for the Home Office, Sir Arthur Dixon was more sympathetic to 
the report, and declared that despite its ‘one-sidedness… the report seems to me to 
give evidence of careful preparation and to merit careful consideration.’301 Despite 
the friction highlighted by Clark between the Home Office and Game, it was agreed 
that a public inquiry would not be held as the report had ‘elicited no new facts of 
importance'.302  
Although the catalyst for the introduction of the Public Order Bill was the disorder at 
Cable Street described in the previous chapter, provisions were also established that 
were directed towards the conduct and behaviour at public meetings which 
expanded on the existing provisions to restrain freedom of speech. 
7) Public Order Bill 1936 
Several provisions were introduced in the Public Order Bill which created or 
amended certain offences in relation to public meetings. When the Home Secretary, 
Sir John Simon, read the Bill a second time on 16 November, he stressed that the 
object of the Bill was not to legislate against anybody’s creed, or to distinguish from 
one extreme creed or another, but to legislate against the new methods that had 
recently been adopted by some movements. However, political violence and 
disturbances were not new to British political meetings, and this was recognised by 
Sir John Simon who stated that there was, ‘plenty of noise and roughness in our 
political methods, but this roughness and this noise have been on the whole tolerant 
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and good humoured.’ In the following debate, this view had been challenged by 
those whose experiences of political ‘roughness’ were neither tolerable nor good 
humoured. The most detailed account came from Conservative MP, Commander 
Bower, who suffered the organised break-up of his meetings in his constituency of 
Cleveland in North Riding. This included the use of abusive language, the smashing 
of windows, the breaking of chairs, their female supporters were kicked and clods of 
earth were thrown at the speakers. He also mentioned that he was physically 
attacked on stage and his speaker system was damaged. He attributed these 
instances of organised disruptions to Labour Party supporters, and criticised that 
until recently the party did little to prevent it. This demonstrated that the disruption of 
public meetings was not uniquely associated with the extreme creeds of the fascists 
and communists, but was also prevalent among mainstream political parties in some 
areas. The increasing violence between fascist and anti-fascist supporters at public 
meetings legitimised the introduction of the Public Order Bill, but its provisions had 
the potential to protect all parties from political disturbances. However, the provisions 
themselves would still rely on a certain amount of police discretion. 
Labour MP for Hackney South, Herbert Morrison recounted his amazement of the 
‘dangerous vigour’ about his public meetings in Cornwall, in which he had to mind his 
step. He continued to state that he had been shouted down and threatened with 
violence by Tories, and that the actions of the Communists were notorious. 303 
Despite the primary concern of fascist violence, there was a prevailing attitude that 
the Bill needed to protect the political speakers and prevent all organised public 
disruption of political meetings. Commander Bower believed the Bill did not 
successfully tackle this, as he stated, ‘This hooliganism has gone on far too long, 
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and I am afraid there is nothing in this Bill which will put an end to it.’304 In summing 
up the debate, the Attorney General revisited the question and declared, ‘there is no 
doubt about the feeling which has been voiced on all sides of the House that the 
organised cold-blooded and persistent interruption of meetings is something to be 
reprehended.’305 
William Gallacher made an important distinction between the propaganda of the Left 
and the significance of the BUF in the East End. Being politically provocative, he 
claimed, was an essential feature of the United Kingdom, but using abusive or 
insulting language directed at racial or religious sections of the community is entirely 
different. He stated that the police already had powers to deal with that, but they 
should be increased if necessary.306 Thus, it can be determined that the division 
between these different uses of provocative language were an important factor in 
framing legislation which would effectively restrict freedom of speech. Yet, while the 
general debate is about how to impose conditions on the British fascists at their 
meetings, many arguments, including those mentioned above, also demonstrate the 
desire for politicians to protect their own political meetings from disruption by political 
opponents. Political violence, therefore, was not completely marginalised to the 
radical doctrines of the fascists and the communists, but still played a role in 
mainstream politics despite the increasing intolerance towards it.  
Clause 4 made it an offence for anyone present at any public meeting or on the 
occasion of any public procession to have with him any offensive weapon without 
lawful authority. When the Marquess of Dufferin and Ava summarised the Bill on the 
second reading in the House of Lords, he said of clause 4, ‘I am afraid that that 
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clause is only too necessary to-day.’  The clause was questioned by Lord Atkin, who 
stated that without a definition of ‘offensive weapon’ it may be possible that an 
innocent bystander with a walking stick may be charged with such an offence and 
the question for the jury of whether the stick was intended as a weapon or not would 
be an extremely difficult one. 
Clause 5 created an offence for any person who in any public place or at any public 
meeting used threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour with intent to 
provoke a breach of the peace, or whereby a breach of the peace is likely to be 
occasioned. The only amendment in the wording from s54(13) Metropolitan Police 
Act 1839 was to change ‘in any thoroughfare or public place’ to ‘any public place or 
at any public meeting’ which extended the power of the police to public meetings, 
which by definition would also include those held on private premises.307 The 1936 
Act, introduced the charge of insulting words or behaviour to the whole nation as it 
had only previously existed in London under the 1839 Act, and in some larger towns 
and cities under local Acts. Ronald Kidd claims the Metropolitan Police referred to 
this power as ‘the breathing Act’ because to get a conviction under it was ‘as easy as 
breathing’.308  
Clause 6 amended the Public Meeting Act 1908, and provided the police with the 
power to arrest anyone who they reasonably suspected of committing an offence 
under that Act by acting in a disorderly manner in an attempt to break up a lawful 
public meeting and refuses to give their correct name or address. As the BUF did not 
organise the interruption of opponents’ meetings at this time, this clause was more 
likely to have been utilised to protect fascist meetings. However, the experiences of 
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disruption and hooliganism shared by many MPs suggest that they also wanted the 
increased power to protect their own meetings. 
8)  The Police, Anti-Semitism and the Public Order Act 
In his report for the year 1937, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Sir Philip 
Game, declared that the Public Order Act 1936 had ‘a good effect on the conduct of 
political meetings… but has not reduced their number... [asserting] 11,804 meetings 
and processions have had to be policed, over 7,000 of which were Fascist or anti-
Fascist.’309 However, the Public Order Act did not eliminate anti-Semitic remarks at 
public meetings, the frequent assaults on Jews, or the vandalism of their property. 
Following the London County Council  (LCC) elections of March 1937, the secretary 
of the Jewish People’s Council, J Pearce, declared in a memorandum sent to the 
NCCL that the ‘Public Order Act as can be seen from the violent anti-Jewish 
campaign had failed’, and had suggested that agitation must now be focused on the 
demand for a Racial Incitement Bill.310 The NCCL had recommended an amendment 
to s5 which would have provided that, ‘any person who in any public place or at any 
public meeting uses words calculated to bring any racial or religious community into 
public hatred or contempt, would be guilty of an offence.’311  
This agitation was the result of an increasingly violent BUF campaign in East London 
ahead of the LCC elections. Fascists in East London were reported to have smashed 
Jewish owned shop windows and chalked anti-Semitic propaganda on walls. The 
BUF polled 15,278 votes, which amounted to 18% of the poll. The JPC were 
concerned that their anti-Semitic propaganda could mobilise enough support to 
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return a fascist candidate in the Borough Council elections in November 1937.312 
During BUF public meetings, it was claimed that no attempt was made by the police 
to stop speakers from Jew-baiting, despite this being a clear violation of s5 Public 
Order Act. A transcript of the BUF’s first public meeting following the LCC elections, 
held at Bethnal Green on 12 March 1937 illustrates the language used by fascist 
speakers. The first speaker addressed the need to keep on fighting against the 
Jewish interest, stating, ‘We have given the Jews notice to quit and next we’ll see the 
Jews clear out altogether.’ BUF candidate, Raven Thomson claimed that the number 
of votes that the BUF received gave them a mandate for their policy based on anti-
Semitism. He claimed that Mosley could then claim that he was not a fanatical anti-
Semite, and that he was not speaking for himself but a significant section of the 
population. He continued his attack on the Jews by commenting, 
Here’s a British people today, to all intents and purposes lying in a ditch and 
lousy with Jews. (Police Constable and crowd laughed). The Jew can no 
more help being a parasite than a louse can be a louse… We can’t altogether 
ignore the Jew… We will hold him up as a horrible example.313 
At this time the NCCL was collecting transcripts of fascist speeches and highlighted 
their perception of a pro-fascist police force which took little or no action against 
fascist speakers while arresting anti-fascist hecklers or Left wing speakers. An NCCL 
report entitled ‘Disturbances in East London’ from August 1937, quoted other fascist 
speakers as referring to Jews as, ‘Hook-nosed, yellow-skinned, dirty Jewish swine’ 
and ‘Venereal-ridden vagrants’. 314  Again, no action was taken by the police in 
relation to these speeches. In a witness statement, collected by the NCCL in relation 
to police behaviour at a fascist meeting in Stepney Green on 14 July 1937, Alfred 
Levy described how he was chased by a man in plain clothes who said, ‘Get away 
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you Jew bastard’, and then he was caught and assaulted by several police officers 
who threw him into the back of a van. Levy claimed that he was stood at the back of 
the crowd talking to a friend when the incident took place. He stated that he was 
accused by the police of being a machine gunner.315 When the police van started to 
move, he alleged that he heard someone in the van say, ‘run these f ---- Jews down 
if they don’t get out of the way.’ Another statement by local resident Leonard 
Arundoli remarked that the crowd, measuring many hundreds, were hostile to the 
fascist speakers and ‘indignant that these people should be allowed to come to 
Stepney Green and preach this racial hatred, protected by the police.’316 The police 
later cleared the crowd with a baton charge under the orders of an unnamed 
Inspector, despite many witness statements collected by the NCCL which claimed 
that the crowd was orderly and that the police took an aggressive stance towards 
hecklers.317  
These allegations that the police used anti-Semitic language and laughed at a 
fascist’s Jew-baiting at a public meeting raise worrying questions about partiality in 
the police force. At the higher levels of the police, the successive Metropolitan Police 
Commissioners, Trenchard and Game, were both outspoken in their desire to 
supress the fascist movement. Yet, at street level, disturbing allegations highlight 
huge inconsistencies in police practice that support the assertion that many 
members of the police were pro-fascist, anti-Left and even anti-Semitic. However, 
these accusations must be seen against the wider picture of extreme political activity 
in Great Britain.  
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In the Metropolitan Police district alone, there were over 7,000 fascist or anti-fascist 
meetings held in 1937.318 In consideration of the large number of meetings held in 
the first year of the Public Order Act, events such as this with such strong 
accusations of police impropriety must be seen as isolated incidents rather than 
reflecting any normality in their practice. To substantiate this claim, consideration 
must also be given to how the police were also active in invoking their new legislative 
powers on BUF speakers in order to limit fascist provocation. Thus, selecting a wider 
range of sources has the potential to dispel notions of a prevalent police culture of 
political partiality in favour of the BUF which has been argued by Ewing and Gearty. 
When considering the nature of police discretion, and the necessarily subjective 
decisions they make, other factors in the decision making process are also influential, 
and, therefore, it is not always correct to assume that political partiality is the prime 
component. While it is important to recognise that some police officers did have 
fascist or anti-Semitic dispositions which was reflected in their failure to fulfil their 
duty impartially, this does not inevitably mean that all police action taken against 
anti-fascists or communists was politically motivated. 
There were also arrests of fascist speakers following the Public Order Act offering 
some validation that police practice was inconsistent rather than politically motivated. 
Section 5 was a loosely defined provision which was open to wide discretion. The 
term ‘threatening, abusive or insulting language or behaviour’ is open to 
interpretation, but it is even more subjective to determine whether it may cause a 
breach of the peace or was even calculated to cause a breach of the peace. 
Inspector James’ report from a fascist meeting held on 23 June 1937, again in 
Bethnal Green, illustrates how the police operation was managed. James was 
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present with one sergeant and ten constables who he positioned around the outskirts 
of the crowd. One constable was stationed near the platform next to a shorthand 
writer from Special Branch who was taking a transcript of the meeting. The constable 
could then relay information on any provocative language used to James, who 
roamed the back of the crowd assessing the possibility of a breach of the peace. 
James’ report described the fascist speaker Earnest Clarke as ‘not a very loud 
speaker’ who usually relied on a loud speaker van to be heard. On this occasion, the 
Inspector claimed that it was difficult for him to distinctly hear what was said. James’ 
report acknowledged the transcript taken by the shorthand writer, and he declared 
that he had heard some of what was said but stated that no action was taken against 
Clarke as the crowd was predominantly fascist sympathisers and were quiet and 
orderly throughout. He stated that there were no Jews present and no sign of a 
breach of the peace taking place, adding: 
I am of the opinion that had an arrest been made at this meeting, the crowd 
would have undoubtedly have become disorderly and the police present 
would not have been sufficiently strong to have maintained order…[He 
continued to acknowledge a change in tactics since this incident] Since the 
recent Memorandum on Public Meetings was issued, I have occupied a 
stationary position alongside the Shorthand Writer, close to the Speakers 
platform, and all speakers before taking the platform have been cautioned by 
me against the use of insulting or provocative language.319 
 
The Sub-Divisional Inspector added his knowledge of the fascist speaker Clarke, 
stating that, ‘when speaking, [he] closely watches the movements of the Inspector 
present at his meeting and, in the event of the inspector’s attention being distracted 
from him, seizes the opportunity to attack the Jews.’ The Superintendent’s report 
claims that he had attended a large number of Clarke’s meetings, and ‘if a senior 
officer is present he invariably is informed and moderates his speech accordingly.’ 
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The reports demonstrate the difficulty faced when policing fascist meetings. Two 
days later, Clarke again spoke at Bethnal Green, and excited the fascist crowd with 
anti-Semitic remarks, who responded with shouts of ‘Jewish scum’ and ‘Shonks’. 
Clarke moderated his speech when the Inspector began to approach him, but he 
later made more anti-Semitic references, and was then arrested by an Inspector and 
Sergeant Duncan. A rush was made towards the platform by the crowd, and Duncan 
drew his truncheon but did not need to use it. Clarke was taken in the police car and 
charged under s5. Following the arrest of Clarke, the meeting became disorderly and 
the fascist speaker could not regain order. The meeting was then closed on the 
request of the police. It was stated that 150 fascists made their way to the local 
communist meeting which created tension and, anticipating a breach of the peace, 
that meeting was also closed on the request of the police. Another fascist, Henry 
Burwood, was also arrested for using insulting words and behaviour. 
Clarke was later convicted at Old Street Police Court with the evidence of Police 
Constable Templeman of Special Branch, who took the notes at the meeting on 23 
June. In his judgment, the Magistrate, Herbert Metcalfe, declared, ‘on this occasion 
you used language of the most gross, insulting, and disgraceful character, language 
which, from the very word ‘go’, was calculated to insult, not merely the people who 
were there, but other people.’320 This conviction was also to have implications for 
Inspector James who was present at the meeting on 23 June. In the defence’s 
summing up it was claimed that the meeting ‘was so orderly that the uniform police 
made no attempt to stop the meeting at any time.’ The failure of James to take more 
appropriate action at the meeting was taken seriously by the Deputy Assistant 
Commissioner. James’ report, which mistakenly stated that no inflammatory 
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language was used, was deemed by his superiors to have demonstrated neglect to 
his duty and he received an official caution. It is likely that James was also on duty at 
previous fascist meetings, and other speakers may have exploited his ‘neglect’. 
However, James’ report, and the tactics he employed at the fascist meeting in 
question, demonstrates that his priority was in preventing a disturbance that 
originated from the crowd rather than with what was said on the platform. 
Following the passing of the Public Order Act, Sir Oswald Mosley suffered several 
disruptions at public meetings. At Liverpool on 10 October 1937, whilst addressing 
an estimated crowd of 8,000, Mosley was struck on the head by a large stone and 
was said to have been unconscious for between five to ten minutes. The newspaper 
reportage states that there was a mixture of boos and cheers for the fascist leader 
but the van and other fascists were hit by a ‘shower of missiles thrown from all 
directions.’321 In an earlier incident at Southampton, Mosley attempted to address a 
crowd of 20,000 on 18 July 1937. Again missiles were thrown at Mosley, but none to 
any effect. The noise generated by large sections of the crowd also made it 
impossible for Mosley’s speech to be heard.    
Two weeks after the Southampton meeting, Sir Oswald Mosley sought a deputation 
with the Home Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare, regarding public meetings. Following 
the refusal by Hoare, Mosley conducted a series of letters to the Home Office to 
raise issues regarding the implementation of the Public Order Act by the 
Metropolitan Police and provincial police forces. Mosley’s initial letter began by 
praising the Metropolitan Police declaring no one can deny that their arrangements 
for ‘the preservation of order are admirable.’322 He continued to express his view that 
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fascist speakers were arrested and charged immediately if they said anything 
provocative while people who attended their meetings and processions were 
permitted to say anything with the object of provoking a breach of the peace, yet 
action was only taken if they were guilty of physical violence. Despite suggesting that 
the law should be impartially used, Mosley, admitted that ‘it is only fair to admit that 
order is now well maintained at outdoor meetings by the London Police.’ However, in 
relation to the provincial police he claimed that the ‘diversity of experience in different 
areas is extreme and varies on different occasions.’ The Home Office attempted to 
promote ‘even-handedness’ in police practice when regulating politically extreme 
meetings, yet, Emsley highlighted that this definition also meant that Left wing 
speakers who were little trouble would have action taken against them because 
‘action had been taken against Blackshirts who were serious trouble.’323 Furthermore, 
Emsley stated that, ‘Some senior provincial policemen ignored such directives and, 
with full support of their local police authority, acted against those whom they 
considered to be the trouble-makers.’324  
In an example of provincial policing, Mosley recalled the Southampton meeting 
described above, and claimed that there were 25,000 members of the audience and 
only 24 police. From the outset, he claimed that 200 men were permitted to stand 
near the platform and prevent the rest of the crowd hearing the speech by constantly 
shouting and singing. He also accused the police of not taking action against crowd 
members who threw missiles, even when one police officer was stood beside a 
stone thrower. He claimed the man was only removed when he drew attention to him 
and the idle police officer next to him from the platform. Following the disorder at 
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Southampton, A K Chesterton’s325 front page headline of the Blackshirt responded 
with the cry, ‘ALLOW BLACKSHIRTS TO KEEP ORDER’ and claimed that the police 
were ‘less use than a sick headache.’326 
With respect to the policing of their provincial meetings, Mosley suggested that, ‘it is 
difficult for the present administration of the law to preserve even a pretence of 
impartiality.’ He declared his amazement that there had not been any fatalities at 
their meetings and declared that if there were, then the Government would be 
morally guilty of murder as, through the Public Order Act, they had removed the right 
of the BUF to defend themselves.327 This is a reference to s2(1), which provides that:  
If the members or adherents of any association of persons, whether 
incorporated or not, are-- 
(b)     organised and trained or organised and equipped either for the purpose 
of enabling them to be employed for the use or display of physical force in 
promoting any political object, or in such manner as to arouse reasonable 
apprehension that they are organised and either trained or equipped for that 
purpose; 
then any person who takes part in the control or management of the 
association, or in so organising or training as aforesaid any members or 
adherents thereof, shall be guilty of an offence under this section 
This was a strange point to adopt, as even before the Act, Blackshirts who trained in 
the Fascist Defence Force could not legally maintain order in open spaces. This has 
always been the duty of the police and the mentioned provision was implemented to 
prohibit quasi-military organisations. The only exception to the police’s duty to 
preserve order at public meetings is when they occur on private premises, where the 
responsibility is passed to the organisers. However, this controversial and easily 
abused authority is discussed in Chapter 4.  
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In response, the reply from the Home Office made it clear that: 
So far as the position in the Metropolitan Police District is concerned, the 
Commissioner of Police has issued definite instructions that the police are to 
take action in any case in which an offence under Section 5 of the Public 
Order Act is observed, whether the offender is a speaker at a meeting or a 
member of the audience.328 
It was pointed out that there had been 27 arrests in the Metropolitan Police District at 
BUF meetings between 1 January 1937 and 31 July 1937. 15 of these were anti-
fascists, while only four were fascist speakers and two were fascists from the crowd; 
the political persuasion of the other six was unknown. With regard to the provincial 
Chief Police Officers, A I Tudor Esq, on behalf of the Home Secretary, stated that:  
It is not… legitimate criticism… to suggest that the law is not administered 
impartially because on occasions, in spite of police arrangements, perfect 
order is not preserved and some stone throwing or assaults take place and 
some of the offenders escape detection. 
The most significant remark, in the response to Mosley, was the admission that it 
was ‘no part of the duty of the police to secure a hearing for speakers at meetings’. 
This adds considerable confusion to the provisions under s6 POA which amended 
the Public Meeting Act 1908. Under this amendment, the police now had the power 
to arrest a person, on the direction of the Chairman at a lawful public meeting, 
whether on private premises or in a public space. This could be implemented if they 
were acting in a ‘disorderly manner for the purpose of preventing the transaction of 
the business for which the meeting was called together, or incites others so to act’ 
and they failed to give their name and address to a police officer. To what extent 
would someone have to be acting in a disorderly manner to be deemed to be 
attempting to prevent the transaction of business of the meeting? Why was anti-
fascist singing so frequently permitted when the obvious intention of it was to drown 
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out the voice of the fascist speaker? The discretion available to the police in 
preserving order, despite its intrinsic faults which lead to inconsistency and alleged 
partiality, is the ability to adapt to individual situations. Correspondence between the 
Home Office and the Metropolitan Police in discussing the reply to Mosley highlight 
that the police could only act if they were instructed by the chairman, and even if 
names were taken of interrupters, it was ‘not necessarily the duty of the police to 
institute proceedings for a breach of the Act of 1908’.  
An important feature of Mosley’s letter was the question of how the police would 
respond if it were fascists interrupting the meetings of Conservatives or Socialists by 
openly inciting violence in their propaganda and transporting men long distances to 
make it happen. The question, which was raised twice by Mosley, could have been 
seen as being threatening, yet, the conclusion of his letter reaffirmed his desire to 
avoid a breakdown of law and order stating that he was, ‘ready at any time to co-
operate with the police to avert it.’329   
There was also significant autocratic police action taken against the BUF in Devon. 
Following the decline in BUF membership in Plymouth and the subsequent closure 
of the Plymouth branch in 1934, efforts were made to rekindle fascism in Exeter. By 
1937, public meetings were beginning to attract larger crowds and anti-fascists 
began to oppose them. Prospective Parliamentary Candidate Rafe Temple-Cotton 
and County Propaganda Officer Captain Hammond were prominent speakers. Chief 
Inspector, Albert Rowsell, reported that fascist activity during 1937 grew but it was 
not till October that year that police observed disorder. His report also acknowledged 
an incident on 16 October which suggested that the crowd took a particular dislike to 
Hammond, and had the police not been there and had ‘Hammond continued to 
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address the crowd, injury to person and property would have resulted.’330 On this 
occasion the police requested that Hammond close the meeting as they anticipated 
serious disorder. Hammond obeyed the request and the fascists were shepherded 
back to their headquarters by the police. Again, this example demonstrates that the 
fascists’ liberty to speak publically was also compromised by police interference. Yet, 
it also reveals that the fascist speaker did not challenge the police request. The use 
of police resources to accompany the fascists back to their headquarters was an 
important precaution to prevent any disorder and, therefore, does not necessarily 
demonstrate police collusion or partiality. Furthermore, fascist activism was further 
restricted by the police as, when they were dispersing the crowd, they stopped 
Temple-Cotton from distributing fascist leaflets. This illustrates that a significant 
number from the crowd were receptive to the fascist message by accepting the BUF 
propaganda. Yet, police discretion was used to prevent fascist activism rather than 
enforce the law against those members of the crowd who threatened the peace in 
order to prevent it. 
Following this, Exeter’s Chief Constable, Frederick Tarry, prohibited Hammond from 
addressing any further meetings except in the open space known as the Triangle. 
This banning order commenced on 19 October 1937. Reports of Exeter meetings in 
Blackshirt state that Hammond spoke at the Triangle while Temple-Cotton 
addressed meetings in other areas, and there is no evidence to suggest that the 
Exeter fascists broke Tarry’s prohibition. This very wide interpretation of the police 
officer’s duty to prevent a breach of the peace is highly questionable. In his analysis 
of this incident, local historian Todd Gray revealed that the Home Office doubted the 
legality of the police’s use of preventative measures citing, 
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It certainly seems as though the Chief Constable has overstepped the mark 
in failing to recognise that, because an individual has used provocative 
language or conduct on one occasion (apparently not sufficiently serious to 
warrant a prosecution under Section 5 of Public Order Act) he is not on that 
account justified in banning that individual from public speaking.331 
This incident reveals that while the Home Office recognised that the legality of the 
preventive powers used by the Chief Constable were highly doubtful, they did not 
attempt to hold him to account for these actions. Furthermore, this action was not 
legally challenged or disobeyed by the BUF. 
These examples of disorder at fascist meetings after the Public Order Act reveal 
several inconsistencies within police practice. Firstly, there is a divide in the policing 
of fascist activism between some provincial forces and the Metropolitan Police. This 
difference was even highlighted by Mosley, who argued that the BUF was politically 
discriminated against by some provincial forces. Secondly, there was also a notable 
divide in the actions and attitudes of the senior police officers with their subordinates. 
For example, Inspector James was cautioned for failing to act when fascist speakers 
had used insulting words, and those of the lower level officers who seemingly 
prioritised crowd control over the monitoring of provocative political speeches. 
Although this may have been influenced by the anti-Semitic attitude of some officers, 
it must also be considered that in practice, it was more difficult to attain a conviction 
of an anti-Semitic speaker than it was of a protester that caused, or threatened to 
cause a disturbance at a meeting. Furthermore, accusations against the police of 
anti-Semitic and pro-fascist behaviour were also prominent in East London during 
the BUF’s LCC campaign. These instances demonstrate that police officers were not 
immune from the popular prejudice towards Jews in this period and it also effected 
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how some of them performed their duty.332 While s5 was a provision that was utilised 
against both the speaker and the heckler at public meetings, wide discretion was still 
available in deciding whether the words used were threatening, abusive or insulting 
and if they were conducive to a breach of the peace. This ambiguity continued in the 
post war era and the use of police discretion at fascist meetings was again 
questioned. 
9) Policing Public Meetings after the Second World War 
In the post war era, fascist activism continued and the same debates about police 
action disproportionately demonstrating pro-fascist partiality at public meetings 
continued. Historian David Renton led the most critical condemnation on police 
action during the 1945-51 period. He contended that the police arrested more anti-
fascists than fascists, protected fascist meetings and acted in collusion with the 
fascists.333  Yet, these arguments fail to acknowledge other factors which had been 
discussed above. For example, to claim that the imbalance in the number of arrests 
made demonstrates partiality is ultimately inaccurate as it fails to take into account 
the behaviour of individual activists, the limitations of the legislation and other factors 
which influence police discretion. Also, his assessment of police protection and 
collusion is hindered by not recognising that as the Union Movement were not 
proscribed and were at liberty to hold public meetings, it became the duty of the 
police maintain order at them. In addition, it was the responsibility of the meeting 
organisers to communicate information with the police which included the proposed 
length of the meeting, projected numbers, and whether it was known if any 
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opposition was expected. Therefore, such communication does not necessarily 
constitute acting in ‘collusion’ with the fascists.  
Intriguingly, Renton contends that there were three ways the police could have acted 
in this era: positively, to close down the fascist meeting; negatively, intervening with 
the fascists against the anti-fascists; or neutrally, choosing between the fascists and 
anti-fascists, and always upholding the law.’334 His argument contends that the police 
acted in the second option. This argument suggests that the police are a monolith 
and his claim omits any incidents of police action against the fascists. Furthermore, 
there is little legal debate on why police action may have more frequently targeted 
anti-fascists rather than fascists. Yet, more importantly, the third option for police 
conduct in this period that they acted neutrally is not explored in any great detail 
because it makes the assumption that the law is absolute. For example, as the 
discussion on police discretion above has demonstrated, police officers are provided 
with wide legal powers to uphold the law and are presented with varying options of 
action which all may fall within legal boundaries. Therefore, the option to ‘always 
uphold the law’ is inherently multifaceted; police officers are inevitably required to 
use their discretion in order to prioritise what laws to uphold and how to enforce them.    
Despite the defeat of Nazi Germany and the revelations of the Holocaust, anti-
Semitic feeling remained high in Great Britain. In August 1947 there was a weekend 
of anti-Semitic riots in Manchester, Liverpool and Glasgow, and disorder in Bristol, 
Hull, London and Birkenhead. Throughout the country there was also individual 
attacks Jewish property. The resurrection of anti-Semitism, just two years after the 
War, was kindled by the Daily Express front page story of the murder of two British 
soldiers in Mandate Palestine. Although this article may have provided the spark, 
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journalist and analyst of far-Right movements Daniel Trilling has highlighted how 
anti-Semitism festered within British society after the War, even though fascist 
activism had practically diminished. In addition to the Jewish terrorist violence in 
Palatine, he highlighted that during the years of austerity, the myth of the Jewish 
black-marketeer and fuel hoarder was kept alive, and soaring unemployment (which 
reached 1.9 million in 1947) had led to animosity towards Jews and foreigners over 
claims that they ‘were getting jobs.’335 The far-Right quickly capitalised on this wave 
of denigration towards the Jews and fascist activism was revitalised. Former BUF 
member Jeffrey Hamm capitalised and his public meetings for the British League of 
Ex-Servicemen and Women were given renewed impetus. Also, in November 1947 
Mosley held the inaugural meeting for Union Movement. Renewed fascist activism 
also led to the revival of anti-fascism and groups, such as the 43 Group, who 
emerged to challenge the far-Right crusade and physically disrupt their meetings.  
A police presence at fascist meetings was a necessity in order to keep the peace. 
However, an analysis of fascist meetings in this period demonstrates the vagueness 
of s5 Public Order Act 1936. While the first component stated that it was an offence 
to use threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, the second part of the 
section required that it must be proved that the speaker intended to provoke a 
breach of the peace, or that a breach of the peace was likely to be occasioned. It is 
this caveat that hindered the prosecution of many fascist speakers. However, there 
were some successful prosecutions. For instance, Hamm was charged for using 
insulting words which were likely to cause a breach of the peace for speeches that 
he delivered on 14 and 21 September 1947 in Dalston, North-East London. The 
                                               
335
 D. Trilling, ‘The Lost Weekend’, The New Statesman, 28 May 2012, p. 33. Trilling interviewed 
former Jewish refugee and Communist Party councillor Max Levitas who recalled the general 
atmosphere of the time. 
202 
 
charge relating to the speech on 21 September was dismissed, and the magistrate, 
Blake Odgers stated that he ‘was perfectly entitled at any political meeting to 
[verbally] attack any other political meeting… [and continued that it] was inoffensive 
inasmuch as he was not attacking Jews as Jews.’ This was in relation to Hamm’s 
criticism of communists and the use of the term ‘oriental rabble’. Yet, Odgers ruled 
that Hamm had exceeded the legal boundaries when he used the words ‘Pale, pink, 
palpitating pansies’ which was phraseology which was likely to cause a breach of the 
peace. 336  This demonstrates the breath of discretion utilised by magistrates in 
interpreting which actions were lawful or unlawful under s5. Hamm was bound over 
in the sum of £25 for 12 months.    
Former BUF activist Tommy Moran, mentioned above following his arrest in 
Plymouth in 1934, was also charged with using threatening behaviour at Derby in 
1948. Moran, who was addressing a crowd at the Market Place, responded to a 
shout from the crowd of ‘Let’s smash the Jews up’, by jumping off his platform and 
running towards a rival meeting. After being charged with threatening behaviour, 
Moran replied to the police officer, ‘I did more than threaten. I hit a Jew. I tried to stop 
a meeting of the Stern Gang and whatever happens to me I shall always do my best 
to stop them.’337 Moran was fined £5. His reference to the Stern Gang directly related 
to the violence in Palestine. Founded in 1940 by Avraham Stern, the Stern Gang 
was a Zionist extremist group who were responsible for terrorist attacks on British 
personnel in Palestine. Although there was relatively little activity in the UK, the 
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association of Jews with the terrorist group was a valuable propaganda tool for the 
far-Right.338    
Despite the convictions of Moran and Hamm, the magistrates in each case only gave 
relatively light sentences. One of the charges against Hamm was even dropped and 
the magistrate stressed that the liberty to attack rival political parties or the 
Government existed, although his judgment that Hamm’s references to Jews were 
inoffensive as he was not attacking ‘Jews as Jews’ is more remarkable. In the 
magistrate’s judgement, this was not offensive yet the crowd and the police who 
were present at the meeting interpreted his words as anti-Semitic. The difficulties in 
securing a prosecution against an anti-Semitic speaker was not just to prove that the 
words used were offensive, but were either calculated or likely to provoke a breach 
of the peace. Even in cases where disorder does occur, the police and the 
magistrates have the discretion to decide whether any subsequent disorder was the 
direct result of the speech or not. For instance, a political opponent might well attack 
a fascist meeting despite what was being said, and so the magistrate and the police 
must use their discretion appropriately to judge if the speaker was responsible for the 
disorder.  
In the two incidents above, the police acted against the Hamm and Moran for 
different reasons. In Hamm’s case, the police reported that during the speech on the 
21 September, ‘the crowd were whipped up into a complete frenzy’. Therefore, the 
large scale animosity towards the meeting which appeared to naturally manifest from 
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Hamm’s speech aided the police in directing their action at him rather than the 
potentially violent crowd. In Moran’s case, his use of threatening behaviour by 
running towards a rival meeting and claiming to have punched a man also compelled 
the decision to make an arrest. The difficulty that faced the authorities in controlling 
fascist meetings was when a decision was not so clear cut. The difficulty to secure a 
prosecution in less translucent incidents forced the police to take less affirmative 
action when faced with anti-Semitic propaganda. In addition, Renton suggested that 
a positive use of police power would have been to close fascist meetings. Yet, to 
take such autocratic action in anticipation of anti-fascist retaliation would set a 
dangerous precedent that would ultimately deny the liberty of free speech to those 
who had opponents who were prepared to use violence against them. Although the 
doctrine of the far-Right is repugnant and antagonistic, the use of oppositional 
political violence should not be tolerated because of its potentially commendable 
ethical status. The violence and disruptive tactics of many of the anti-fascists 
necessarily warranted police intervention.  
On 7 March 1948, a Union Movement meeting at Dalston Road was attacked by 
several anti-fascists. The police action used here and the proceedings at the Central 
Criminal Court demonstrate the problems faced by the legal authorities of organised 
political disruption. The police reports state that while the meeting was in progress, 
30-40 Jews arrived in groups of eight to ten and were directed to strategic points by 
anti-fascist activist Gerald Jacobs.339  In response to the anticipation of disorder, 
police reserves were requested but before they arrived, ‘there was a sudden rush 
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forward by the Jews, shouting, “Down with Fascism”, “smash them up now”. They 
attacked every person who offered the slightest resistance, surged forward and 
upset the platform.’340 Eight arrests were made and the police ordered the fascist 
speaker, Alexander Raven-Thomson not to proceed with the meeting after they had 
re-erected the platform as they anticipated that more disorder would occur. He 
accepted the order but some supporters of the Union Movement went to the nearby 
Commonwealth Party meeting and chanted, ‘we want free speech’ and ‘break up this 
meeting as well as ours’. Anticipating further disorder, the police also instructed the 
speaker to close the meeting, which he did reluctantly. A further two arrests were 
made which included the arrest of Margaret Hutchings of Union Movement for 
insulting words after she was heard by a police officer shouting, ‘Dirty Jew Bastards. 
They smashed our meeting’. The police believed that the organised attack on the 
Union Movement meeting was organised by the 43 Group. This is very possible; 
Renton claimed that in the previous year the 43 Group had disrupted ‘hundreds’ of 
fascist meetings. It was only from the Autumn of 1947 when the attendance at fascist 
meetings had risen to up to 3,000 that the disruptive tactics of the 100-200 
‘commandos’ of the 43 Group became ineffective. Despite the violence and unlawful 
tactics of the 43 Group, Renton describes their actions as ‘heroic activities’ and even 
ponders on why more anti-fascists were arrested in this period than fascists.341    
Seven of the anti-fascists were indicted for unlawfully assembly for conspiring to 
commit a breach of the peace. Four of whom, also faced additional charges of 
assaulting a police officer. Two of the defendants were found not guilty by the jury for 
the charges relating to unlawful assembly, and there was also an acquittal for two of 
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the assault charges. Jacobs fine of £20 was the largest punishment of the five who 
were found guilty. The others were given fines which ranged from £3 to £7. Following 
the sentencing of the defendants, the Recorder of London Sir Gerald Dodson, 
warned them not to take the law into their own hands and stated,  
You must realise that Police Officers are not your natural foes, they are your 
friends and provided you behave like reasonable people they will help you… 
[adding] You may not like fascists, whatever they may be, or their meetings, 
but leave the law to look after them.342    
 
Dodson also warned the defendants that although his sentences were light this time, 
should this should happen again, they would ‘undoubtedly’ go to prison. The police 
report also reflected that, although the sentences were considered to be 
‘comparatively small’, the effect of a higher level prosecution at the Central Criminal 
Court on indictment, rather than the normal practice of being heard by the 
magistrates had the positive effect. The report, which was written on 14 May, stated 
that since 7 March there was no disorder at public meetings in the Ridley Road area 
except when Mosley made his first open air appearance on 1 May, which was 
regarded as being quite different from the usual meetings held there.343 
These incidents demonstrate the continuing public order problems faced by the 
police regarding free speech at far-Right meetings. These examples show how the 
use of police discretion was used to respond to the origin of the disorder. However, 
other examples are more opaque. Kenneth Younger, the Under-secretary of State 
for the Home Department addressed the difficulty of securing a prosecution against 
fascist speakers using s5. 
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I think the House would agree that nothing would do more harm than for the 
police to bring prosecutions which frequently fail. Indeed they have had some 
rather unhappy experiences where they have thought a particular sentence 
or passage in a speech might fall within the mischief of that Section, where 
they have prosecuted, and where the prosecution has failed, and where on 
numerous subsequent occasions the same speaker has used those 
sentences over and over again, adding that the courts had already said that it 
was quite all right.344 
This highlights the difficulty of applying discretion to act against a speaker who uses 
insulting words. The police officers present would also need to prove that a breach of 
the peace was either intended or likely. As many of the fascist speeches were 
directed at the character of the Jews in general, rather than any deliberate direction 
to the crowd to create disorder, a prosecution on the grounds that the speaker 
intended to create a breach of the peace was unlikely. Therefore, the offence more 
likely to secure a prosecution was on the basis that a breach of the peace was likely 
to be occasioned. This provision relied, somewhat tentatively, on the reaction and 
behaviour of the crowd. However, even in cases such as the Hamm meeting on 21 
September 1947 mentioned above where the police witness declared that ‘the crowd 
were whipped up into a complete frenzy’ by the fascist speaker, the magistrate had 
dismissed the charge.  
The challenge of enforcing s5 at public meetings created the detrimental police task 
of adjudicating what is permitted or prohibited from a political platform. The wide 
discretion available under this provision, as well as the uncertainty of judicial 
interpretation when deciding whether to initiate a prosecution, led to inconsistent 
police action. That is not to say that some policing was not politically sympathetic as 
some police officers would have undoubtedly identified with the views of far-Right 
speakers, but it would be dangerous to conceive that all policing which seemingly 
favoured fascist activism was politically motivated. How police officer’s utilise their 
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discretion may include various other factors. William Ker Muir Jr identified four 
different categories of police officer in a study which identified that the paradoxes of 
coercive power determine how differently police officers react to the psychological 
side of their role.345 Within this typology it is possible to project different reasons for 
an apparently pro-fascist response to politically extreme meetings which provide 
alternative explanations to political motivation. 
The first category Muir identified were ‘Enforcers’ who fight an ‘us against them 
battle’. This is the category where police officers were more likely to act in a 
politically partisan way, considering that the far-Left regularly pitted themselves 
against authoritative powers such as the police, while the far-Right (especially under 
Mosley) aligned themselves with law and order. Additionally, Robert Reiner has also 
highlighted that police officers are more likely to be aligned to the political Right, as a 
result of the nature of the job, the routine clients from the bottom layer of the social 
order, and the disciplined, hierarchical structure of the force.346 Considering Muir’s 
notion of the corruptive influence of coercive power then this potentially suggests 
that police officers that fall within the ‘Enforcers’ category, are more likely to use their 
power to support the far-Right speaker than the anti-fascist or Jew. Yet, a 
consideration of the other categories of the police as ‘streetcorner politicians’ may 
also produce similar outcomes with different motivations. For example, ‘Avoiders’, 
who evade responsibility and therefore fail to exercise their authority, would also 
potentially allow the offensive speeches of far-Right speakers in order to avoid the 
necessary confrontation in enforcing the law. Typically, ‘Reciprocators’, who enforce 
their authority with negotiated accommodation, may have demonstrated their power 
by warning speakers when they believe that the speech was becoming potentially 
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unlawful. This form of ‘negotiation’ was a frequent occurrence at far-Right meetings 
which Renton criticised as demonstrating police collusion.347 Even, those within the 
category of the ‘good policeman’, who is not corrupted by power but exercises it with 
morality and empathy, may still allow a fascist meeting to continue, despite their own 
disapproval of the speech, knowing that a successful prosecution would still be 
unlikely. These possible responses, using Muir’s different police categories, 
demonstrate other explanations of police action, other than the politically partial pro-
fascist police officer. 
Academic lawyer Harry Street also questions the extent that pro-active police action 
at fascist meetings would have been desirable. He contended that those who 
promote unpopular causes which may excite heckling by exaggerating, distorting 
and vilifying should still receive police protection. Street suggested that any 
alternative would ultimately see the police as ‘the new censors of speech’ and the 
opponents of unpopular causes, such as anti-fascists, would be free to use violence 
to break up political meetings and subsequently prevent freedom of expression.348 
As an offence under s5 can only be committed if the words or behaviour used was 
likely to result in a breach of the peace, it must be accepted that anti-Semitic 
speeches delivered to a completely pro-fascist audience would not lead to disorder. 
In addition, if an anti-fascist purposely attended and caused disorder at a fascist 
meeting, the motives of that person must also be questioned in order to determine if 
a s5 offence had been committed. Did he attend the meeting with the intention of 
causing disorder? Was his disruption the result of the speech, or his prior dislike of 
the fascist doctrine? These were important questions which dictated the action of the 
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police and the judiciary. Yet, a landmark judgment in 1963 provided new directions at 
common law on how to treat disruptions at public meetings. 
On 1 July 1962, Colin Jordan of the National Socialist Movement delivered a 
particularly odious speech to a crowd of 5,000 at Trafalgar Square. In his speech he 
praised Adolf Hitler and suggested that Great Britain fought the war against the 
wrong side, submitting that we should have joined Hitler in a war against the Jew. 
There was a surge towards the platform and amidst the scenes of disorder the police 
closed the meeting and arrested the speaker under s5. The justice’s convicted the 
defendant who subsequently appealed to the Quarter Sessions. His appeal was 
allowed on the grounds that, although the words were insulting, they ‘were not likely 
to lead ordinary, reasonable persons, attending the meeting in Trafalgar Square, to 
commit breaches of the peace by committing assaults’. 349  This indicates the 
wideness of the provision without any leading common law judgment and the 
discretion available within the courts in interpreting the meaning of the provision. On 
appeal at the Queen’s Bench Divisional Court, Lord Parker CJ ruled that the speaker 
must take their audience, ‘as he finds them’. For instance, in referring to Jordan’s 
provocative and insulting remarks to the political Left who were present in the 
audience, Parker judged that those words ‘were intended to be and were deliberately 
insulting to that body of persons’ constituting an offence by itself. On the extent of 
free speech which is to be allowed, Parker stated: 
 A man is entitled to express his own views as strongly as he likes, to criticise 
his opponents, to say disagreeable things about his opponents and about 
their policies, and to do anything of that sort. But what he must not do is - and 
these are the words of the section - he must not threaten, he must not be 
abusive and he must not insult them, "insult" in the sense of "hit by words."350    
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The importance of this case was that it was explicitly ruled that a speaker who used 
words which threatened, abused or insulted, had to take his audience as he found it 
and, if the words spoken to that audience were likely to provoke a breach of the 
peace, he was guilty of an offence.  
10) Conclusion 
 
Police responses to the public meetings before and after the Public Order Act 1936 
varied significantly. Tactics applied were seen to have either focused on disorder 
coming from elements within the crowd, or of the speakers themselves. It has been 
suggested that the application of this strategy predominantly focused on anti-fascist 
protesters at fascist meetings, and the speakers at communist or anti-fascist 
meetings. Yet, a wider look at further events and the methods employed by both the 
far-Right and the far-Left in relation to existing law indicates that other pertinent 
reasons enlighten this debate. The BUF largely remained a movement that 
advocated lawful and constitutional methods of gaining power. Examples of fascist 
speakers being compliant with requests to close or move meetings would have 
certainly helped their relationship with members of the police. In contrast, examples 
of extremists of the Left, who regularly resisted police authority and advocated 
unconstitutional methods in their propaganda, naturally antagonised conflict.  
Whilst much of this activism can be morally vindicated for its anti-fascist stance, 
patronage for the hungry and unemployed, and its support for the protection of civil 
liberties, the scepticism that existed within the Home Office and the police of 
revolutionary communist motivations must also be considered as important factors 
that influenced the use of their discretion. In contrast, the BUF’s respect of police 
authority and their cooperation with them during their demonstrations gave the police 
212 
 
fewer opportunities or motivations to use force against them. The paradox is that the 
unethical policies BUF and other fascist movements have the power to provoke 
disorder whilst conducting it in a largely lawful manner. Unlawful activities, such as 
the attacks on Jews and Jewish property were committed more covertly and 
although these acts may have been committed by members of fascist movements or 
inspired by them, they were usually committed independently of the movement’s 
official activism.     
Despite the contrasting political methods, and different relationships each group 
invariably had with police officers on the spot, the enforcement of the law was still 
inconsistently applied. Following the intensified use of anti-Semitism in the BUF’s 
political propaganda and the enactment of the Public Order Act, there is increased 
evidence to suggest that fascist speakers were also becoming more targeted by 
police responses. The neglect of Inspector James, who failed to act upon anti-
Semitic remarks made at the fascist meeting, and his consequent caution, 
demonstrates how serious a view the higher levels of the police took of Jew-baiting. 
The change in James’ tactics, to situate himself in hearing distance of the speaker, 
(an order issued to all senior officers) also identifies a shift in the focus of policing 
public meetings. James’ view that it would be wrong to arrest a fascist speaker at a 
peaceful meeting, because it would potentially create disorder amongst the audience 
also became redundant. This was witnessed by the arrest of Earnest Clarke and the 
subsequent closure of the BUF meeting at Bethnal Green. However, s5 still required 
the prosecution to prove that a speaker had either intended to provoke a breach of 
the peace or that a breach of the peace was likely to be occasioned. The police also 
had to be aware of the astute tactics employed by the fascists, who took advantage 
of any distraction of the police officer to use provocative words. In provincial areas 
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too, questionable preventive measures which were applied to Captain Hammond at 
Exeter, prohibiting him from addressing crowds except at one specific point is a 
further example of how fascist speakers were also oppressed. It is interesting to note 
though, that in this instance, Hammond did not break the Chief Constable’s 
instruction to refute its legality, as had been done in Duncan v Jones. It is also 
evident that both the BUF and the anti-fascist and far-Left groups claimed that police 
action was partial in favour of their opponents.   
This chapter has demonstrated that there was no linear progression or regression of 
the status of free speech across this period although it was regularly claimed as a 
‘right’ by different activists. The Trafalgar Square riots of the 1880s even led to 
attempts to give the right of free speech and assembly positive legal status within 
constitutional law. Even the Public Order Act 1936 did not clarify to what extent free 
speech was attainable as the provision under s5 only provided an ambiguous 
definition of what words and behaviour was criminalised. The difficulty in securing a 
conviction of fascist speakers in the 1930s and 1940s based on this provision has 
been highlighted above. Ewing and Gearty’s assessment of the policing of interwar 
fascism and Renton’s analysis of the policing of the far-Right after the Second World 
War both neglect important factors. For instance, there is an assumption on both 
their parts that any police action against the far-Right was just and correct, while 
police action that targeted either the far-Left or the anti-fascists was unjust and 
politically motivated. This chapter has demonstrated that the use of police discretion 
influenced a wide range of inconsistent responses which have both favoured and 
hindered fascist activism.  
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Chapter 4 
‘Blackshirt Brutality’ and the Role of the Steward: Public 
Meetings held on Private Premises 
 
You will find that interruptions at Fascist meetings do not last long.351 
1) Introduction 
Police responses to disorder at public meetings held on private premises have had a 
contentious and inconsistent history. This has a significant position in public order 
law as, contrary to the majority of public order policing which is concerned with 
preserving the peace in public places,352 an ambiguous legal debate on the role of 
the police during disorder at public meetings held on private premises still endures. 
For the benefit of this chapter, all further references to public meetings will denote 
those which are held on private premises unless otherwise stated. 
This chapter contextualises the substantive law and analyses criticisms of partiality 
within police practice by comparing the police responses at a range of political 
meetings. By utilising legislation, case law, Parliamentary discussion, Home Office 
correspondence and political publications, these legal responses are critically 
evaluated and their influence on the current legal debate is analysed. Arguments in 
the existing historiography that political motivation accounts for the variation in police 
practice are challenged, and it is argued that the application of a historico-legal lens 
adds an important balance to the understanding of police tactics and the use of their 
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discretion. The development of police practice on the occasion of public meetings is 
examined from the start of the twentieth century, when prominent politicians such as 
Sir Edward Grey in 1905, and Lloyd George in 1908, were victim to suffragette 
militancy and organised interruption. Prominence is given to the interwar years, 
especially the controversial and inconsistent use of police discretion when dealing 
with the BUF’s rally at Olympia and the International Labour Defence Organisation’s 
meeting in South Wales, which came to prominence in Thomas v Sawkins. Ewing 
and Gearty have advocated that the difference in police practice here is a clear 
demonstration of political partisanship which favoured fascist activism. They 
regarded the Olympia meeting as ‘one of the most dramatic occasions of the inter-
war period’ and argued that when policing Right wing groups, ‘the police were 
invariably able to rediscover a nineteenth century style of dedication to political 
liberty and free speech’ that was absent in respect to Left wing groups.353  The 
following debate in this chapter importantly differentiates the dynamics between 
these two meetings and suggests that the difference in police responses were 
influenced by other elements than political motivation. Other interwar meetings held 
by the BUF and the far-Left are analysed, as well as the allegedly brutal stewarding 
by Conservative stewards and Winter Garden staff at the 1958 conference at 
Blackpool and the resulting court cases. By placing the Blackshirt stewarding of the 
1930s within this wider historical context, it is suggested that, although provincial 
police practice did differ, there is more consistency within the legal responses to 
disorder held on private premises than may have originally been thought.  
2) Legal Definitions 
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The current legal definition of ‘public meeting’, found in s9 Public Order Act 1936, is 
examined in Chapter 3. A further meaning which is more applicable to meetings held 
on private premises, but has since been repealed by the Defamation Act 1952, is 
found in s4 Law of Libel Amendment Act 1888. Public meeting is defined here as, 
‘any meeting bona fide and lawfully held for a lawful purpose, and for the furtherance 
or discussion of any matter of public concern, whether the admission thereto be 
general or restricted.’ This provision was mandated to privilege newspapers with the 
authority to report the minutes of meetings, including those of ‘a vestry, town council, 
school board, board of guardians, board or local authority form or constituted under 
the provisions of any Act of Parliament… [and print] at the request of any 
Government office or department, officer of state, commissioner of police, or Chief 
Constable of any notice or report issued by them for the information of the public’, 
provided that it is not published with malicious intent, or with blasphemous or 
indecent matter. Although not legally bound by statute, a similar definition was 
offered to the Report of the Departmental Committee on the Duties of the Police with 
respect to the Preservation of Order at Public Meetings in 1909 by the Chief 
Constable of Liverpool, Leonard Dunning:  
[A] public meeting may properly be defined to include any lawful meeting 
called for the furtherance or discussion of a matter of public concern, to which 
the public or any particular section of the public is invited or admitted, 
whether the admission thereto is general or restricted. 
Dunning described this definition as ‘an instruction to the police put in a language 
they are likely to understand’.354  
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The legal definition of ‘private premises’ is more problematic. The Departmental 
Committee of 1909 clarified that, ‘If a public building is hired, or even lent, to an 
association or other section of the public for the purposes of a meeting, it becomes in 
law for the time being a non-public place.’355 S9 Public Order Act 1936 defines 
private premises as, ‘premises to which the public have access (whether on payment 
or otherwise) only by permission of the owner, occupier, or lessee of the premises.’ 
The implication of this distinction means that persons in attendance of a meeting on 
private premises are only present by the invitation of the organisers, meaning that if 
they refuse to leave when requested, they become trespassers. This entitles the 
organisers, or stewards acting on their behalf, to eject, without undue violence, any 
person who refuses to leave. Until the controversial judgment in Thomas v 
Sawkins,356 it was widely understood that the police also required the invitation of the 
organisers to enter the premises if their assistance was required. Yet events have 
frequently developed that have compelled the police to take assertive action and 
enter private premises to either restore order or to prevent disorder.  
As the law currently stands, the organisers of public meetings are entitled to refuse 
entry to the police, but this entitlement is subject to the police officer’s power and 
duty to preserve the peace. A police officer can enter private premises to either 
prevent or deal with a breach of the peace, or to pursue a criminal. If no legal 
justification can be offered for the police officer’s entry and the officer subsequently 
refuses to leave when requested by the organisers, then the police officer becomes 
a trespasser and ceases to be in the execution of their duty. The ambiguity of the law 
relating to public meetings and the importance of considering the individual facts of 
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each case is highlighted by Peter Thornton QC who stated, ‘The police might argue, 
for example, that a meeting convened to protest against the passage of a Race 
Relations Bill might permit their attendance if held in Bradford, but not if held in 
Devon.’357 The availability of wide discretionary powers, although potentially justified 
on the reasonable apprehension of disorder, demonstrates the available scope of 
police practice and possible perceptions of partiality which raises several questions. 
When a breach of the peace is only anticipated, what justification can validate the 
intrusive use of preventative police tactics? On the occasion of a suspected breach 
of the peace, at what point should the police enter the premises to restore order, and 
how can a breach of the peace in this case be defined? 
3) Pre-War Disruption of Political Meetings 
3.1) The Suffragettes, Political Militancy and the Public Meetings Act 1908  
 
The problems of keeping order at meetings came to the forefront during the militant 
practices of the suffragettes whose high profile campaign to disrupt political meetings 
was most prominent between 1905 and 1908. The Suffragettes largely targeted 
Liberals after the Prime Minister, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, told one of the 
leading suffragettes, Christabel Pankhurst, that his cabinet was largely opposed to 
female enfranchisement. Historian Martin Pugh suggested that prominent Liberals of 
the time, such as Winston Churchill and Lloyd George, enjoyed the extra newspaper 
publicity, and even used it to exercise their wit and humour. This was illustrated by 
the suffragette heckle, ‘We have waited for forty years’ to which Lloyd George replied, 
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‘I must say the lady rather looks it’.358 Christabel Pankhurst argued that the publicity 
was beneficial to the suffrage movement, adding that it diverted press attention away 
from the ministers’ speeches.359  Suffragettes were often violently ejected by the 
stewards, who were acting under the orders of the organisers, which subsequently 
generated condemnation of the Liberal Party’s attitude to civil liberty. 
In 1905, Christabel Pankhurst and Annie Kenney were ejected from the Free Trade 
Hall, Manchester which was addressed by Liberal MP Sir Edward Grey. Grey 
refused to answer their questions on female suffrage which were ruled out of order. 
Following Pankhurst’s cry of, ‘Treat us like men!’ the two agitators were forcibly 
removed from the hall by the police.360 The charges of disorderly conduct, assault 
and obstruction, which were brought against Christabel Pankhurst, related to the 
events after the eviction when she spat in the face of a police officer, and attempted 
to address a crowd on the street outside the hall. The extensive publicity that was 
gained as a result of the disruption of the high profile political meeting in Manchester 
heralded the start of the suffragettes’ defiance of the law as it became clear that 
militancy ‘paid off’.361 Political disruption became a common suffragette tactic.  
At a Liberal Party meeting at the Albert Hall on 5 December 1908, the methods 
employed by the stewards in evicting female hecklers were subject to fierce criticism 
in the correspondence printed in The Times. Descriptions of the ejections included 
the powerful statements, ‘Of the first half-dozen women ejected, four at least were 
fallen on with extreme violence by the stewards, sometimes thrown on the ground in 
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the struggle, and… were pommelled and knocked about.’362 Other descriptions from 
witnesses at the meeting recorded that the actions of the male stewards towards the 
female interrupters were ‘regrettable and scandalous’ asserting that the women were 
‘handled with a brutality which was a disgrace to our sex, and to any civilised 
country.’363 The interruptions caused by the women were also subject to different 
interpretation. One letter described the female heckling as ‘no more than ordinary 
interruptions made by men at political meetings for which they are never thrown out’, 
adding that these women suffer missiles and assaults at their meetings but instead 
of ejecting people they ‘control meetings by the ordinary political methods of good 
temper and firmness.’364 The opposing view insisted that, ‘Some of these ladies were 
so persistent in their attempt to interfere with the meeting that they had to be ejected’ 
but continued to suggest that this should be done by ‘muscular women… as it is very 
repulsive to see a woman struggling in the arms of men’.365  
The interruptions organised by the suffragettes revealed the conflicting contemporary 
views regarding the disruption of meetings and the freedom to heckle political 
speakers. The legacy of the militant suffragettes’ tactic of disrupting political 
meetings can be detected in a new offence that was introduced and passed through 
Parliament in the same month as the controversial Albert Hall meeting.   
The legal issue that was highlighted by the suffragettes’ interjections was addressed 
in the memorandum which preceded the Public Meeting Bill 1908. It declared that no 
legal provision existed to remedy the problem of a person or body of persons 
breaking up a public meeting or preventing any of the speakers from being heard 
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unless an actual assault took place. The object of the Bill was to create an offence of 
disorderly conduct at a meeting with the purpose of preventing the transaction of 
business.366 The Bill was presented to Parliament by Conservative MP Lord Robert 
Cecil on Friday 18 December 1908 and was rushed through Parliament. There was a 
mixed response in the House of Commons to the Bill’s effect on civil liberty. Liberal 
MP Josiah Wedgwood, who was critical of the Bill, declared it ‘was the worst blow at 
the right of expressing individual political opinion that had been delivered for a long 
time.’367 Other MPs, such as the Liberal William Byles, praised the clause as it 
offered to preserve the priceless liberties of free speech and free expression. He 
added that the object of the Bill was not to make an offence of disorderly conduct at 
political meetings, but disorderly conduct that was for the express purpose of 
preventing the transaction of business. In a response to those who opposed the Bill 
on the grounds of civil liberty, he stated that, ‘his hon. friends were championing the 
rights of those blackguards who came on purpose to prevent the object of the 
meeting being carried out’.368 
An important feature of the Commons debate of the Public Meeting Bill was that 
experience of disruption and violence at political meetings was widespread. Labour 
MP William Crooks declared, ‘My experience has been that it was the Liberals who 
broke up my meetings.’369 Will Thorne, also a Labour MP, stated: 
No men in that House had been through the mill more than he had in regard 
to political meetings. On one occasion at Camborne he got an awful bashing, 
yet he was not prepared to vote for a Bill which would prevent anyone making 
inter[text missing – interjections at] such gatherings… It was for those who 
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organized the meetings to make proper provision against those who would try 
to prevent the speakers being heard.370 
The armament of a legal provision to protect public meetings from disruption was 
defended by Liberal MP Edward Hemmerde who declared that most disruption could 
be attributed to women and socialists. He stated his praise of the Bill as the measure 
gave them a ‘chance of clearing public meetings and public discussions of what was 
rapidly becoming an intolerable nuisance.’371 In some circumstances the disorder 
was even tolerated. Crooks described interjections as ‘the salt of public meetings’372 
while Wedgwood pleaded that, ‘it would upset traditions which had obtained for 500 
years,’ and he therefore hoped that ‘even at this eleventh hour it would be 
successfully opposed.’373 Cecil successfully defended his Bill and it became law on 
21 December 1908: 
If the small knot of people were not stopped it meant the denial of free 
speech, or if the other members of the meeting endeavoured to stop the 
interrupters it meant a free fight. Lynch law or the denial of free speech 
was the alternative with which they were confronted. 
However, despite the passing of the Public Meeting Act, the duty of the police at 
public meetings was still vague and inconsistent across the United Kingdom.  
3.2) The Debate regarding the duty of the Police at Public Meetings 
 
The prevalence of political disruption in mainstream politics was highlighted in the 
1908 by-elections at Chelmsford, which was contested by the Conservative Unionist, 
Ernest Pretyman and the Liberal, Mr A Dence. Although the violence exercised at 
the meeting at Ingatestone was not necessarily unusual, or any more severe than in 
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other parts of the country, especially at election time, it was the practice of the police 
which gave the incident national attention. The Times described the Chelmsford 
division as ‘old fashioned’ adding that the use of eggs as political weapons had ‘not 
yet gone out of date in the elections here’. A description of one by-election meeting 
recorded, ‘Mouth organs were played and fireworks were exploded in a crowded hall, 
and for half an hour the Liberal candidate tried in vain to obtain a hearing' 374 
demonstrating the loudness and disorder that was prevalent. The public meeting 
Dence was due to address at Ingatestone on 25 November 1908 which was 
abandoned at the last moment, revealed the variation of police practice. It was 
reported that the meeting was forcibly entered by 50 youths who threw aside the 
doorkeepers and violently ejected the Liberals inside. One was the temporary Liberal 
agent, Mr Martin, who was carried out to the street, being dropped along the way, 
and was rescued by friends who brought him into a side room of the hall where he 
fainted.  
The report of Police Sergeant Willsmer to the Chief Constable of Essex 
Constabulary revealed that Mr Martin had requested a police presence inside the 
hall and informed the Sergeant that ‘a number of roughs were coming from 
Chelmsford and Brentwood to upset the meeting’.375 However, Willsmer refused the 
request stating that the police were not allowed to be present in the hall and it was 
up to the organisers to keep order at their own meeting. Following this disturbance, 
Liberal Unionist Austen Chamberlain asked the Home Secretary, Herbert Gladstone, 
whether he knew that different police forces in the country held different views of 
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their duties regarding the preservation of order at public meetings and suggested 
that a committee should be appointed to inquire into the conduct of the police.  
The Departmental Committee on the Duties of the Police with respect to the 
Preservation of Order at Public Meetings was duly appointed publishing its report on 
14 April 1909. The Committee interviewed the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, as 
well as the Chief Constables of four counties and six large boroughs to establish the 
range of police practice. The Report determined that the varying practices of the 
Chief Constables could be classified by three distinct principles: 
(1) That it is unwise for police to interfere with political meetings any further than 
they are bound to do in order to prevent actual breaches of the peace; 
(2) That it is expedient to assist the promoters of public meetings to keep order 
inside, but that this is a special duty of the police which must be paid for by 
the persons desiring their assistance; 
(3) That keeping order inside public meetings is part of the ordinary duties of the 
police, for which no payment ought to be asked.376 
The Committee did not advocate any action to bring uniformity of police practice to 
public meetings as it was believed that the three different systems ‘have in each 
case been adopted either in consequence of, or with the sanction of, the public 
opinion in each locality.’377 
The Departmental Committee minutes of evidence revealed the consensus among 
the Chief Constables that the Public Meeting Act 1908 was a weak statute that did 
not confer any additional powers or impose any additional duties on the police. With 
barely any exception, the Chief Constables would not direct the police to prosecute 
interrupters, but would require that the charge sheet was signed by the promoter or a 
steward of the meeting. The Committee considered the possibility of strengthening 
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the Act by adding a power of arrest without warrant, but considered that the arrest of 
an interrupter would probably tend to further excite hostile opinion, and may even 
find disfavour among the supporters of the meeting. Chief Constable Dunning of 
Liverpool City Police expressed his dissatisfaction by stating that such a short Act of 
Parliament had too many pitfalls. In his questioning, it is established that if the police 
were to bring a prosecution under this Act, they would first have to prove that it was 
a lawful public meeting; second, that there was a disorderly act by someone in 
preventing the transaction of the business for which the meeting was called; and 
third, they would have to prove the intent of the person was to obstruct the meeting. 
Because of the wide discretion involved, Dunning explained that the Public Meeting 
Act should only be instigated by the injured person and not the police. Further to the 
inadequacy of the Act, he also clarified that there was no power of arrest under this 
statute if the disorderly person refused to give their name to the police.378  
The principal reason that the Departmental Committee refused to support any new 
legislation, which imposed a duty on the police to undertake the role of stewards 
inside public meetings was that it would ‘be resented by public sentiment as an 
apparent infringement of the liberty of public meeting.’ It also added that the police 
force were the ‘guardians of public order’ and if such duty was imposed on them, 
they would be the first to ‘resort to physical force, instead of merely “keeping the 
King’s peace” as at present.’379 The Report highlighted that the Chief Constables 
who followed a policy of non-interference at public meetings were unanimous against 
Chamberlain’s proposals. Even those Constabularies who followed a policy of 
stationing police officers inside public meetings opposed the proposals, as their 
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practice was to ‘abstain from taking any action until they are called upon to assist the 
stewards in resisting violence or until a breach of the peace arises.’ Under these two 
practices, the maintenance of police impartiality is declared to have been 
comparatively easy.  Yet, referring to the suggested proposals, the report concluded 
that ‘an indiscretion or failure [on the police’s] part would be more serious in its 
consequences than in the case of ordinary stewards.’380  
Therefore, the maintenance of impartiality of police conduct was a decisive factor, 
and it was considered that this could be achieved with as little police interference as 
possible. However, by the 1920s the organised disruption of political meetings by the 
far-Left was rendering them impossible with speakers unable to be heard. A letter 
from Conservative and Unionist Chairman J. Davidson to the Home Secretary 
William Joynson-Hicks stated that within two months it was impossible for their 
speakers to attain a hearing at four of their meetings. A socialist pamphlet which 
instructed their members on how to disrupt meetings accompanied the letter. The 
pamphlet included the signals that the group marshal would use to initiate 
interruption by either the shouting of slogans or the singing of far-Left anthems.381 
The Home Office considered strengthening the Public Meeting Act and it was again 
highlighted that police practice at public meetings varied across different regions.    
Furthermore, it reinstated the 1909 Departmental Committee’s disclosures that 
police practice varied amongst different towns and boroughs. In the Metropolis and 
many other large towns and most County forces, the practice was that police were 
not allowed to enter public meetings. In Manchester, Cardiff and a majority of 
boroughs it was highlighted that police officers were allowed in the meeting on the 
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application of the promoters, while in Birmingham and ‘a few other places’ it was 
considered that it was ‘the ordinary course of their duty’ to attend inside public 
meetings regardless of an application from the promoters or not. 382  Following a 
Home Office consultation with Chief Constables it emerged that no legislative action 
should be taken as the consensus was that the existing law was sufficient in its 
provisions to keep order at meetings provided that the onus was on the promoters to 
prosecute interrupters under the Public Meeting Act 1908 which would effectively 
prevent future disturbances.383  
The authorities concern with maintaining public order at public meetings centred 
primarily on the disorder caused by interrupters. Even in the era of the suffragettes, 
the violent stewarding was mainly criticised on the basis of gender, arguing that it 
was more appropriate for females to be ejected by other females. The reassessment 
of the law regarding disorder at public meetings in the 1920s highlighted that the 
majority of Chief Constables were reluctant to have their powers increased, instead 
favouring the promoters of meetings to make adequate arrangements and initiate 
their own legal proceedings against interrupters. However, in the 1930s when the 
BUF used their trained stewards of the Fascist Defence Force to keep order, the 
spotlight regarding the disorder at public meetings shifted its focus upon the 
stewards, rather than the interrupters. Additionally, with wide police discretion 
available regarding public meetings and varying police practice still present across 
England and Wales, the disparity between police responses was to come under 
intense focus. 
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4) Responses to Fascist and Communist Meetings between the Wars 
The different application of police powers at the BUF meeting at Olympia, London on 
7 June 1934 and the communist meeting in Caerau, Wales, just two months later on 
17 August, have been frequently compared, yet vital differences that offer 
justification for a non-politically motivated police action has been neglected.384 It is 
argued here that the police were hindered by wide discretion associated with 
ineffective legislation, ambiguous common law powers under the breach of the 
peace doctrine, and different past experiences with both political movements to 
consistently maintain public order. 
During the interwar period the issue of police partisanship was addressed by 
Parliament and the NCCL.385 The accusations had heightened in the aftermath of the 
BUF’s public meeting at Olympia. For the BUF, the Olympia meeting represented a 
political triumph with an unprecedented 15,000 spectators.386 Mosley had brought 
the spectacle of large scale fascist rallies to British politics, emulating the methods of 
their Nazi counterparts. Eyewitness accounts have recorded the unnecessarily 
aggressive removal of hecklers and violent assaults conducted by the BUF 
stewards.387 Despite the violent physical attacks exerted on members of the crowd, 
the Metropolitan Police did not intervene or attempt to prevent the BUF’s gratuitously 
violent stewarding. The failure of the police to stop Blackshirt brutality and take 
effective control of the event attracted much criticism. The Home Secretary, Sir John 
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Gilmour, defended the police, asserting that they had no legal authority to enter a 
public meeting unless they were invited to do so by the organiser, or had good 
reason to believe that a breach of the peace was being committed.388 No legislation 
existed to confirm the legality of the police entering a meeting and, in defending the 
police action at Olympia, Gilmour had to rely on the Report of the Departmental 
Committee from 1909. The uncertainty of police powers and their legal authority with 
regard to meetings held on private premises could potentially excuse the police of 
employing politically motivated methods at Olympia. However, this view does not 
vindicate the police decision not to enter the hall using common law powers when 
eyewitness accounts clearly demonstrated that severe disorder had occurred.  
The NCCL, which had only formed in the February of 1934, collected numerous 
statements from spectators at Olympia in order to conduct an enquiry to investigate 
whether the allegations of ‘Blackshirt brutality’ could be justified. The majority of the 
recordings were critical of the fascist stewards and it is clear that the police would 
have been aware that a breach of the peace was occurring in the hall, thereby giving 
them the right to enter: 
Wounded people began to leave the Hall. Hysterical women came out 
shrieking, “There’s murder going on in there!” Then young men and women 
came out, all in a very distressed condition. Many women were holding their 
breasts and their faces displayed signs that they had been clawed by finger 
nails. The young men were in a deplorable condition. One man I saw, who 
was being assisted along by kind friends, looked as though an animal had 
attacked him, his face was mauled, his legs were dangling and his clothes 
were torn. Other men who were being assisted out had damaged faces and 
had the appearance that they were suffering from rupture. Practically all the 
men had smashed faces, not just bruised faces, but smashed faces.389  
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The NCCL’s appeal for witnesses to the fascist brutality, demonstrated that their 
position was sympathetic to the abused interrupters; namely the anti-fascists. 
Despite the horrific scenes described, it is difficult to form a critical view from these 
descriptions alone as they were collected with the objective of holding the BUF 
accountable for the violence that occurred. This bias was addressed by a critic of the 
enquiry, who wrote to the NCCL’s founder and secretary, Ronald Kidd, stating that 
‘any body which has the temerity to call itself ‘The Council for Civil Liberties’ should 
disdain even the appearance of impartiality’ and underlined the actions of the 
interrupters, contending that the organised breaking up of a meeting with the use of 
weapons was also an infringement on civil liberties.390 The NCCL did have an openly 
anti-fascist stance. For Sylvia Scaffardi, a co-founder of the Council, fascism 
represented ‘the thunder of brute force [that threatened] to trample and overrun the 
sensitive humanitarian world.’ 391  She acknowledged that in 1934 the image of 
fascism was still respectable to the wider public who were not involved in politics.392 
Reports from Germany on the treatment of the Jews and the Brown Book of Hitler 
Terror, published by Victor Gollancz in 1933, which contained statements and 
documents on Nazi violence, interrogation, torture and murder, also influenced the 
NCCL’s contempt of fascism. Therefore, fascism represented an end to the ideals of 
individual freedom and liberty that the council were defending, which initiated their 
anti-fascist stance in Britain. The stated objective of the NCCL weakens the reliability 
of the extreme testimonies they collected. This does not absolve the Blackshirts from 
their violent actions but addresses the need to analyse their account of the event.   
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The BUF’s version of Olympia was recorded in their weekly newspaper Blackshirt.393 
Their propaganda predictably confirmed that the communists were responsible for 
the violence and were determined to ‘Kill Mosley’.394 BUF propaganda officer A K 
Chesterton’s report detailed a ‘frenzied Red minority’ who were determined to 
prevent Mosley being heard and that large groups of communists set upon stewards 
who tried to remove hecklers. He glorified the heroics of the Blackshirts who were 
‘fighting with their bare fists against the foulest weapons daggers, razors, stockings 
filled with broken glass, everything that the criminal lunatic, mentality could 
devise.’395 In his autobiography, Sir Oswald Mosley quoted the Conservative MP 
Patrick Dormer’s account from the National Review: 
[The Communists] marched from the East End, the police kindly escorting 
them, with the avowed purpose of wrecking the meeting... and with my own 
eyes I witnessed gangs of Communists (some of them dressed in black shirts 
to make identification of those responsible for the uproar more difficult) 
resisting ejection with the utmost violence. If then, as cannot be disputed, 
some of these hooligans were armed, can it in equity be argued that the 
stewards used their fists, when provoked in this manner, with more vigour 
than perhaps the situation required? 396  
This perception reversed the accusation of police partiality and also highlighted the 
nature of the resistance by those the stewards were ejecting. Mosley claimed that at 
their own dressing stations ‘highly qualified medical personnel’ treated 63 Blackshirts 
‘for injuries, mostly abdominal, and injuries caused by blunt instruments’. Mosley’s 
descriptions of the injuries sustained to Blackshirts were just as brutal as the 
statements collected by the NCCL. These included a female Blackshirt who suffered 
a cut to her eye, down her cheek and neck, finishing between her shoulder blades as 
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well as several Blackshirts who ‘were laid up for three weeks’ after being kicked in 
the head and stomach and attacked with blunt objects. Mosley also claimed that 
there were no serious injuries caused to the interrupters, but whatever the validity of 
the different accounts there is no question that a breach of the peace had occurred.  
5) Changing Attitudes to Political Violence  
The Olympia meeting was a pivotal moment in the history of the BUF and has 
received much critical attention. Thurlow argued that although the initial effect of the 
meeting was to attract a large number of new recruits, with many new members 
being attracted to the BUF’s dedication to the preservation of free speech and its 
stance against Left-wing activism, they lost the long term ‘propaganda war 
concerning responsibility for the violence… and in retrospect it marked the turning-
point in the fortunes of the movement.’397 This is the general summary of textbook 
analysis, yet an evaluation of the responses to Olympia prompts further questioning 
of the contemporary political culture and reactions to political violence.  
Lawrence introduced the pre-war political culture in which the ‘old ways’ of party 
politics and the disorder that occurred are referred to as a ‘form of sport’ and argued 
that it was commonly accepted by some politicians that the mobilisation of a private 
force was necessary to ensure successful political meetings.398 He contended that 
this view changed after the First World War when ‘the politics of misrule ceased to 
be tolerated by the vast majority of politicians.’399 Pugh responded by stating that 
when old attitudes change they do so gradually and ‘that many of the inter-war MPs 
had grown up in an era when political violence was routine and they retained the 
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assumptions of an earlier generation.’400 The historical debate between Lawrence 
and Pugh established that there was conflicting contemporary opinion on the 
acceptability of using violence in order to protect a political meeting. Despite the 
shock that the eyewitness accounts evoke from the modern reader, the conflicting 
contemporary attitudes concerning the entitlement of the organisers and their 
stewards to use ‘reasonable necessary force’ created a challenging situation for the 
use of police discretion in this era.   
A greater understanding of the contemporary political culture and legal framework 
generate questions that demonstrate the complexity of the issues faced by the police 
and politicians. The situation at Olympia cannot be simplified by explaining police 
actions as either pro-fascist or anti-communist. While the nature of the fascist 
violence cannot be excused, it would be naïve, considering the advertised 
communist campaign to stop the meeting, to regard all of the ejected as innocent 
victims. However, many of the reports recorded in the national press demonstrate 
that the Blackshirt brutality was indiscriminate and unjustifiable. The Times recorded 
some of the injuries sustained at the meeting, declaring that 70 patients were treated 
by doctors and several had to be detained in hospital. The injuries varied from a 
woman with external bleeding after blows to the abdomen, ‘a man with five lacerated 
wounds in the scalp (said to be caused by a blow with a fire extinguisher)’ and a man 
with a ‘badly lacerated finger, obviously caused by some sharp cutting instrument.’401 
These examples demonstrate that women were also indiscriminately attacked, 
usually by female Blackshirts, but perhaps more importantly, that the Blackshirts 
were accused of using a variety of weapons to maintain order, including purposefully 
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brought weapons of a discreet nature such as the ‘sharp cutting instrument’, or the 
use of nearby objects such as the fire extinguisher. 
Correspondence from audience members published in The Times provided a 
balanced view of the event. In his short defence of Blackshirt action, Aylmer Haldane 
declared that the ‘interrupters only received the treatment which they deserved’ and 
that a ‘forcible ejection of such intruders [was] the only remedy left’ to preserve the 
meeting for the majority who wished to hear Mosley’s speech.402 Nonetheless, it 
would be incorrect to assume that Haldane’s view on the necessity of force was 
common among other audience members. Haldane was an army officer who began 
his military career in 1881. In his account of how an insurgency was put down in The 
Insurrection in Mesopotamia, 1920 he insisted that ‘The Arabs of Iraq respect 
nothing but force, and to force only will they bend’.403 Most members of the audience, 
attending the Olympia meeting out of curiosity of what fascism had to offer, were put 
off by the brutal exhibition of violence. This was the experience of T. S. Singleton-
Fleming in his letter published the same day. He highlighted the ‘disgusting display 
of force’ and the ‘un-English theatricalism and schoolboy hooliganism… [which] 
made it quite impossible for us to take fascism seriously.’404  
While it could be argued that anti-fascist witness statements may have embellished 
the disorder that occurred, it becomes necessary to examine the perspectives of the 
police officers that were on duty. Police reports from the Olympia meeting 
demonstrate that, not only were some police officers aware of the disruption inside, 
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but that the graphic descriptions from the eye-witnesses were not necessarily 
exaggerated. One Special Branch Officer reported that:  
At 10.43 p.m.… A man was thrown through the entrance by three fascists into the 
street. One leg of his trousers had been torn off, and the other was round his ankle. 
His private parts were exposed, and he was bleeding freely from a head wound.405  
Special Branch Sergeant Hunt, who was stationed inside the hall as an observer, 
witnessed ‘about 50 persons ejected. They were handled in a most violent manner 
and in some cases were punched unconscious and their clothing torn.’406 Another 
Special Branch Sergeant recorded that the strong opposition put up by interrupters, 
‘no doubt accounted for the great deal of the violence used upon them’ but also 
witnessed hecklers that offered to walk out without fighting were still set upon by 
stewards and ‘not allowed to do so without molestation.’407    
In one instance, a Police Inspector assisted by ten Police Constables actually 
entered the building when a ‘linkman’ working for the Olympia venue informed him 
that a person inside needed assistance. Inspector O’Carroll’s report stated that apart 
from the man ‘in a state of semi-coma’ he witnessed, ‘six groups, each containing six 
to eight ‘Blackshirts’ beating and kicking unmercifully a man in the centre of each 
group.’408 He then rescued a youth being brutally beaten by four Blackshirts on the 
stairs. Interestingly, his account of the proceedings changed after he was 
interrogated by the Deputy Assistant Commissioner. The amended version of the 
events, absolved O’Carroll from not making any arrests as he now stated that the 
youth ‘appeared to have been beaten in a brutal manner’ rather than ‘was being 
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beaten in a brutal manner’ and that those responsible immediately ran making it 
impossible for him to restrain or identify them.409 The seriousness of the assaults had 
also been lessened in the amended account, which highlighted that none of the 
individuals that he rescued accepted medical attention. The Deputy Assistant 
Commissioner defended O’Carroll’s actions and stated that ‘I am of the opinion that 
he acted with sound judgment in very difficult circumstances, and that his reasons for 
not making arrests are clear and sufficient.’410 The difference of accounts does call 
into question the validity of police statements and their personal bias to protect or 
justify their own actions. 
In the month following the Olympia meeting, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, 
Lord Trenchard, wrote a Memorandum to the Home Secretary that emphasised that 
the fascists were the main cause of the recent disorder. Mosley frequently absolved 
his movement from any responsibility for violent confrontations, arguing that the BUF 
Defence Corps was a necessary measure to ensure his movement’s ‘right’ to 
freedom of speech. Trenchard highlighted that the main source of disruption at 
fascist meetings was caused by the ‘abnormal provocation provided by the existence 
of a private uniformed “army” adopting continental methods and ideas’. 411  His 
memorandum does not demonstrate any sympathy for the fascist movement and he 
suggested that legislation should be introduced along the lines of a recent Swedish 
Act, which prohibited the formation of, or the taking part in, an organisation which 
was ‘intended to serve as a defence corps for a political party or similar group’.412 It 
was Trenchard’s belief that this measure, along with prohibiting uniforms for political 
purposes, that would prevent further disorder on a large scale.  
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Trenchard addressed the issue of freedom of speech with regard to the organised 
disruption of fascist speakers, arguing that political opponents were free to talk back 
and it should only become a concern of the authorities if the simultaneous 
communication leads to a breach of the peace. In the event of a public meeting the 
chairman had the right to ask an interrupter to leave, and stewards had the right to 
remove the person if they declined. On this issue, Trenchard stated that it was the 
responsibility of the police to interfere as little as possible and that the onus of 
keeping order in a meeting should stay with the stewards. The only detail that he 
would have liked to have changed was that it should be within the discretion of the 
Chief Officer of Police to deploy a sufficient number of men in the hall whether it was 
asked for by the organisers or not. This should be a power employed only on rare 
occasions wherein the police should only deal with unnecessary violence and 
fighting if disturbances develop throughout the hall, and ultimately they should be 
empowered to order the chairman to close the meeting and withdraw his supporters.    
Trenchard’s suggestions demonstrated that although he did not want the police to 
become embroiled with the stewarding of public meetings, he was not politically 
motivated either. Furthermore, as the police’s responsibilities included the 
maintenance of public order, his post Olympia suggestions represented a 
proportionate response that could have prevented further confrontations and brutality. 
Home Office papers demonstrate that many Chief Constables were in favour of new 
legislation to clarify police presence and powers at public meetings.413 Fifteen Chief 
Constables participated in discussion with the Metropolitan Police Commissioner 
following the Olympia event for the purpose of drafting his memorandum and 
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proposing new legislation. All of the Chief Constables agreed, to some extent, that 
the police should assist stewards in removing interrupters when it became necessary. 
The object of this request was not just to support the stewards in keeping order 
during their meetings but also, as the Chief Constable of Durham pointed out, to 
empower the police to act when a breach of the peace occurred, whether it was from 
organised interruption or excessively violent stewarding.414 Although there was an 
overwhelming consensus that the police should be present at public meetings, there 
was some disagreement to the point at which the police should intervene. This was 
either after a breach of the peace had occurred as already suggested or, as the 
Chief Constable of Southport declared, when a breach of the peace was likely, 
adding that any person who acted in a way which was likely to cause a breach of the 
peace should also be prosecuted. He went even further to check fascist aggression 
by stating that organisers should be required by law to appoint stewards who should 
be subject to the direction of the police if they are present.415 Whether there to help 
preserve or to restore public order, the lawful presence of the police at public 
meetings without the necessary invitation of the organisers was the ultimate ideal. 
These suggestions reveal that a number of constabularies were eager to attain new 
and clear legislation to be able to deal with the problems of public order associated 
with BUF meetings and communist interruption without any partiality. Despite the 
uncertainty of existing powers, the police would have been expected to have 
intervened when the violence at Olympia had become apparent. They would also 
have had the power to arrest a person they had seen commit a breach of the peace, 
or a person that had been charged by another for a breach without a warrant being 
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necessary.416 Police inaction cannot be attributed solely to unclear police powers. 
Nor can it be claimed that police discretion had allowed the Blackshirt violence to 
have been deemed as reasonable necessary force. Yet, despite clear indications 
that Lord Trenchard and many of his colleagues had no sympathy towards either the 
fascists or the communists; his memorandum particularly identified the fascists as 
the cause of much of the disorder, as well as being a drain on police resources.  
6) A New Power: Anticipating a Breach of the Peace 
It was not the enactment of new legislation that enabled the police to legally enter 
meetings when they apprehended a potential breach of the peace, but the common 
law authority of Thomas v Sawkins. The background to this case needs further 
clarification in order to elucidate the differences between the events at Caerau and 
Olympia. Two months after the Olympia meeting, on 17 August 1934, Police 
Inspector Parry, along with Sergeants Lawrence and Sawkins of the Glamorgan 
County Police, entered the communist meeting at Caerau using common law powers, 
anticipating that the meeting could become an unlawful assembly, a riot, that a 
breach of the peace may occur, or that seditious speeches were to be made. They 
refused to leave the premises after Alun Thomas, a speaker at the meeting, had 
lodged a complaint against the officers at the police station. When Thomas 
proceeded to exercise his believed right to eject the police and placed his hand on 
Parry’s shoulder, Sergeant Sawkins intervened by pushing Thomas’ arm and hand 
away and stated, ‘I won’t allow you to interfere with my superior officer.’417 Thomas 
brought a criminal prosecution against Sawkins under s42 of the Offences Against 
the Person Act 1861. It was agreed that neither Thomas nor Sawkins used more 
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force than was reasonably necessary in the execution of their duty as steward or 
police officer, but if the prosecution could prove that Sawkins had no right to be in 
the hall at the time of the incident, his actions would have constituted assault. The 
magistrates held that the police were entitled to be on the premises and the charge 
of assault was dismissed. An appeal was taken to the Divisional Court where Lord 
Chief Justice Hewart asserted that ‘a police officer has ex virtute officii full right so to 
act when he has reasonable ground for believing that an offence is imminent or is 
likely to be committed’ and dismissed the appeal. 418  This was a controversial 
outcome, and Thomas Kidd of the NCCL reflected on its potential effect stating 
‘Judge-made law, as binding as parliamentary law, could undermine democracy.’419  
For the respondent, Vaughan Williams KC argued that the police by oath swear to 
keep the peace and, by their duty of preventive justice, have a right to enter private 
premises to prevent a breach of the peace.420 For the appellant, Sir Stafford Cripps 
KC argued that although the duty of the police was to preserve the King’s peace, 
they may only enter private premises without a warrant, to either: 
take a felon, where a felony has been committed and a particular person is 
reasonably suspected to be the offender, where a felony is likely, or about, to 
be committed, where he hears an affray on the premises, or to pursue and 
arrest those who have taken part in an affray.421 
Other examples were used to demonstrate that existing provisions to empower a 
constable to enter private premises did not apply: ‘There is no authority empowering 
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a constable to enter private premises merely because he has a reasonable belief 
that an offence or a breach of the peace may be committed thereon.’422 
In the original hearing held at Bridgend, W. H. Thompson, representing Thomas, 
quoted the Home Secretary’s remarks from the Olympia debate in the Commons. 
This was a measure that could not be repeated in the appeal case. Despite the 
Home Secretary’s ruling that the police could only enter when a suspected breach of 
the peace was actually being committed, the magistrates returned with the verdict 
that the police were entitled to be present and the summons on Sergeant Sawkins 
was dismissed. The magistrates also heard that the police in Caerau had been 
‘aggravated’ by the ‘considerable trouble’ caused by recent meetings and marches 
and had every reason to have anticipated that a breach of the peace would occur. 423  
The reasonable anticipation of a breach of the peace was echoed by Lord Hewart 
who confirmed that it was part of the ‘preventive power, and, therefore, part of the 
preventive duty, of the police… to enter and remain on the premises.’424 Such a 
strong emphasis on the preventive power of the police has deep implications for civil 
liberties. This measure does in fact open the discretionary power of the police to act 
under the apprehension of an offence being committed and effectively punishes the 
person that the police are acting against without them even committing an offence. 
Justice Avory reflected on the preventive power of the magistrates. He quoted 
Justice Fitzgerald in R v Queen’s County Justices425 who declared that ‘magistrates 
are invested with large judicial powers, for the maintenance of order and the 
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preservation of public peace.’ 426  After referencing that that principle had been 
approved in Lansbury v Riley427 and Wise v Dunning428 he contended that the power 
of a magistrate to bind someone over to be of good behaviour is no different to the 
duty of the police constable to prevent a breach of the peace. 
Despite it being preventive police action, and not the decision of the magistrates, 
similarities can be drawn reconciling Thomas v Sawkins with Wise v Dunning and 
Lansbury v Riley. The latter two cases dealt with the binding over of speakers with a 
known history of using insulting words or words calculated to incite a breach of the 
peace. The appellants against the magistrates’ decisions were a Protestant lecturer 
from Liverpool, George Wise, who was known to cause Breaches of the Peace with 
anti-Catholic speeches and gestures, and Lansbury a supporter of the Women's 
Social and Political Union, who was known to incite militancy to advance pressure on 
the Government to extend the voting franchise to women. Unfortunately, Thomas v 
Sawkins does not define the potential threat to a breach of the peace, or document 
the history of the appellant as clearly. Yet, reasonable suspicion that seditious 
speeches would be made was evidenced by the comments of Thomas at a previous 
meeting. In reference to the police present, he said, ‘If it were not for the presence of 
these people… I could tell you a hell of a lot more.’429 In the view of the respondent 
and the other officers, their anticipation of an unlawful assembly, riot or a breach of 
the peace was based on their knowledge and experience of previous meetings. 
Avory asserted the authority of the police most clearly confirming that ‘no express 
statutory authority is necessary where the police have reasonable grounds to 
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apprehend a breach of the peace’. 430  This effectively set a new precedent by 
providing the police with the power to enter public meetings when a breach of the 
peace was anticipated. 
Regardless of the emphasis on preventive power, other factors were considered in 
the summing up. It was significant that the meeting was well advertised and 
members of the public were invited to attend free of charge. Avory insisted that 
‘There can be no doubt that the police officers who attended the meeting were 
members of the public and were included in that sense in the invitation to attend.’431 
Hewart added that it was remarkable to talk of trespass on the part of the police after 
a public invitation had been issued, especially as part of the business of the meeting 
was the dismissal of the Chief Constable of the county.  
Despite no statutory authority being mentioned to clarify the right of the police to be 
at the meeting, the Justices accepted that common law had provided significant 
justification for their actions. Humphries v Connor432 demonstrated the extent of the 
preventive powers available as it was held that a police officer was entitled to commit 
a technical assault on a person to preserve the public peace. Justice Lawrence 
referred to this in his summing up stating that ‘If a constable in the execution of his 
duty to preserve the peace is entitled to commit an assault, it appears to me that he 
is equally entitled to commit a trespass.’433 
7) The BUF Olympia Meeting and Thomas v Sawkins: Compatibility for 
Comparison? 
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The different approaches in exercising discretion evidenced by the Metropolitan 
Police and the Glamorgan County Police have been applied to demonstrate the 
existence of police partiality. The eye witness accounts of the event at Olympia 
discussed in this chapter, demonstrate the different attitudes of those present which 
debate whether the Blackshirts used more than ‘reasonable necessary force’ when 
dealing with disrupters or not. This ambiguous phrase, which split the opinion of the 
audience, highlights the problem of police discretion. Although the Superintendent’s 
decision not to enter the hall to prevent the violent ejection of interrupters was 
contentious, it was one based more on their contemporary perception of their legal 
power rather than pure partisanship. Thomas v Sawkins was a ‘constitutional 
innovation’, in which the Chair of Jurisprudence at Oxford, Arthur Goodhart, argued 
that no ‘case was cited by counsel or in the judgments in which it had been 
specifically held that the police had this power, and no text-book contains a 
statement that it exists or has ever existed.’434 As the scenes witnessed at Olympia 
happened a year before this decision, the Metropolitan Police were understandably 
more apprehensive about entering the meeting as their actions could have been 
interpreted as trespass by a court of law if sufficient reason could not be given to 
justify the use of this discretionary power. 
The precedent set by Thomas v Sawkins directly conflicted with Gilmour’s belief that 
the police had no legal right to enter meetings ‘merely because they apprehend that 
disorder may occur’.435 His Memorandum proposed that the law should be amended 
to empower the police to enter the premises of a public meeting if the Chief Officer of 
Police had reason to believe that disorder was likely to occur, whether invited to do 
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so by the organisers or not.436 This recommendation would give the police statutory 
authority to enter the meetings rather than relying on common law powers of 
anticipating a breach of the peace. In the Commons, Gilmour recognised that the 
police did have the right to enter if they had good reason to believe that a breach of 
the peace was being committed.437 Therefore, it was perceived that the police did not 
have legal preventive powers to enter the Olympia hall on the apprehension of a 
breach of the peace, but they were empowered to do so on the occasion of a breach 
of the peace being committed. The Departmental Committee of 1909 addressed the 
disputable issue of what constituted a breach of the peace at a public meeting. The 
Chief Constable of Manchester suggested that ‘it only occurs when the meeting is 
broken up by the opposition, and the conveners of the meeting resort to retaliatory 
methods.’ 438  Although the Blackshirts’ violent approach could accurately be 
described as retaliatory, the meeting was not broken up and able to continue until its 
natural conclusion. Therefore, under this tenuous definition a breach of the peace did 
not occur.  
Gilmour asserted the need to strengthen police powers observing that the fascist 
policy of refusing police help had created a new problem that required the changing 
of the law.439 The Public Meeting Act 1908 was only effective if the police were 
asked to assist when organised interruption disrupted a meeting, as it did not contain 
any provision for the police to enter private premises. The Act did not directly involve 
the police and by 1934 many Chief Constables considered the Act to be a ‘dead 
letter’.440 Another issue emphasised by the Departmental Committee of 1909 was 
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that ‘disorderly conduct’ did not necessarily amount to a breach of the peace. The 
difference was highlighted that it was the duty of the police to keep the peace and 
not to secure a speaker’s desire to be heard.441 The Act was not amended until the 
Public Order Act 1936. 
It is the experience of the Glamorgan County Police and the preventive action 
mentioned in Wise v Dunning and Lansbury v Riley that distinguishes these events 
from the BUF meeting at Olympia. It has been suggested that the difference in police 
practice in Thomas v Sawkins and the Olympia meeting indicate the use of partial 
law enforcement.442 The stimulus behind police action at Caerau was calculated to 
prevent seditious and inflammatory speeches being made and prevent any potential 
disorder. In contrast, at Olympia, Mosley’s fascist movement had not yet adopted an 
open anti-Semitic policy, and it would have been anticipated by the authorities that 
any potential disturbances at Olympia would be caused by organised communist 
protest, and not because of the potential of seditious speeches being made by 
Mosley. Therefore, it was still accepted that it was the stewards’ responsibility, acting 
under the instructions of the chairman, to keep order at the meeting. The issue at 
Olympia was why the police did not enter the meeting despite it being evident that 
the stewards used more than reasonable necessary force. Yet, if a breach of the 
peace were defined as disorder that prevented the business of the meeting were 
applied, then a breach was not present at Olympia offering justification for the police 
not entering the premises. 
The Superintendent responsible for keeping order outside Olympia stated that he 
was satisfied that they had prevented a serious disturbance that would have led to 
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injuries and serious damage to property.443  His priorities demonstrate why more 
action was not taken by the police. If the police had entered the building, there was a 
risk that their presence would have inflamed the situation. Additionally, in the event 
of a riot, under section 2(1) Riot (Damages) Act 1886, the Metropolitan Police would 
have been liable to pay compensation to any person who had sustained loss by 
injury, stealing, or destruction. Another danger would have been that police action 
inside the hall could have been interpreted as pro-fascist. In the Commons, 
Conservative MP Geoffrey Lloyd upheld the view that had a breach of the peace 
occurred it was not the responsibility of the police to take charge of the meeting, but 
to help the stewards to restore order.444 Therefore, if an interrupter, on refusing to 
leave the hall when requested, fought the Blackshirt stewards, the obligation of the 
police would have been to assist in that person’s ejection. Although this may have 
helped regulate the force that was used by the stewards, it could still have been 
criticised as preferential policing in support of the fascists.   
The danger of police intervention provoking serious disorder was reported in The 
Times following the action of the Glamorgan County Police at Caerau. Following the 
scuffle between Thomas and Sawkins, 20 police officers rushed into the back of the 
hall and some had batons drawn which created considerable disorder. The Times 
stated that ‘It looked as though there was going to be serious trouble… but Inspector 
Parry then had the good sense to tell the police to withdraw.’445 The Superintendent 
outside Olympia would have had similar concerns to the reaction to a significant 
number of police officers entering the hall, he stated that the police had ‘successfully 
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carried out and upheld the law.’446 The police had fulfilled their duty impartially, albeit 
without some controversy.  
8) The Continuing Inconsistency of Police Practice 
The different uses of discretion applied at Olympia and Caerau raises the issue of 
diversity in police practice. Following the Olympia meeting, Labour MP Rhys Davies 
highlighted in the Commons that, the Committee of 1909 did not come to any definite 
conclusions on the issue of policing public meetings and stated that the report 
‘pointed out the three distinct ways of dealing with this issue, which they termed the 
Birmingham, the Liverpool and the Manchester police methods’, adding that they 
were likely to differ again in London.447 He defended the Metropolitan Police adding, 
‘The police carried out their duties in connection with the Olympia meeting very fairly’, 
declaring:  
Is it not possible to secure that the method employed in one of these three 
cities which is the most effective for the purpose of the proper conduct of 
public meetings shall be adopted throughout the whole of the country? I 
cannot conceive how the Manchester Watch Committee can issue 
instructions to its police force on how they should conduct themselves in 
connection with public meetings, while different instructions are issued by the 
Birmingham and the Liverpool Watch Committees respectively. 448 
These contemporary issues relating to the difference in police practice in different 
provinces were neglected by Ewing and Gearty.  
Although responsible for the Metropolitan Police, the Home Office did not have the 
same level of authority over County and Borough police forces, which were 
organised on a local basis. Gilmour’s interpretation of police powers at public 
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meetings, and his belief that new legislation was required to allow police to enter 
public meetings, is reflected in the actions taken by the Metropolitan Police at 
Olympia. 
There is a significant collection of incidents that justify the charge of partisan policing 
in the 1930s,449 but it is important to select evidence from a range of events that 
demonstrate a more balanced view. The varying approaches employed by different 
Constabularies in the 1930s regarding fascist and communist meetings help support 
the view that police practice in different regions upset this view of a pro-fascist police 
culture. This is most significantly noted by the Manchester City Police and the 
Manchester Watch Committee who showed very little tolerance of fascist activity or 
provocation. 
A year before the Olympia meeting, Mosley spoke to a crowd of 3,000 in Manchester. 
The Daily Mirror reported that when ‘pandemonium broke out [the police entered] 
and insisted that every “Black Shirt” should leave the hall.’450 The fascist propaganda 
following the meeting predictably used the incident to criticise the police for 
protecting the communists who attempted to break up the meeting. The BUF 
newspaper Blackshirt reported: 
Under the National Government, a British audience in the Free Trade Hall 
witnessed the disgraceful spectacle of Red rowdies protected by the 
police, and thereby permitted to break up a Fascist meeting by the agents 
of Government. The red flag was under police protection for the night. 
Even a Communist who attempted to pull down the Union Jack was saved 
from Fascist retaliation by the police, and was escorted from the hall 
without arrest or punishment. Reds carrying bludgeons and razors were 
not touched by the police. 
                                               
449
 See Ewing and Gearty, The Struggle, pp. 275-330 and Lewis, Illusions of Grandeur, p. 161. 
450
 The Daily Mirror, 13 March 1933. 
250 
 
The Manchester Watch Committee was also involved in stifling fascist activity by 
refusing to grant permission for a uniformed BUF procession before the prohibition of 
uniforms under s1 Public Order Act 1936.451  
Four months after Olympia, Mosley addressed a BUF meeting at Plymouth Drill Hall 
on 5 October 1934 and the police entered to restore order. The meeting which had 
an estimated audience of between 3,500 and 4,000 was stewarded by just 50 
Blackshirts.452 There was some disorder at the meeting and the Western Evening 
Herald reported on the ‘Blackshirt’s Outrageous Conduct at Plymouth’. The most 
serious disturbance occurred near the end of the meeting when the platform was 
rushed by 20 anti-fascists creating disorder and widespread fighting. The police 
subsequently entered the hall and restored order. Following the disorder, six fascists 
were summonsed with the charge of ‘maliciously committing damage, injury and 
spoil to and upon a camera’ belonging to the Western Morning News Company 
contrary to s14(1) Criminal Justice Administration Act 1914. Four of the fascists were 
charged, and a second charge of assault which related to a public meeting held 
outside Plymouth Pannier Market on the 11 October 1934, was also reflected in their 
sentence. Reports regarding the police practice at Plymouth varied. The Times 
stated that ‘a large number of police who were present inside the hall took no part in 
the struggle’453 while the Western Morning News reported that order was restored by 
the police who were forced to enter the hall.454  
In consequence of the criticism levelled at the Blackshirts’ violent stewarding 
methods at the Olympia meeting, the BUF accepted the Metropolitan Police’s 
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request to station police officers within the premises of their next high profile meeting, 
held at the Albert Hall on 28 October 1934. Significantly, this meeting fell a month 
after the Bridgend magistrates had ruled in Sawkins favour, but a full seven months 
before the appeal at the Divisional Court. Mosley declared: 
We said we certainly had no objection to their coming in. We are always 
delighted to see the police. They are very influential members of the 
community… I have now held twenty-five meetings in this country and at 
only one of these were the police present – and at one only did disorder 
occur. Nevertheless we are delighted to see the police here tonight.455 
The correspondence between the Metropolitan Police and the BUF prior to the Albert 
Hall meeting details arrangements such as the BUF instructions given to the 
Blackshirt stewards which included the directives, ‘All interrupters are to be warned 
twice before action is taken… [and] If it is considered necessary to remove anyone 
from the Hall, it must be done as quickly and quietly as possible, force not being 
used unless absolutely necessary.’456 The shortcomings of the Metropolitan Police, 
who did not enter the Olympia Hall despite evident breaches of the peace, were also 
addressed in the Albert Hall operation. The Commissioner’s instructions included: 
In the event of a disturbance inside the Hall, one of the plain clothes men 
[from Special Branch] will go out to the nearest squad of uniform men and 
bring them in… [and] If the uniform men outside see a man ejected from the 
Hall looking as if he has been “knocked about” they should go in 
immediately.457  
The Times reported that the event ‘passed off without any disturbance’.458 
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Parallels can also be drawn between communist meetings in which stewards used 
violent methods of ejection. John Wynn initiated a private prosecution against a 
communist steward following a meeting at Ealing Town Hall held under the auspices 
of Ealing Communist and Labour Parties to discuss affairs in Spain. Giving evidence 
at Ealing Police Court, Wynn accused the stewards of excessive violence towards 
the interrupters declaring that one man was completely surrounded by stewards and 
was struck. Wynn, declaring his political impartiality, stated that he only became 
involved to assist a man who was being beaten following a melee of minor fights 
breaking out. Following his intervention, and the cry from the speaker to ‘eject them 
all’, he was repeatedly punched in the face and was thrown down a flight of stairs 
which knocked him unconscious. This incident demonstrates the excessive force 
used by a communist steward that was akin to the exorbitance of the Blackshirts. In 
this case, the charge of grievous bodily harm was dismissed, as Wynn was deemed 
to have obstructed the stewards in their duty.459  This judgment reveals that the 
magistrates in this case accepted a certain level of violence by stewards in order to 
protect their own meeting from disruption even when the violent stewarding was 
conducted by a communist.  
9) The Public Order Act 1936 
S6 Public Order Act amended the Public Meeting Act 1908, and provided the police 
with the power to arrest anyone who they reasonably suspected of acting in a 
disorderly manner in an attempt to break up a lawful public meeting and refused to 
give their name or address. This is described in more detail in Chapter 3 above. 
More controversially, s2(6) was believed by many to give the fascists licence to 
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continue their violent stewarding methods. In general s2 is mandated to proscribe 
quasi-military organisations, yet subsection 6 provides that  
Nothing in this section shall be construed as prohibiting the employment of a 
reasonable number of persons as stewards to assist in the preservation of 
order at any public meeting held upon private premises, or the making of 
arrangements for that purpose or the instruction of the persons to be so 
employed in their lawful duties as such stewards, or their being furnished with 
badges or other distinguishing signs. 
During its progression through Parliament, Aneurin Bevan criticised the introduction 
of subclause 6 stating: 
We are now re-importing into the Bill the possibility of an organised, 
disciplined and semi-military force… The right hon. Gentleman suggests that 
he has safeguarded himself by putting in the word "lawful" before "duties." I 
have had no legal training whatever, but it, seems to me that the importation 
of the word "lawful" does nothing at all to strengthen the language, because 
no steward could in the discharge of his duties do an unlawful thing.460  
The fear that this could safeguard unnecessarily violent fascist stewarding was 
eased by Dingle Foot, the Liberal MP who was also a member of the NCCL and critic 
of fascism, who stated: 
I think the insertion of the word "lawful" does something to avoid the precise 
evils which he has in mind, because if you have a group of stewards 
organised, not to use undue force, such as some of us think has been used 
in meetings in the last year or two; that would not come within the word 
"lawful."  
The obligation of the organisers of meetings to appoint stewards was to ensure that 
police presence at meetings (especially political) was a last resort. Yet parameters 
had to be drawn in order that the violence at Olympia was not repeated. In defence 
of the sub-clause, Foot suggested that ‘unlawful’ would cover stewards who were 
armed with knuckledusters and continued: 
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[B]y using the word "lawful" here, we are drawing a distinction between the 
legitimate use of stewards for removing an interrupter who refuses to be 
silent and in fact holds up the meeting, and stewards who use very different 
methods and quite unnecessary force.461 
10) Violent Stewarding following the Public Order Act 
According to Sylvia Scaffardi of the NCCL, the only reported incident of violence at a 
fascist meeting following the Public Order Act was on 25 January 1937 at Hornsey 
Town Hall.462 At this meeting, the fascist stewards allegedly ejected members of the 
audience in a violent manner.463 The NCCL applied pressure on the Government to 
launch an official enquiry, but on the rejection of this, they proceeded to collect 
statements from eyewitnesses to record their own unofficial enquiry. One of the 
assaulted audience members was Norman Boulton, a stockbroker’s clerk. He had 
witnessed an assault on a man in the row behind who had requested permission to 
ask Mosley a personal question. This was granted, and he asked Mosley, ‘Can you 
deny that your wife was a Jew?’ A number of stewards then assaulted him striking 
him in the face and body. Following this assault, Boulton attempted to leave the hall 
and, on being questioned by a fascist steward, told him that he was going to fetch a 
policeman. He was subsequently struck in the face by the fascist steward, cutting his 
lip, and thrown out onto the pavement by four other fascists. He then reported that 
when he informed the Inspector in charge he refused to listen and ‘told one of his 
subordinates to push me aside.’464 
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Another recorded assault at Hornsey Town Hall was upon E McKercher. In response 
to some fascists sitting behind him who shouted ‘castrate the bastards’, he asked 
them to moderate their language in the presence of ladies. After repeating his 
request a second time Mckercher was punched in the face, causing him a cut to his 
eyebrow and cheek and breaking his glasses. The lady next to him agreed to be a 
witness to the assault. When McKercher reported this to the Inspector outside the 
hall, he was informed that he could do nothing without the name and address of the 
fascist, and he could not assist him on finding the suspect as he could only go inside 
the hall if he was requested to do so.  
By 1938, many Labour controlled Councils, including London County Council, had 
prevented the use of halls for BUF meetings. Copsey stated that this further helped 
push the BUF away from mainstream politics as they were left with little alternative 
than to conduct their activism on street corners and at open air meetings.465 By 1939, 
it was the fascists themselves which began to disrupt political meetings. In one 
instance, it was reported that 300 fascists had entered a Liberal meeting at York Hall, 
Bethnal Green on 16 February, allegedly by printing their own tickets, and proceeded 
to throw tomatoes and light bulbs at the speakers. A fight broke out and the police 
entered but only one arrest was made.466 A letter from the Town Clerk to the Home 
Secretary submitted that the fascist retaliation came following the rejection of the 
fascists’ application to use the hall. He suggested that the fascists may have been of 
the opinion that if they ‘are not allowed the use of York Hall, no other political party 
shall have the quiet user thereof’ and warned of the potential for further disruption in 
the future. 467  Home Office correspondence reveals that the police had already 
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shared intelligence with the meetings organiser that the fascists may try to enter with 
forged tickets to create disorder. During the meeting the police were repeatedly 
called upon and they criticised the inadequate provisions that were made to keep 
order, stating that, ‘the stewards were too few in number and too weak to deal with 
the situation.’ 468  Deputy Assistant Commissioner Ralph had instructed the Sub-
Divisional Inspector to have ‘a good number of police readily available to enter the 
hall if necessary.’469 Sub Divisional Inspector Robson’s report reinforced the view 
that the police should not be present at meetings to act as stewards or to ensure the 
speaker receives a hearing. This was emphasised by police engagement with 
fascists who retaliated when they were asked to leave which resulted in the arrest of 
the fascist Reginald Hewitt. In addition, he did not take any action against hecklers 
when a breach of the peace was not imminent.470 This view was reinforced by the 
Superintendent’s report who stated that the only time the police could legally 
intervene was during the incident involving Hewitt.471  
10) The BUF ‘Peace Campaign’ and Earl’s Court 1939 
In July 1939, the BUF hosted one last major rally at Earl’s Court, London, where 
Mosley addressed a crowd of 15,000 to promote their peace campaign.472 The timing 
of the Earl’s Court meeting was particularly significant. In March that year, Hitler’s 
military advance into Czechoslovakia had effectively torn up the Munich agreement 
which the Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain claimed would bring both ‘peace with 
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honour’ and ‘peace for our time’.473 This signalled the increased threat of British 
involvement in a European war. Thurlow noted that the that this development had 
the effect of both, changing the public’s trust of Hitler and their perception of Nazism, 
whilst also showing Mosley as a potential leader, if only momentarily, that would 
keep Britain out of another war. The result was that although some BUF members 
left in protest, as the peace campaign was seen to put ‘fascist loyalties above 
patriotic considerations’, others ‘flocked to the movement’.474   
More importantly, from a public order perspective, the Earl’s Court meeting did not 
attract any significant opposition. Copsey noted that militant opposition to Mosley 
had effectively dissipated as foreign events now took political prioritization. 475  In 
addition to this, the far-Left also advocated peace. On 31 March 1939, when the 
danger of a German invasion of Poland became apparent, Communist MP George 
Gallacher declared: 
The serious and important thing is that Members on this side of the House 
have continuously asserted that with collective security peace could be saved. 
The Prime Minister's policy has collapsed. Now he has led the country to the 
brink of war… I ask the Prime Minister to do a real service to the country and 
to give to those who believe in collective security an opportunity of forming a 
Government and saving the people of this country and the people of Europe 
from the menace of war.476 
The British Government’s reluctance to form a defensive pact with the Soviet Union 
over German aggression in East Europe was followed by the signing of the Nazi-
Soviet pact in August 1939. Copsey argued that anti-fascist activism was now 
discarded by the CPGB who now accommodated the ‘dictates of Soviet foreign 
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policy.’477 Continued BUF activism in the months leading up to the War, such as the 
meeting at Earl’s Court, as well as continued activism during the phoney war, 
therefore, did not provoke any organised opposition. There were exceptions, such as 
the attack on fascists in November 1939 who were travelling from a meeting in two 
double-decker buses, but Copsey pointed out that incidents like this ‘proved 
exceptional.’478   
11) Reflections on the Stewarding of Political Meetings in the Post-War era   
 In the years after the War, the newly formed fascist movements never reached the 
same scale of the BUF’s meetings at the Albert Hall, Olympia or Earl’s Court. 
Consequently, most fascist activism was performed on the streets. However, there 
were exceptions. For example, Mosley’s official launch of Union Movement was held 
at Wilfred Street School, Victoria on 8 February 1948 and it was reported that 
‘several hundred police… protected the meeting’.479 Despite the incapacity of the far-
right to hold large political rallies within hired premises, this did not prevent them 
from causing disturbances at other political meetings. A. K. Chesterton’s League of 
Empire Royalists (LEL), a Conservative pressure group which formed in 1953, 
advocated for the preservation of the British Empire. They disowned political 
violence and terrorism and regarded the Conservatives within the Macmillan 
administration as traitors and gained publicity by heckling at high profile meetings.480 
Their disruption of the Conservative Party Conference in Blackpool’s Winter Gardens 
on 11 October 1958 is the most significant event regarding the stewarding at a 
political meeting in the years following the Second World War. 
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A graphic description of the level of violence used to evict the hecklers was recorded 
in The Spectator by Taper. 481  He declared that as the Prime Minister Harold 
Macmillan rose to address the conference, a young man sounded a bugle three 
times from the balcony and cried, ‘The League of Empire Loyalists sounds the 
retreat…’ before being cut off and the sound of a scuffle being heard.482 Taper 
described how about seven people carried the man out, three of whom wore the 
uniform of the Winter Gardens venue and the others were either stewards or 
delegates of the conference. He continued to state that: 
The youth was either flung, or fell, to the ground as the group of which he 
was the centre came up the steps, and when he was lying on the ground he 
was kicked in the side. He was then dragged to his feet and propelled along, 
being repeatedly punched in the head and body as he went; two very violent 
blows in particular (delivered by a Tory delegate) landing on the nape of his 
neck… At no time did the youth offer any resistance. 
Further hecklers were given similar treatment. Another youth who had his arms 
pinioned to his sides was attacked by a delegate who ‘punched him repeatedly in the 
face.’ The forth interrupter was marched out of the hall after being held and punched 
by members of the audience. Taper followed and witnessed the youth being taken 
into a room which was guarded by two uniformed Winter Garden staff. He stated that 
the youth offered no resistance and was shouting ‘I want the police, fetch the police’ 
as he was escorted. Taper continued: 
Sounds of violence could be heard from beyond the door. After a few minutes 
the door was opened from the inside and the group emerged. The boy's face 
was marked and running with blood, his shirt torn and hanging out, and he 
was obviously on the point of complete collapse. I later saw a pool of blood 
on the floor. 
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As with the responses to Olympia, the violence used by stewards split opinion. The 
Times did not report on the violence that was alleged to have been used and in 
referring to disorder only reported that the hecklers were ‘hustled from the gallery’ or 
‘removed by attendants’.483 However, the letters to the editor which were published 
in the days following the event reveals more illuminating contemporary attitudes on 
the use of violence at political meetings.  
A. K. Chesterton began the correspondence by criticising the violence used by the 
Conservative stewards. Unsurprisingly, his view on the stewarding of this meeting 
contradicted his description of the Blackshirts at Olympia. In his article ‘Olympia and 
the Jews’, Chesterton described the Blackshirt stewarding as the ‘action of British 
manhood in defending their mighty rally from being wrecked by the mob.’484 In his 
letter regarding the treatment of the LEL hecklers at the Winter Gardens, Chesterton 
highlighted that minimum force was not used, using the experience of Donald Griffin 
as an example. He also stated that the LEL activists had always left meetings quietly 
when they were asked.485   
Lord Hailsham, chairman of the Conservative Party, declared that LEL members who 
entered the meeting ‘were trespassers ab initio’ as their tickets were obtained by 
‘one device or another.’ He continued to state that the heckle of treason aimed at the 
Prime Minister was calculated to cause a breach of the peace. On pointing out the 
potential criminality of the interrupters, Hailsham does note that members of the 
audience were not justified in physically intervening with them as this went against 
Conservative principles. However, he does not pass any judgment on the stewards 
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or the Winter Garden staff stating that his view of the audience was obstructed by 
the television lights.486 The Labour response by MP Barbara Castle demonstrated a 
continuity of the desire to uphold the liberties of free speech even though the 
hecklers in this case were from the far-Right. Castle pointed out that when four LEL 
members heckled her meeting they were only asked to leave when the audience got 
tired of their ‘childish interruptions… [she continued] What struck me at the time was 
how quietly these insult hurling gentlemen went as soon as they were told to 
leave.’487 Former Mosleyite, Noel Symington showed remarkable consistency with 
the BUF line at Olympia in his attitude regarding hecklers even though the LEL 
hecklers were also of the far-Right. He stated that as hecklers aim to get cheap 
publicity at the expense of the hosts, the ‘use of deterrent force then comes into 
perspective.’ He explicitly advocated that it ‘is high time that the suspension of free 
speech through organized hecklers was brought to an end.’ However, considering 
the opposition that Mosley’s Union Movement received at outdoor public meetings, 
this stance should be expected.488      
The descriptions of the brutality used by the venue staff, stewards and delegates 
evoke comparisons to the fascist violence at Olympia. Yet, unlike Olympia, two of the 
victims at the Winter Gardens brought a charge of assault against two of the alleged 
offenders. Donald Griffin and Stanley Hulka of the LEL brought summonses against 
William Lynch, a member of staff at the Winter Gardens, and George Finley, a 
Conservative Party agent for assault. R. Gordon Clover QC, defending Finley, 
argued that the interrupter was unwilling to leave and Finley only used as much force 
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as necessary. The defence emphasized the deceitful character of Griffin and the 
deliberate aggravation he caused: 
He gets into meetings using forged tickets, deliberately putting himself by 
dishonesty, trickery, and deception into situations where he can then proceed 
to behave with maximum amount of provocation and try to spoil meetings.489 
Lynch also claimed that he did not hit the claimant or any other heckler. Bernard 
Levin, who wrote The Spectator article above under the pseudonym Taper, gave 
evidence of the ‘needless severity by stewards’ and Independent Television News 
reporter, Reginald Bosanquet described the treatment of the hecklers as ‘excessively 
violent’.490 Despite this, the magistrates acquitted Lynch and Finley and ordered 
Griffin and Hulka to each pay £100 costs.  
The legality of the actions of the stewards and Winter Garden staff has been 
questioned by Harry Street in consideration of the power of private citizens. Street 
argued that more facts needed to be ascertained in order to evaluate the legality of 
the ejections. Firstly, he stated that if a person had entered private property 
peaceably then no force could be used to eject them unless they failed to comply to 
a request to leave. Furthermore, it would need to be ascertained whether the 
Conservative Party were the occupiers of the premises or had just paid a fee for their 
use. Street argued that if they were not the occupiers then they had no power to 
eject anybody, and this could only be done by the owners of the Winter Gardens and 
their staff. Conversely, if the Conservative Party were the occupiers then their 
stewards had the power to eject hecklers, but not the employees or owners of the 
venue. 491  Following Streets argument, as both employees and stewards were 
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involved with the ejections, either the stewards or the venue staff had acted 
unlawfully.     
Remarkably, a quarter century after Olympia, the violent tactics employed by 
stewards, audience members and venue staff had been accepted in the courts. This 
demonstrated that there was still room for political violence within mainstream 
politics and it could still be justified and accepted within the compounds of the 
established conservative orthodoxy for the means of defending a political meeting. 
Despite Hailsham’s criticism of the audience members who also allegedly assaulted 
the hecklers, the account that so many, including women, who did wilfully engage in 
violence demonstrated that a continuation of old attitudes towards political violence 
had not completely vanished. Pugh’s argument that there was a common 
acceptance of the Blackshirt violence at Olympia by Conservatives as the pre-First 
World War attitudes to political violence only changed gradually can thus be 
extended, and shown that, even in the post-Second World War era they had not yet 
been diminished.492  
12) Conclusion  
Differences in the events at Olympia and Caerau demonstrate that they are not 
sufficiently compatible to suggest police partiality but they do highlight the scope of 
police discretion available when policing public meetings. The intelligence of the 
Glamorgan County Police of recent communist meetings gave them reasonable 
belief that their presence was required to prevent seditious speeches and the 
disorder that may follow. Although disorder could have been reasonably anticipated 
by the Metropolitan Police at Olympia, as it was the threat of organised communist 
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interruption that was the likely to be the cause, it was the duty of the steward, and 
not the police, to control the meeting. This does not mean that, as the events of the 
evening unfolded, and the brutality that occurred became apparent to the police, that 
they were right not to enter the meeting. On the contrary, when it became apparent 
to the police that serious breaches of the peace were being committed inside, it 
became their duty to take control of the meeting and prevent further breaches of the 
peace as was the case at the BUF meetings at Manchester and Plymouth described 
above. Despite knowledge of previous fascist violence, it is possible that the police 
did not expect such an outrageous display of brutality by the Blackshirts, and were 
too apprehensive to deviate from their initial objective of keeping order outside the 
hall. The likelihood that the Police Superintendent in charge apprehended that police 
action could have inflamed the situation and caused a riot, should not be discounted 
either. Not only could police presence have provoked further disorder inside the 
meeting, but the 760 police on duty were also responsible for controlling an anti-
fascist demonstration outside the Olympia hall. If a sufficient number of police had 
entered the meeting, it could have incensed the protest outside, leaving an 
inadequate number of police officers to control it. 
The differences in the policing of these meetings were largely the result of their 
different understandings of their legal powers which stemmed from the ambiguity of 
the breach of the peace doctrine. There is no clear definition of what constitutes a 
breach of the peace and at a meeting on private premises the issue is even more 
clouded by the power of the stewards to evict members of the audience. Therefore, 
at what point can it be said that a breach of the peace has occurred when physical 
force is necessary to remove a member of the audience. One measure of the 
consistency between  the incidents discussed is that police intervention at the BUF 
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meetings at Manchester and Plymouth and the Liberal meeting at Bethnal Green all 
occurred when the disorder became widespread and the stewards were unable to 
control it. However, when the stewards were able to contain order, albeit with the use 
excessive force to remove the hecklers such as at Olympia, the communist meeting 
at Ealing Town Hall, and the Conservative Party conference at Blackpool in 1958, no 
police action was taken. Additionally, in the case of the communist meeting and the 
Conservative Party Conference, the stewards charged with assault were acquitted 
by the magistrates who recognised that the use of physical force was a necessary 
part of their power to fulfil their duty. These examples demonstrate a particular 
consistency in police practice across a varied spectrum of political activism.  
Regardless of whether the police were right in not taking more affirmative action or 
not, the obvious injustice that was meted out to the interrupters at the hands of the 
Blackshirts dictates that more should have been done to protect them. But, the 
application of a legal lens has revealed that allegations of police partisanship are 
potentially misplaced and legal restrictions had a greater bearing on their tactics. The 
inconsistent application of police discretion at meetings held on private premises can 
also be better understood by their previous experience of different political groups or 
individuals, the diverse practice employed by provincial police forces, and the wide 
breach of the peace powers at their disposal.  
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Chapter 5 
‘Bye, Bye, Blackshirt, have you lost your wool?’1: Political 
Uniforms and Fascist Provocation 
 
The uniform of Blackshirts is a lot of buffoonery and provocation in itself.2 
1) Introduction 
Political uniforms played a major part in organisations of the British far-Right in the 
1920s and 1930s. Many groups were inspired by Benito Mussolini’s blackshirted 
Fascist Party, who formed an Italian government in 1922. This included the British 
Fascisti and the Imperial Fascist League. These movements adopted the Blackshirt 
uniform as well as many of Mussolini’s fascist principles, but they were relatively 
small, and it was not until Sir Oswald Mosley formed the British Union of Fascists in 
1932, that the Blackshirt uniform took a more prominent place in British society. The 
BUF, who were also known as the Blackshirts, paraded in uniform along the streets 
of Britain in public processions and held public meetings. The Blackshirts were often 
seen as a nuisance which provoked violent confrontation from opponents, and their 
political activities regularly threatened public order. Yet, to what extent can the 
wearer of a political uniform be held responsible for the provocation of violence?  
This chapter examines the role of the political uniform in the interwar years and the 
contemporary perceptions of the wider public. Mainstream political responses are 
analysed, including the views of the Metropolitan Police Commissioner and the 
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Home Secretary who both favoured the introduction of legislation to ban uniforms in 
1934. In 1936, the Public Order Bill was introduced amidst significant debate in 
Parliament on the effect of clause 1, which prohibited the wearing of uniforms in 
connection with political objectives. Concerns were shared about the effect of clause 
1 on civil liberties, and how uniforms should be defined in legislation. Following the 
enactment of the Public Order Act 1936, several members of the BUF defied the ban, 
and were subsequently arrested and tried at Magistrates Courts. As the Public Order 
Act did not include a definition of what constituted a uniform, these cases are 
significant as it became the Magistrates’ role to interpret this ambiguous provision. 
The legacy of the infrequently utilised power under s1 is then examined with 
reference to the 1975 IRA case, O’Moran v DPP3 and the prosecution of members of 
the Ku Klux Klan in R v Robert Edward Relf and others.4 In conclusion, the charges 
summonsed under s1 are compared and the interpretation of what constituted a 
political uniform reviewed. 
Coupland highlighted the cultural meaning of the Blackshirt uniform and addressed 
the contemporary responses to it. The uniform represented a militaristic force in 
which the BUF were criticised as this symbolism was provocative to the whole British 
public. The choice of wearing a uniform also embodied the flavour of European 
politics which seemed to contradict the patriotic message of the BUF. This foreign 
influence was commonly used to criticise the BUF as their uniform was referred to as 
‘alien elements making for conflict and disorder.’5 Coupland concluded that the black 
shirt added to the myths and dynamism of the BUF’s political identity but argued that 
they ‘were all dressed up with nowhere to go; dressed for a struggle that never 
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happened.’ 6  But more importantly for Coupland, he argued that the Blackshirt 
uniform more commonly conjured the image of the ‘alien menace in anti-fascist 
discourse’ which negated the most vociferous claim of the BUF, ‘Britain First’.7 Ewing 
and Gearty’s evaluation of the law relating to political uniforms highlighted the 
successful prosecutions of members of the BUF in the lower courts after the 
enactment of s1 Public Order Act 1936. Although critical of the time taken to address 
the issue of provocative uniforms, they praised the ‘carefully targeted and well 
prepared provisions’ in s1.8 This chapter assimilates cultural and legal implications of 
the Blackshirt uniform, evaluating responses to it since its inception into British 
society, and assesses the legacy of s1 which is still in force despite the movement 
that the provision was largely mandated to impede being proscribed in 1940.  
2) The Function of the Blackshirt Uniform 
The BUF was the largest and most organised fascist movement in Britain, their 
adoption of the Blackshirt uniform and its frequent visible presence on the public 
streets gave them both exposure and notoriety. Officers were distinguished by 
wearing a black shirt with black trousers, while unit leaders and men wore a black 
shirt with grey trousers. Women wore a black blouse with a grey skirt and black beret 
and they did not wear any lipstick or make-up.9 The black shirt itself was designed in 
the style of a fencing jacket. Mosley was a keen fencer and had also represented 
Britain internationally. Mosley claimed: 
Soon our men developed the habit of cutting the shirt in the shape of a 
fencing-jacket, a kindly little tribute to my love of the sport; also this form had 
the practical advantage that it gave the opponent nothing to grasp, in 
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particular no tie which he was wont to pull adroitly for purpose of 
strangulation.10 
 
In official BUF literature, the value of the Blackshirt was attributed with numerous 
qualities. Oswald Mosley declared that the uniform and the spirit of those who wore it 
‘have been by far the biggest factors in the early success of Fascism.’ He continued, 
‘Throughout modern Europe it has become the outward expression of manhood 
banded together in the iron resolve to save great nations from degeneration and 
decay.’11 Despite the publicity that the uniform generated, its function was frequently 
aligned to fascist policy. For instance, Mosley stated that the uniform broke down 
class barriers as dressed in the same black shirt all men look alike, ‘whether they be 
on the “dole” or whether they be prosperous managers of big businesses.’12 This 
point was further stressed in a later publication as he claimed, ‘Already the Blackshirt 
has achieved within our own ranks that classless unity which we will ultimately 
secure within the nation as a whole.’13 It was also asserted that the uniform, which is 
illustrated in figure 5.1, had a practical quality which enables the fascist to 
‘distinguish friend from foe in the fights which Red violence forces upon us.’14  
In his autobiography, Mosley claimed that the adoption of a uniform was a vital 
necessity to combat organised disruption. He argued, ‘Public meetings were our only 
way of putting over our case, and if our audiences were to hear it we must be 
prepared to fight for free speech.’ In order to secure the continuation of the fascist 
movement, Mosley recognised that a distinctive dress needed to be worn in order for 
members to recognise each other: 
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A shirt is the easiest and cheapest garment for the purpose of recognition, 
and the shirts had to be paid for by the men themselves, most of whom were 
poor, some even being on the dole. Others had already worn coloured shirts 
for the same reason, but this no more made our movement Italian, or 
German, than wearing uniform turns an English army into a German army.15 
Under this description, the Blackshirt uniform was a useful device of the Fascist 
Defence Force, which allowed them to easily identify each other at public meetings. 
In a speech given at Manchester Free Trade Hall on 12 March 1933, Mosley stated 
that he did not want violence but insisted on attaining free speech as that was the 
reason why the Fascist Defence Force was present.16    
 
 
Figure 5.1 Oswald Mosley and the “I” Squad wearing the Blackshirt uniform in  
Hyde Park, 1934. 
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The official function, or role of the political uniform, may only be comprehended by 
someone who had read or heard the official literature. To the wider public, the 
uniform would have represented something else. Contemporary legal commentator 
Ivor Jennings asserted that uniforms create a feeling of security to those that wear 
them, and feelings of insecurity in those who see them.17 If this psychological impact 
is true, then that insecurity could have harnessed the hostile and violent responses 
which the Blackshirts were subjected to. The uniform could then be seen as a 
provocation in itself, in addition to the provocative far-Right policies which were 
exhibited by the fascists.  
Historian Philip Coupland’s examination of the Blackshirt in Britain importantly 
highlighted the cultural responses to political uniform that informed contemporary 
society. They varied from those who disparaged the dangerous ideology behind the 
uniform, such as one critic who commented, ‘the germs of political violence in 
contemporary England do not take much detecting’, to more humorous responses 
such as P. G. Wodehouse who created the fictional would-be dictator, Roderick 
Spode, the leader of the Black Shorts. Coupland also highlighted the fears of 
contemporary writers who argued against satirising Mosley’s fascist movement. E. M. 
Forster importantly criticised the English sense of humour that mocked Mosley as a 
‘figure of fun’ referring to this as a ‘dangerous conceit’. Similarly, J. B. Priestley 
commented on the danger of ridiculing the fascists which would turn ‘comic storm 
troops into real storm troops’.18 
The most significant response to the adoption of a political uniform by a British 
political movement was the foreign influence that it represented. Labour MP John 
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Clynes highlighted this during the Public Order Bill debate in 1936, stating that 
uniform: 
brings into our political activities alien elements making for conflict and 
disorder… Strange, indeed, it is to us that these new political forces and 
factors should have turned so readily to alien practices. They have acquired 
foreign symbols, foreign salutes, foreign names and foreign dress, and to do 
that is to head for trouble and the development of private armies, which I am 
certain all Members will not approve. 
In his speeches, Mosley claimed that British fascism was unlike its European 
counterparts. At Barnstaple, North Devon, Mosley stated:  
Mosleyism is a “British” thing, quite unlike its continental counterparts. There 
is no copying of the “foreigner” about our brave Blackshirts! If the Black Shirt 
itself is the Italian symbol of Fascism, it is only by curious coincidence that 
the Mosley movement happens to garb itself so!19 
The uniform also added the theatrical display of a fascist meeting. Reporting the 
speech, the North Devon Journal described Mosley as ‘film-star-like’ and claimed 
that the audience ‘appeared to enjoy the novel nature of this political show almost as 
much [as] it would enjoy, say, the “pictures.”’20 Despite Mosley’s efforts to distinguish 
the BUF from European fascism, addressing this issue in his speeches 
demonstrated that his audience needed to be convinced that ‘Mosleyism’ was unique 
to Britain. Adopting foreign fascist symbols, such as the Blackshirt uniform, only 
hindered Mosley’s attempt to separate his movement from those in Europe.      
3) Political Responses to the Blackshirt Uniform 
As early as June 1933, the correlation between public disorder and political uniforms 
was raised in the House of Commons. Following recent political disturbances in the 
West End of London, Labour MP Rhys Davies, questioned Sir Douglas Hacking, the 
under-secretary for the Home Department, whether he would, ‘consider the 
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desirability of suppressing all these organisations that are wearing uniforms and 
parading the streets?’ Hacking replied, ‘It may not always be desirable to prevent the 
wearing of uniforms. The wearing of uniform alone helps the police to find people 
guilty of any offence.’21 But any benefit that political uniforms gave the police was 
soon to be reversed. Following discussions with the Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner, Home Secretary Sir John Gilmour claimed, ‘recent developments 
have shown that any advantage in this direction is outweighed by the provocative 
effect of the wearing of such uniforms and the increasing number of street brawls 
which have occurred in consequence.’22 The association of political uniforms with 
political violence remained, and was frequently used in the mainstream political 
rhetoric.  
In February 1934, Gilmour was asked if he would consider introducing legislation to 
prohibit the wearing of uniforms by political parties. He reported that this question 
had been engaging his serious consideration. He continued to state that incidents of 
disorder which the police attributed to the wearing of political uniforms had escalated 
from eleven incidents in the first six months of 1933 in the Metropolitan Police District, 
to no less than 22 disturbances in the last six months of the year.23 This was the first 
in a series of questions aimed at the Home Secretary throughout 1934. Further 
questions came from Conservative MPs Vyvyan Adams, 24  Captain Sir Peter 
Macdonald25 and Oswald Lewis,26 Labour MPs John Tinker,27 Jack Lawson28 and 
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William Thorne, 29  Liberal MP Robert Bernays, 30  and Scottish Unionist William 
Anstruther-Gray.31 Gilmour’s reply to these questions frequently suggested that the 
matter had seriously engaged his attention, or that he had nothing further to add.  
Despite the frequency of questions from all parties desiring the introduction of 
legislation to prohibit political uniforms, when a motion was made in May 1934 under 
the ten minute rule to introduce a Bill by Conservative Mr Oliver Locker-Lampson, it 
found little support. Locker-Lampson argued: 
Violence breeds violence, and, if you want to turn England into a Communist 
camp, encourage Mosley to arm and dress and to break the law. Mosley 
breeds Bolshevism at every step, and he does it on purpose. Let his 
opportunities of appearing heroic be limited by a Bill like mine.32 
Conservative Earl Winterton objected to the Bill claiming that ‘It would be quite 
impossible to define a political uniform for the purposes of this Bill.’ His criticism 
continued, ‘if this proposal were to be adopted, it would be the greatest possible aid 
and advertisement for Sir Oswald Mosley's movement… what a cheap ready-made 
martyrdom it would provide.’33 
In July 1934, Gilmour debated the existing law on public order with the Chief 
Constables of England and Wales. Although Gilmour was still cautious about 
introducing any legislation prohibiting political uniforms at this time, the Chief 
Constables overwhelmingly supported the idea in some form or another. Of the 16 
questioned, only three Chief Constables did not support legislative action. The Chief 
Constable of Newcastle recognised that uniforms were the crux to the disorder but 
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questioned the advisability of a ban. 34  In his following memorandum, Gilmour 
proposed: 
That it should be an offence for any person, in pursuit of a political object, to 
form any body of persons into an organisation of a military character, by drill, 
or by the use of uniforms, or by the use of other military methods.35 
The Lord Advocate suggested that targeting the use of political uniforms may be 
treated as an aggravation and that he preferred the banning of private armies in 
support of political organisations.36 By mid-July, a cross party conference was held, 
which included Home Secretary John Gilmour, Attorney General Sir Thomas Inskip, 
deputy Labour leader Clement Attlee, and Labour MP Sir Stafford Cripps. Although 
the proscription of political uniforms was not ruled out by this conference, and there 
was a great deal of sympathy towards such legislative measures, no further action 
was taken. It was reported in the News Chronicle that the current view of the 
Government was that the Blackshirt movement had ‘shot its bolt, and that no special 
legislation is now necessary’.37    
By October 1934, a Public Order Bill38 was drafted but it was not introduced to 
Parliament. Despite the provocation and disorder that was arguably caused by the 
wearing of political uniforms, this was omitted from the draft Bill. The wording of 
clause 1 was directed towards the prohibition of trained, or drilled political 
organisations, and was criticised by Metropolitan Police Commissioner Trenchard 
because it did not include the term ‘uniform’ in its provisions. Trenchard pointed out 
that while the wearing of a uniform makes for a military appearance and is 
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provocative, it could not be said that ‘persons wearing uniform are necessarily 
“equipped for as to be capable of use as an instrument of force.”’39 The Draft Public 
Order Bill was dated 2 October 1934 and Trenchard issued his criticisms of it to Sir 
Russell Scott, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Home Office. By the 30 October 
Gilmour was again questioned whether any legislation relating to political uniform 
was to be introduced. He replied that, ‘This matter has continued to engage my 
attention but I regret that I am not in a position to state whether legislation on this 
subject will form a part of the Government's legislative programme for next 
Session.’40 By late 1934, the urgency of legislating for the prohibition of political 
uniforms had demised in parallel to the ailing membership of the BUF. Gilmour’s 
‘wait and see’ policy before deciding to act was justified and the problem appeared to 
have been contained without unnecessarily repressive legislation. 
By 1936, questions were again directed to the Home Secretary, now Sir John Simon, 
on the matter of prohibiting political uniforms. The problem of how to define uniform 
was again used in response.41  On 10 July 1936, during a debate about police 
expenditure and salaries, the issue of the BUF’s Blackshirt uniform and the disorder 
associated with it were frequently made. In the course of the discussion, Simon was 
asked if there had been any success from the continent from countries that had 
prohibited uniforms. Simon replied: 
I believe there is one continental country which attempted to suppress this 
trouble by legislation prohibiting uniforms and black shirts, and it is said that 
the result was that the followers of those people ceased to wear uniform, but 
shaved their moustaches so as to make that male ornament very closely 
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resemble that of the leader of the Nazi party in a different country on the 
Continent.42 
Despite the rising disorder that was associated with the BUF in 1936, the Home 
Office refused to be drawn into any commitment that any motion towards the 
prohibition of uniforms would be made. Without any legal restrictions on the wearing 
of political uniforms, by October 1936, the BUF donned a new uniform of an even 
more provocative character.  
4) The Restructuring of the BUF: The Uniform becomes a Privilege 
In January 1935, the BUF underwent a programme of restructuring. Effectively, 
Mosley split the BUF into the Blackshirt Organisation and the Political Organisation. 
He retained leadership of both, but appointed different officers to conduct each 
organisation. The main difference this had was to allow those who did not wear the 
Blackshirt uniform, to have a greater role in the movement. For those who did wear 
the uniform it became: 
a privilege reserved for those who perform conspicuous service to the 
Movement and are prepared to give a substantial proportion of their time to 
this work. A Blackshirt must give a minimum of two evenings a week to the 
work of the Movement except in cases of special difficulty where one night a 
week may be temporarily accepted as adequate.43 
Historian David Lewis suggested the changes that were implemented in 1935 were 
designed to entice ‘ideologically committed members’, rather than a ‘bunch of half-
inspired, vaguely motivated, middle-class patriots’ that had been the experience 
during the period of support from Lord Rothermere’s newspaper empire.44 In May 
1935, further restructuring of the BUF was completed which gave more power back 
to the uniformed members in their respective districts. This time, three divisions were 
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created. The first and second division consisted of uniformed members who were 
distinguished by how much time they were prepared to devote to the movement. 
Those in the third division did not wear uniform and were only required to pay a 
monthly subscription. In October 1935, rewards for service to the BUF became 
available.  
A member who sells three hundred and twenty copies of “The Blackshirt” in 
four weeks will be awarded a uniform black shirt or a belt… By selling four 
hundred copies within five weeks he will be entitled to a pair of uniform 
trousers; selling seven hundred and twenty copies in nine weeks he will earn 
a uniform mackintosh; and if he sells eight hundred copies in ten weeks he 
can have either a pair of boots, a pair of breeches, or a uniform greatcoat.45 
By 1936, the influence of German Nazism began to eclipse the BUF’s original 
inspiration from Mussolini’s brand of fascism. The Roman ‘fasces’, which symbolised 
unity and strength, was replaced by the lightening flash within a circle, which 
represented the flash of action within the circle of unity, and was styled on the 
swastika. The BUF also changed their name to the British Union of Fascists and 
National Socialists. This simple change demonstrated the influence of Hitler’s 
National Socialist German Workers Party. The uniform also took a more militarised 
form akin to the Nazi SS, and is illustrated in figure 5.2. In reflection, Mosley 
conceded that the change in uniform style hindered their political ambitions. He 
declared, ‘My mistake was in allowing the development of a full military uniform for 
certain men who qualified to wear it’. The qualification was to commit five nights a 
week of service and to sell a requisite number of Action newspapers. Mosley claimed 
that he wore the new uniform himself to encourage others to devote time to the 
movement. He reflected: 
It was an error and a dereliction of duty, for I should have known that while 
we could have got away with the simple black shirt, the uniform made us 
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much too military in appearance and would create prejudice. The old soldier 
in me got the better of the politician.46 
 
Figure 5.2 Mosley wearing the new military styled uniform in 1936.  
 
 
5) Regional Responses to the Blackshirt Uniform 
In July 1936, the BUF were denied an application to march in procession by the 
Manchester Watch Committee on account of the provocative nature of the fascists’ 
uniforms. In response to this rejection, the BUF publically reapplied stating: 
In order to test whether the Watch Committee is animated by a genuine 
objection to political uniforms or by political prejudice against Fascism, I now 
make application for permission for a march of our members to the meeting 
in everyday clothes. They will, of course, be accompanied by bands and 
banners, which have also been used by socialist processions through 
Manchester and other cities.47  
Furthermore, when the BUF march was permitted, the route was stipulated by the 
Chief Constable. The Manchester Watch Committee was inevitably condemned by 
the fascist press which claimed that the wearing of the uniform was an essential 
component of maintaining public order, as it distinguished the BUF from their 
opponents declaring: 
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…the work of the police will be greatly increased, since our members are 
determined to abide by the law and the Red Hebrew front is determined to 
violate the law. In these circumstances every distinction which enables the 
orderly party to be recognised is a help to the Law, and every circumstance 
which renders difficult distinction between those who propose to hold a 
meeting and those who have resolved to smash it is an embarrassment to 
the police.48 
The effectiveness of this imposed condition, which essentially banned the wearing of 
the Blackshirt uniform for the procession on 19 July 1936, was subject to conflicting 
reports. The Manchester Guardian led with the headline, ‘Disorder at Fascist Rally’ 
and described scenes in which numerous stones were thrown and sporadic fighting 
broke out. The police created the beginning of a stampede amongst the dense crowd 
as they attempted to reach the fighting, women with babies were removed to a safe 
distance, and there were eight arrests.49 The Times reported that the demonstration, 
‘which had given the authorities some cause for anxiety beforehand, passed off fairly 
peaceably’, and made a brief reference to a stone being thrown and some trouble in 
front of the fascist platform where some of the BUF’s opponents, ‘who shouted 
themselves hoarse and raised their clenched fists whenever the Fascists gave the 
Hitler salute.’50 The Assistant Chief Constable claimed that the success of keeping 
order at the demonstration was because without their uniform, the fascists ceased to 
be provocative.51 Following questions in the Commons, Home Secretary Sir John 
Simon could not assert whether the conditions imposed on the BUF march were 
made with any legal authority or not.52 However, if any challenge was made to the 
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decision, Ewing and Gearty suggested that, ‘the police could have relied if they had 
chosen to do so on their breach of the peace jurisdiction.’53 
Mosley’s response to the disorder emphasised that the organised disruption by the 
socialist and communist element ‘is exactly the same whether we are in uniform or 
not.’ His statement, which was published in the Manchester Guardian, then 
described occasions where larger BUF demonstrations, in which their Blackshirt 
uniform was worn, had generated less opposition and disorder than their plain 
clothed march in Manchester.54  
Influenced by the Manchester Watch Committee and recent disorder at a BUF 
meeting in Hull addressed by Mosley, the Hull Watch Committee’s chairman, 
Alderman Stark, issued a statement that there would be no more uniforms worn at 
meetings in the city. There was also a motion put forward by Councillor Nicholson to 
prohibit fascist meetings altogether. However, this was discarded by Stark, who 
replied that the decision to prohibit meetings rested entirely with the Chief Constable 
on grounds of an anticipated breach of the peace, and that the Watch Committee, 
the Town Clerk and the Home Secretary had nothing to do with such a matter.55 
Nevertheless, despite the statement on uniforms, Blackshirts continued to be 
politically active in Hull. They regularly met at Paragon Square and reportedly 
insulted people and caused obstruction. It was recorded that the Blackshirts also 
targeted anti-fascists and Jews with anonymous postcards threatening that they 
were ‘marked men’, and it was also alleged that insulting placards were pasted onto 
Jewish owned shops.  
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Although there had been an increase in Blackshirt related violence in Hull, and Stark 
warned that there was ‘a first class riot brewing’, the Watch Committee conceded 
that they were powerless to prohibit the Blackshirt uniform. 56  The Committee 
admitted they were misled by media reports which declared that the Manchester 
Watch Committee prohibited the uniform. In fact, the BUF had agreed to march 
without their uniform in Manchester following negotiations with the Manchester 
Watch Committee. Stark announced to the committee that ‘there was no law to 
prevent any organisation from holding meetings in uniform whether they were 
postmen, Salvation Army, Boy Scouts, Fascists or anybody, but the law did state 
distinctly that a disorderly meeting could be dealt with.’57 This admission stressed the 
constraints encountered by regional authorities in their struggle against political 
violence and public disorder that was frequently associated with the wearing of 
political uniforms. It was not until after the disorder in Cable Street on 4 October that 
national attention had been resurrected and again focused on the pressing for a ban 
on political uniforms. 
6) The Repercussions of Cable Street 
Reports following the disorder at Cable Street58 frequently commented on the military 
styled uniform worn by Oswald Mosley and other fascists. The Western Morning 
News recorded: 
Sir Oswald Mosley… yesterday wore the new uniform – a black military-cut 
jacket, grey riding breeches, and jack boots. He had a black peaked military 
hat and a red armband. Many of the Fascists on parade wore similar 
uniform.59    
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The scale of the violence at Cable Street was unprecedented in terms of BUF related 
disorder. In combination with this, the escalating anti-Jewish attacks in East London 
and the new uniform, which was even more militarised and provocative, forced the 
Home Office to take action. There was renewed intensification over political uniforms 
and whether legislation should be introduced to prohibit them. Game admitted that 
the police were not equipped to deal with the situation and asked the Cabinet to 
introduce legislation to prohibit political uniforms and political defence corps, and 
also to grant extra powers to prohibit marching.60  
The Labour Party Conference in Edinburgh on 6 October 1936 used the event to 
demand the prohibition of political uniforms. Joseph Toole of Manchester seconded 
the motion for prohibition, highlighting the BUF’s recent plain clothed march stating: 
Mosley came to Manchester a month ago. We allowed his procession, but 
the Watch Committee insisted that uniforms should not be worn. I moved that 
myself, because I wanted the public to see what Fascists were like without 
Uniforms. (Laughter.) And what a motley crew they were. (Laughter.)61 
Blackshirt propaganda defended the function of the uniform as a tool which helped 
preserve discipline and order and ridiculed the suggestion that it was provocative. At 
a luncheon in Manchester, attended by 200 Lancashire businessmen, Mosley used 
the platform to criticise demands for political uniforms to be prohibited. He 
questioned: 
Are we really to have it laid down in Great Britain that a man might not wear 
the clothes he wishes to wear? [adding] a Socialist has no more right to throw 
a brick at a fascist whose clothes he dislikes than I have to throw one at 
Alderman Joseph Toole because I find his appearance unpleasant and 
provocative…62    
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There were also frequent questions directed towards the Home Secretary in the 
House of Commons, enquiring whether legislation to prohibit uniforms would be 
introduced. These questions were not just instigated by the political Left. Frustration 
at Sir John Simon’s hesitancy was highlighted by Conservative MP for Leeds West, 
Mr Vyvyan Adams. After he received an unsatisfactory answer to his question on 
political uniforms he stated, ‘May we have an early answer about these uniforms as 
we have now had about three years to consider how to deal with these dangerous 
lunatics?’ 63  In the Police Courts, Magistrates could also use their discretion in 
connecting the wearing of the Blackshirt uniform with provocation. For example, in 
October 1936, Woolf Bensusan was accused of using insulting words and behaviour 
towards a fascist. In his judgment, Magistrate, Mr F. O. Langley stated, ‘The 
existence of these Blackshirts is a provocation. I am not going to punish you 
because I think there was provocation.’64 The pressure finally paid off and on 3 
November 1936, the Public Order Bill was introduced, with a clause to prohibit 
political uniforms.  
7) S1 Public Order Act 1936 
When the Home Secretary Sir John Simon introduced clause 1 Public Order Bill to 
Parliament, which prohibited the wearing of political uniform, he declared that: 
It is the unanimous view of the chief officers of police in the areas principally 
affected that the wearing of political uniforms is a source of special 
provocation, and testimony to the same effect has been offered to me at the 
Home Office by a number of deputations.65 
The words, ‘Uniform signifying association with any political organisation or with the 
promotion of any political object’ were carefully chosen, Simon stated that this would 
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exclude the uniform of the Salvation Army, industrial organisations, benefit clubs, 
Boy Scouts and the Church Lads' Brigade.  
Clause 1 was questioned by Mr Turton who stated, ‘To-day any man may go about 
in any public place in any attire, so long as it is decent and is not female attire’ and 
questioned the advisability of adding any further restrictions on what people may 
wear, especially as no definition could be offered.66 He moved that the clause should 
leave out the phrase, ‘in any public place or’ as he believed the Government were 
‘striking at a lot of people who are quite inoffensive and whom it is quite unnecessary 
to brand as criminals.’ He mentioned the green shirts of the Social Credit Party, who 
were law abiding and should not fear the Attorney General when they walked out of 
their house.67  
Simon made it clear that the clause would not carry a definition of the term uniform, 
as this would create potential loopholes that could be exploited. However, without 
definition, it was unclear whether the Orangemen could continue their processions 
and whether the kilt could still be worn. Labour MP, Andrew MacLaren, also 
questioned that innocent individuals could find themselves committing a criminal act, 
‘If there is anything a Scotsman likes to do south of the Tweed it is to wear a 
kilt…We know the intention behind the Bill.’68 This intimation towards the BUF was 
previously made explicit by Labour MP, James Lovat-Fraser, who declared that ‘I 
hope that the action that we take to-night may crush Sir Oswald Mosley's movement.’ 
Conservative, Edward Fleming, stated that without a description of what a political 
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uniform was then he would be driven to the same conclusion as Mr Lovat-Fraser that, 
‘the real reason for this Clause is to suppress the Fascists’.69  
Fleming revealed to the House that he had many fascist friends, and when the other 
Honourable Members expressed their surprise, he replied that many of them were 
once Conservatives, and that some were even Labour men and Communists. 
Without a definition of uniform, he could see that his friends appearing before 
Magistrates in Bolton would be treated differently from those in Manchester. He 
argued that there was no need for clause 1, and that Parliament should bring in a Bill 
that was more explicitly directed that would ‘crush them entirely as a political 
organisation’.70  
S1(1) Public Order Act 1936, which became law on 1 January 1937, states, ‘any 
person who in any public place or at any public meeting wears uniform signifying his 
association with any political organisation or with the promotion of any political object 
shall be guilty of an offence’. Exceptions are permitted on occasion of ceremonial, 
anniversary, or other special occasion, if the Chief Constable and the Secretary of 
State are satisfied that it will not be likely to involve any risk of public disorder. S1(2) 
confirms that the consent of the Attorney General is required for prosecutions to be 
instigated.  
This section caused controversy on two fronts. Firstly, it would affect other political 
organisations that were law abiding and did not threaten public order. Members of 
the Social Credit Party (SCP), recognisable by their green shirts, were the most 
noticeable victims of the new legislation. Other, now prohibited uniforms included, 
the blue shirts of the Kensington Fascists, the grey shirts of the United Empire 
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Fascist Party, the red shirts of the Independent Labour Party Guild of Youth, the 
brown or Khaki shirts of Communist Youth organisations, and the blue and white 
shirts used by Jewish anti-fascist organisations.71 As s1 referred only to political 
uniforms, social and religious groups such as the Boy Scouts and the Salvation Army 
were omitted from the proscription. The only exception made in the Act was that 
uniforms could be worn on special occasions which allowed the Ulster Orangemen to 
wear their uniforms for ceremonial processions. As no definition of ‘political uniform’ 
was offered in the Act, it was controversially left for the Courts to interpret the 
meaning of this term. The implications of this are, if a political uniform cannot be 
defined in legislation, how does a potential offender know whether his dress is 
considered to be prohibited or not? 
8) S1 Public Order Act: Early Prosecutions 
The BUF response to the new legislation demonstrated both their obedience to the 
law and their desire to circumvent it. A BUF cartoon (illustrated in figure 5.3), which 
appeared in Blackshirt, reveals a fascist hanging up his uniform on 1 January 1937, 
demonstrating his respect of the law. The caption, ‘Till the Day’ emphasises the 
anticipated coming of a fascist state when the Blackshirt will again be worn. The BUF 
also submitted a request to the police to bring a test case against them so it could be 
ascertained whether a black shirt and tie worn with a regular suit would constitute an 
offence under the Act. They also issued a statement which declared, ‘It is incorrect to 
say that we either challenge or wish to defy the law. Our desire is, and always has 
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been, to conform with the law.’72 Yet, in practice, attempts were made to elude the 
proscription. 
 
Figure 5.3 Cartoon showing BUF response to Public Order Act 1936.73  
 
In January 1937, there were two prominent s1 prosecutions of BUF members. The 
different defences used demonstrate the way fascists sought loopholes in the new 
legislation. The first to be prosecuted was William Wood, a BUF paper seller, who 
was arrested on 2 January 1937 in Leeds. He was selling the newspapers, Action 
and Blackshirt, whilst wearing ‘a peaked cap with a leather chin strap, and on the 
cap were two badges commonly associated with the BUF. He was also wearing a 
black shirt and a black tie.’74 When Wood was approached by a police officer who 
asked him if he knew that wearing political uniforms was now an offence, he replied 
that he was told by his employers, the proprietors of the paper Action, ‘that if he wore 
the uniform cap while he was selling the papers he was in the same position as the 
ordinary vendors of newspapers.’75 In R v Wood76 at Leeds Police Court, it was 
admitted by the police during cross-examination by Frederick Lawton, that other 
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newspaper vendors also wore caps of a similar design. Defending, Lawton submitted 
that it was ‘not a uniform, but a livery such as is worn by sellers of newspapers in all 
the big centres’ and highlighted that the qualification to wear it was to sell papers to 
the value of 2s 2d per week for a period of one month.77 It was argued by the 
prosecution that although the defendant was not attired in the full BUF uniform, the 
items that he was wearing were complete enough to signify his association with the 
fascist party, submitting, ‘It was not necessary that a uniform should be entirely 
complete to bring it within the mischief of section 1.’78 The prosecutor described the 
Act as ‘vaguely nebulous’ claiming that ‘the police and other people were anxious to 
know what the exact position was.’79  
The Stipendiary Magistrate stressed that he did not want to lay down any general 
principles in regard to the law, declaring that all cases must be treated on their own 
merits. Regarding the dress worn by Wood, he was of the opinion that it could 
properly be described as a uniform within the meaning of the Act, stating, “I think that 
the average person who had seen him would have said not ‘Oh, there’s a man 
representing the Action Press,’ but ‘Oh, there’s a Fascist.”80 Although the maximum 
punishment for a s1 offence was three months imprisonment and a fine of £50, 
Wood was fined 40 shillings as the Stipendiary Magistrate stated that as it was a test 
case he would only impose a nominal penalty. 
Barrister Frederick Lawton, who was later to become Lord Chief Justice, was already 
an admirer of fascism before he became associated with the BUF, founding the 
Cambridge University Fascist Association as an undergraduate. He was called to the 
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Bar by Inner Temple in 1935 and later that year watched Mosley, conducting his own 
case, sue John Marchbanks for slander at the King’s Bench Division. After becoming 
acquainted with Mosley there, he joined the BUF, and was later named as a 
prospective parliamentary candidate for the BUF in 1936. From then on, Mosley 
frequently employed Lawton to defend BUF members in court, as well as help set up 
a commercial radio station in Germany, an enterprise that Mosley hoped would aid 
the BUF’s ailing financial situation.81 Following the failed ‘livery’ defence in R v Wood, 
Lawton was called upon to defend four Blackshirts who had been arrested for the s1 
offence in Hull.  
In R v Charnley,82 Sidney Charnley, Eric Webster, John Charnley and Peter Smith 
were summonsed before the Hull Stipendiary Magistrate on 29 January 1937 for 
wearing a uniform signifying their association with the BUF on 7 January at a public 
meeting. Sidney Charnley, the meeting’s chairman, was described as wearing a 
‘dark navy blue woollen pull-over, black trousers, black belt with the Fascist badge 
on the buckle, and also a red brassard on the left arm.’83 His brother John was 
similarly dressed and Smith wore a black jacket and a red armband. For the defence 
it was argued that the garments worn constituted ordinary clothing and there was no 
intention of them being associated with a political object. The only items purchased 
from the same source were the armlets and belts. As for these items, Lawton argued 
that a distinctive mark such as an armlet may be considered part of a uniform but it 
was not a uniform in itself. He quoted the Attorney General, who stated during the 
House of Commons debates on clause 1, that the wearing of a distinctive tie would 
not constitute an offence under the Act, arguing that the object of the Act was to 
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prevent the wearing of a complete outfit, stating, ‘If they wanted to stop the wearing 
of badges they could have said so.’84  
In giving judgment, the Magistrate dismissed this argument, stating that if uniform 
meant a complete outfit, then Parliament would have stated so. Therefore, uniform 
must mean something less than that, yet, like the Leeds Magistrate before him, 
declared that he would not be drawn into defining the limits upon which a uniform 
could be described. The defendants were said to have been honest in their replies in 
trying to remain lawful, and the Magistrate believed that they were not deliberately 
attempting to break the law. They were ‘bound over on their own recognizances 
each in £5 to be of good behaviour for six months and order to pay 10s each towards 
the costs of prosecution, with the exception of Smith, who was ordered to pay 5s.’85 
Whether the Magistrate’s view that the Blackshirts’ intentions were honest was 
correct or not, the fascists were testing the boundaries of the new law trying to 
exploit its vagueness. The lack of a definition only proved to strengthen the position 
of the Magistrates to implement a wide interpretation of the meaning of ‘political 
uniform’. 
The attire described in R v Wood was very similar to the militaristic uniform worn by 
the BUF before the Public Order Act, but the clothes described in R v Charnley, 
which were claimed to be normal everyday clothes, were still considered to be 
political uniforms because of the various armlets and badges worn. Mosley 
continued to wear a black shirt after the Act and even challenged the Government to 
prosecute him at a speech delivered at Hornsey Town Hall, London, on 25 January 
1937. In his speech, Mosley accused the police of bullying and blackmail, alleging 
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that they frequently took the names and addresses of BUF members who wore a 
plain black shirt, and threatened them with prosecution. He used this platform to 
forbid his followers to wear a black shirt in order to stop this intimidation. His black 
shirt was worn under a light coloured suit and there were no visible badges or 
armlets on display to signify association with any political party. Therefore, no 
prosecution was ever likely. Mosley used this sign of defiance to intensify his rhetoric 
against the Public Order Act, which he described as ‘grossly partisan’ and ‘designed 
by our opponents to damage and to impede our organisation’.86  
In contrast to the successful prosecutions of the uniformed fascists, the Magistrates’ 
judgments in two cases involving the green shirted members of the SCP had quite a 
different outcome. The first was in Luton, where three members were charged with 
the s1 offence with the approval of the Attorney General. The Times recorded that, 
‘The criterion appeared to be whether or not a collection of persons dressed in 
similar articles of distinctive apparel gave a reasonable onlooker the appearance of 
persons dressed in uniform.’87 Although the defendants wore their distinctive green 
shirt and tie, one wore them with an ordinary suit, and others with either a 
mackintosh or overcoat. However, they all wore armlets with the emblem of their 
party on them. The solicitor for the defence read the definition of the word ‘uniform’ 
from the New English Dictionary and argued that, ‘it was perfectly obvious that they 
were not wearing a “distinctive dress of the same pattern, colour and appearance.”’88 
The Bench dismissed the case.  
On 16 June 1937, another member of the SCP was summonsed under s1 Public 
Order Act 1936. He wore ‘a light green shirt, green collar, green tie (the tie bearing 
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an inscription or initials), a black belt, grey flannel trousers, and a green armlet, the 
last marked with a “double K” in white.’89 For the defence, it was argued that his 
green shirt was only revealed because he removed his coat because of the warm 
weather, and his shirt was light green, rather than the dark green that was 
associated with the party. Further, the defendant was not wearing a beret which was 
part of the usual uniform of the SCP, and the shirt and tie were quite ‘ordinary’ and 
ones ‘that anyone might buy.’90 Although the Magistrate, Paul Bennett, held that the 
shirt, tie and armlet constituted a uniform, The Times reported that he ‘did not take a 
serious view of that case’ and he dismissed the summons under the Probation of 
Offenders Act on payment by the defendant of £5 5s. costs. 
The discretion utilised by the Magistrates in these cases demonstrates that the 
members of the SCP were treated more leniently than the Blackshirts who violated 
s1, despite the similarities in the garments which constituted their uniform. This was 
also reflected in the Parliamentary debates which implicitly stated that the main 
function of the uniform ban was to counter the provocation caused by the BUF, and 
to prevent other extremist bodies creating uniformed divisions themselves. A certain 
amount of sympathy had been imparted for members of the SCP, who were not 
considered to be a provocation or a source of political violence by Parliament, but 
would have their liberty to dress in uniform curtailed. The Blackshirts did experience 
a higher conviction rate, but the sentencing consistently reflected a temperate view 
of the offence by the Magistrates. A further Blackshirt conviction in August 1937, 
validates this view, when Reginald Dawson was fined £5 and ordered to pay £2 2s 
                                               
89
 The Times, 17 June 1937. 
90
 Ibid. Also, the ‘Double K’ was likely to stand for ‘Kibbo Kift’ which was a youth organisation founded 
in 1921 by John Hargrave who was a former Commissioner of Baden-Powell’s boy scout movement. 
Hargrave was later influenced by Major C. H. Douglas’ theories of social credit and adopted these 
ideas into the official policy of his movement which became the Greenshirt Movement for Social 
Credit in 1931, and then Social Credit Party of Great Britain in 1935. 
294 
 
costs at Hampstead. The full punishment available to the Magistrates on summary 
conviction under s7(2) was imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months, a 
fine not exceeding £50, or both. Dawson was dressed in a ‘black stockinette jersey’ 
with a polo collar two inches deep and a fascist badge on the left hand side, grey 
trousers, and a wide black leather belt with a chromium plated buckle consisting of 
‘slots which appeared to have been used for holding a badge’.91 During Dawson’s 
public address at Carlingford Road, Hampstead, he responded to a heckler from the 
crowd who commented on his uniform by stating, ‘All right. If you don’t know what a 
uniform is, don’t show your ignorance.’ The clothes worn by Dawson were the same 
as those worn by certain members of the BUF before the Act came into force, 
although the badge had been removed from the belt, and no armlet was worn which 
had been a recent development of the fascist uniform.  
The relatively few reported cases of s1 Public Order Act violations would indicate 
that the provision was successful in preventing political activists from causing 
provocation by wearing political uniforms. In giving evidence, Reginald Dawson 
declared that he had worn the same outfit in Kilburn and Camden Town. At Camden 
Town, an Inspector took a different view of his powers under s1, and asked Dawson 
if any others were going to join him wearing the black polo jumper, stating that if they 
did then it would constitute a political uniform. This demonstrates that it was not just 
the courts that had difficulty defining what constituted a political uniform, because at 
street level, the vague statute also allowed for inconsistency among police action. If 
it proved difficult for the authorities to interpret this ambiguous criminal offence, the 
choice of dress for the political activist had to be carefully selected. The real value of 
s1 was that the Blackshirt uniform was not worn again in public processions or by 
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their stewards at public meetings, and ended the provocation of the uniformed 
Fascist Defence Force, which subdued their appearance as a private army and 
removed a certain level of the provocation that the BUF generated. However, it did 
not end the violence and public disorder that was associated with the BUF and their 
anti-fascist opposition.92 It has been argued by Anderson, that since the provisions of 
the Public Order Act ‘are inhibitive rather than repressive, [its effects] are impossible 
to assess.’93 Coupland has also suggested that, without their uniforms, the BUF 
attracted a mass of new members that were previously put off by their military 
appearance.94 In fact, despite the uniform ban, the BUF had a sudden growth in 
membership before the Second World War, due to their peace campaign. 
9) Post-War legacy: The Enduring Proscription of Political Uniforms 
S1 Public Order Act 1936 continues to remain in force and was not repealed when 
the 1936 Act was reformed by the Public Order Act 1986. The most prominent s1 
convictions since the Second World War were of members of the British Ku Klux 
Klan (KKK) in October 1965, and the Provisional Sinn Fein for offences committed in 
June and August 1974. For the KKK case, s1 was a convenient provision to prevent 
the dangerous growth of a racist, far-Right movement in Britain, emulating the 
American model.  
On 19 June 1965, 12 members of the KKK held a cross burning ceremony in Rugby, 
Warwickshire. Despite being on private land, it was argued by the prosecution in R v 
Robert Edward Relf and others,95 that the ceremony constituted a public meeting as 
members of the press were invited, and the burning cross could be seen for miles 
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around; therefore, fulfilling one of the requirements under s1.96 The eight members 
were all convicted, three of whom received three month prison sentences, two were 
fined, and three were bound over. 
 
Figure 5.4 A member of the British KKK at the ceremony at Rugby, 19 June 1965. 
Permission to reproduce this image has been granted by The National Archive. 
 
With the exception of Relf, who was convicted of aiding and abetting Thomas Allen 
and William Duncan to commit the offence, the dress of the seven uniformed 
members consisted of ‘white gowns with a black cross over the heart and cloth 
headdresses with slits for the eyes and mouth which were not unlike dunce’s caps.’97 
The uniform is illustrated in figure 5.4. At the meeting it was recorded that the aims of 
the Klan were ‘to rid Britain of Jews, Roman Catholics and Coloureds… by every 
possible means including violence.’98 In an interview with the invited members of the 
press, Relf stated that, ‘if candidates could be found they would put them up at the 
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general election’.99 The prosecution also successfully argued that these statements, 
indicated a ‘political organization, and… the promotion of political objectives’ which 
further guaranteed a successful prosecution under s1.100    
The two separate Sinn Fein cases were brought together on appeal to the Queen’s 
Bench Division in December that year. The first, O’Moran and others v DPP101 
consisted of eight appellants who were convicted at Old Street Magistrates for 
offences contrary to s1(1) Public Order Act 1936. They had dressed in black or dark 
blue berets, dark glasses, dark pullovers and other dark clothing, during the funeral 
procession of their colleague and hunger striker, Michael Gaughan, who died in 
Pankhurst prison, on the Isle of Wight. In the second case, Whelan and Others v 
DPP, 102  the 12 appellants had been convicted following an attempted political 
procession from Speaker’s Corner to Downing Street. The members were arrested 
at the start of the procession under s1(1) after several warnings from Chief Inspector 
Cooksley, who informed them that wearing a political uniform was against the law 
and that if they did not remove their berets they would be arrested.        
The significance of the appeal was that it was the first time that matters relating to s1 
had been brought before a superior court. In giving judgment on the first case, Lord 
Widgery CJ ruled that although the defendants were ‘dressed in a similar but not 
identical fashion’ the fact that they all wore berets, and were seen together, rather 
than in isolation, ruled that that article was uniform as its adoption was for ‘the 
purposes of showing association between the men in question.’103 He continued to 
point out that the uniform in O’Moran went beyond the berets in any case and ruled 
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that the pullover, dark glasses and dark clothes, on that occasion, constituted a 
uniform within the meaning of the Act.  
Further to this, Widgery had to judge whether it was necessary under s1(1) for the 
prosecution to prove which political organisation was concerned. At the Old Street 
Magistrates court, Police Sergeant Garnham stated that the berets had been 
previously associated with members of the Irish Republican Army, who wore them 
with combat jackets, and were also becoming a common feature amongst other Irish 
republican organisations at demonstrations in London. He claimed that people 
wearing berets were frequently seen in the close proximity of Sinn Fein banners or 
were carrying them. It was stressed by Widgery that it was not necessary to prove 
the previous use of the article as uniform, but that their style of dress showed a 
mutual association with one another. He continued that this could be judged from the 
events when the alleged uniform was worn. The particular events in this case were 
that the men wore what Widgery had already judged to have been uniforms, at a 
funeral service associated with a member of the Irish republican movement, and 
delivered an address of a political character. Bearing this in mind, he stated that, it 
was ‘abundantly clear that they were activities of an organisation of a political 
character. Thus the chain of responsibility under the section would be complete’104 
and consequently dismissed the appeals headed by O’Moran.  
The appeals headed by Whelan were also dismissed. Widgery’s judgment here was 
even more explicit as he ruled ‘I see no reason why a beret in itself, if worn in order 
to indicate association with a political body, should not be a uniform for present 
purposes.’105 In his reasoning, he concurred with the Magistrate’s view that, ‘An 
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independent bystander, seeing the approach of a group of marchers wearing 
identical headgear under the banner of the Provisional Sinn Fein, would conclude 
that it was their uniform.’106 This ruling indicated that a single item of clothing, such 
as a beret, could be legally described as a political uniform within the meaning of the 
Act.  
10) Conclusion 
Under the common law, there have been several instances when a defendants’ attire 
has been judged to have been a political uniform within the meaning of s1 Public 
Order Act 1936, but a key feature of all these decisions has been the unwillingness 
of the presiding judges to lay down any general principles. Instead, an importance to 
the specific events recorded and conduct of the defendants has been highlighted in 
their judgments. Therefore, no conclusive definition of what constitutes a political 
uniform can be offered, but the common features found in such judgments can 
elucidate a better understanding of the phrase.  
In the interwar period, respective Magistrates have convicted Blackshirts who 
provided varied and innovative defences. For the Blackshirt newspaper vender, 
Wood, it was argued in his defence that his uniform was a livery from the company 
Action Press, and that other newspaper venders wore similarly styled dress. In this 
case it was judged that a complete uniform need not be worn and that a general 
member of the public would have recognised him as a fascist rather than an 
employee of Action Press. The second defence for Charnley and others was that 
their clothes were purchased within the everyday course of their lives, and that only 
their badges signified an association with a political organisation. It was also judged 
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by the Magistrate that the uniform does not need to be complete to fall within the 
meaning of the Act, and the brassard, or armband, ‘with the emblem of the political 
party was certainly an identification and a uniform.’ 107  The third Blackshirt 
prosecution of Dawson relied on the previous association of the black polo styled 
jersey with the BUF before the Act was passed. These three judgments reflect the 
subsequently wide scope that s1(1) holds without a definition of what constitutes a 
political uniform. 
However, the leniency given to the Greenshirts questions the consistency of the 
application of the Act. The descriptions provided to the courts of the defendants’ 
attire had overwhelming similarities with those worn by the Blackshirts. Yet, these 
cases were dismissed. In the case against Douglas Wright it was reported that he 
was dismissed under the Probation of Offenders Act 1907 on payment of £5 5s costs. 
Although this was a similar figure to the fines issued to the Blackshirts, the defendant 
was spared a criminal conviction. This inconsistency was highlighted by The 
Blackshirt, which alleged discrimination against the fascists stating that it was proof 
that the Public Order Act was only supposed to work against them. The BUF 
challenged Parliament to include a definition of ‘political uniform’ within the law, to 
allow the Magistrates to ‘keep their just reputation of impartiality.’108 
The interwar court judgments demonstrate the flexibility that s1 provides without 
including a definition. It is clear from the Parliamentary debates that the uniform ban 
was primarily aimed at preventing the provocation caused by the Blackshirts, and it 
was regretted that small political groups without a reputation for public disorder like 
the SCP would be affected by the Act. Yet, any statutory provision should be applied 
                                               
107
 The Daily Mail (Hull), 29 Jan 1937. 
108
 The Blackshirt, 5 June 1937. 
301 
 
equally to each defendant regardless of their political persuasion. This vague 
provision has offered tribunals an opportunity to apply a broad interpretation to their 
judgment. In practice this has demonstrated that a more lenient view has been 
afforded to those whose uniforms and political methods have not had a history or 
reputation of provocation or serious disorder. Political movements that represent a 
threat to public order or national security such as the BUF, KKK and the IRA have 
consequently found that the courts have taken a more serious view when they have 
breached s1.  
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Conclusion 
 
1) Prologue  
The relationship between public order law and British fascist activism is multi-
dimensional, incorporating the shared responses of the police, the judiciary, the 
Government, local authorities, the public and anti-fascists. Furthermore, seen within 
the context of wider public order responses from before and after the era of the BUF, 
the wideness of discretion which was afforded to the police and the courts 
demonstrates that consistency within the law was an unrealistic ideal. In default of 
this, accusations of partiality from both the far-Right and the far-Left ensued. 
However, this examination on legal responses which has incorporated social and 
cultural factors with an analysis on the discretion used has revealed that there were 
wider factors which directed the actions of the police and the judgments of the courts 
when dealing with extreme political activism. 
2) Parliamentary Responses to Fascism 
Parliament’s crucial response to the BUF in the interwar period was the enactment of 
the Public Order Act 1936. Although it passed through Parliament with relative speed 
following the Battle of Cable Street, debate on public order legislation had previously 
been invoked in the House of Commons. The draft Bills of 1932 and 1934  
demonstrate that the 1936 Act was not a knee-jerk reaction to the disorder on 4 
October in East London, but a response that had incorporated previous notions on 
how legal measures could be devised to keep the peace. Despite this, the BUF was 
the primary stimulus for the Act which was principally mandated to curtail the 
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disorder created by the fascists’ incendiary propaganda. However, the Home 
Secretary, Sir John Simon, contended that, ‘I am not trying to draw a distinction 
between one extreme creed and another… The point is that we should do our best to 
act even-handedly in the matter and base ourselves on general principles.’1 However, 
the provisions incorporated within the Act directly affected different areas of the 
fascists’ propaganda armoury and provided the police and the authorities with more 
definitive powers to preserve order, although many of these provisions still carried a 
certain amount of discretion.  
For example, the difficulty in proscribing a procession when a breach of the peace 
had been anticipated was largely overcome by s3. The previous uncertainty about 
common law preventative powers that had been highlighted by Beatty v Gillbanks 
and previous Blackshirt marches now had a statutory provision, as Chief Constables 
were provided with the power to prohibit a public procession in advance with the 
sanction of the Home Secretary. Yet, although this response sharply followed the 
Battle of Cable Street, we have seen that powers to prohibit processions had already 
been debated in response to the Hunger Marches in 1932 and 1934.2 Furthermore, 
these provisions had the capacity to affect more social groups than just political 
extremists.3 The creation of such liberty limiting legal powers was cynically criticised 
as demonstrating political partiality by Liberal MP and member of the NCCL, Dingle 
Foot: 
The party to which I belong and, I think, the Conservative party, do not very 
often indulge in processions… It is from the very fact that you have a form of 
demonstration not much used by some parties but a good deal used by 
others that some danger arises.4 
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One provision which was more directly targeted at the BUF was the prohibition of 
political uniforms under s1. Yet, even here concern was levelled by Simon that 
failure to act would result in the adoption of political uniforms by other groups. 
The Government’s response in 1936 demonstrated that there was apprehension 
in introducing legislation which prohibited the wearing of certain clothing. The 
abandonment of the uniform clause during the drafting of the unsuccessful Public 
Order Bill 1934 and the frequent requests by certain MPs in this period to prohibit 
political uniforms were justly delayed. This was not because of any fascist 
partiality, or casual toleration of their activities, but because of the serious 
implications on personal liberty of introducing such a restrictive legal provision. 
Yet, two years later with the resurgence of fascist activity and public disorder, the 
law proscribing political uniforms was finally enacted.5  
In response to the fascist Jew-baiting in the East End of London in particular, s5 
created an offence to use threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour with 
intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or whereby a breach of the peace is likely to 
be occasioned. This provision controversially provided the police with wide 
discretionary powers which, as discussed in Chapter 3, led to it being referred to by 
the police as the ‘breathing Act’. Although the powers had previously existed in the 
Metropolitan Police Act, the stimulus to nationalise this provision was a response to 
the fascist’s provocative doctrine. Subsequently, s5 and the amendments made by 
ss4 and 5 Public Order Act 1986 have become a widely used tool by police officers 
dealing with all manner of anti-social behaviour, and not just racial discrimination and 
political extremism.   
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During the progression of the Public Order Bill through Parliament, the eagerness of 
many MPs to create legislation which would bring an end to the BUF was clearly 
evident. This was noticeably demonstrated by Labour MP, James Lovat-Fraser, who 
declared, ‘I hope that the action that we take to-night may crush Sir Oswald Mosley's 
movement.’ 6  The predominant view within Parliament during the reading of the 
Public Order Bill was the wider effect that it would have on individual liberty. 
Communist member William Gallacher made the most outspoken attack on the Bill 
stating that, ‘this is one of the most dangerous attacks on democracy that has ever 
been made in this country’.7 Nevertheless, many MPs who were concerned about 
the loss of fundamental freedoms reluctantly supported the Bill in order to curtail 
fascist propaganda. Labour MP George Lansbury conceded, ‘I should think that no 
Bill has ever been passed, as this will be passed… which was so intensely disliked.’8 
The Home Secretary, Sir John Simon, stated: 
It must be remembered that the essentials of this liberty are not only the 
rights of those who wish to demonstrate or protest, but also the rights of the 
general public, who have their interests in being protected from suffering from 
serious and illegitimate disturbance. It must be remembered that we are not 
passing legislation simply for the purpose of striking at one particular section, 
but trying to base our legislation on a general principle.9 
This admission established that collective security was now being prioritised over 
fundamental civil liberties. Subsequent sanctions by the Home Secretary under s3 to 
prohibit fascist processions also detrimentally affected the liberty of other political 
groups. This danger was predicted by Labour MP Andrew MacLaren: 
It may please many just now because it seems to be hitting at the Blackshirts, 
but when it is the law of the land, and has no regard to the colour of the shirt 
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or to the opinions that are held, people who are welcoming it now will find that 
it hits at them, too.10 
The Public Order Act provided the police with wide discretion in maintaining the 
peace. In 1936, following suspicion about providing the police with such wide powers, 
Simon stated: 
Inevitably, a certain amount of discretion must be left in these matters to the 
police. There are certain people who look upon the police of this country as if 
they were petty tyrants, trying to damage a particular cause. There is not a 
word of truth in that. They do their duty to the public fairly.11 
It is, therefore, essential to analyse police responses in relation to any perceived 
partiality. 
3) Police Responses to Fascism  
The most significant theme discussed within this thesis is the inconsistent policing of 
extreme political activism. Various disparities within the police responses to both 
fascist and communist activity have led to the repeated accusation of politically 
motivated policing in favour of the far-Right. While some analysis of a significant 
number of events seems to support this theory, an in-depth examination which 
contextualises the historico-legal environment presents an alternative hypothesis to 
that of a predominantly pro-fascist police institution. Additionally, the historical 
contextualisation of public order policing before the era of the BUF also highlighted 
that police practice was often inconsistent in different regions, independent of who 
the political activists were.12 Therefore, any inconsistency in police practice must 
also consider that regional variations played an important part of public order policing, 
and potentially undermines perceptions of political partiality.    
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The relationship between the police and the opposing politically extreme movements 
was chiefly dictated by the contrasting attitudes each group demonstrated to both the 
police and the law. For instance, many of the far-Left incidents discussed involved 
challenging police instruction to determine legal boundaries whilst displaying a 
confrontational attitude towards the authorities. In contrast, a common feature of 
fascist activism has involved positive police communication during the organisation 
of large national demonstrations and obeying police instruction when processions or 
meetings were proscribed under the breach of the peace doctrine. This has been 
substantiated by former Devon and Cornwall Chief Constable John Alderson who 
stated: 
Though both extremes have similar characteristics… they differ in the targets 
which they aim to attack. Where the Right attacks minorities and non-
conformist groups in its assertion of nationalism, the Left attacks the 
establishment, particularly the police...13 
 
However, the danger of advocating this position which defends the controversial 
policing of politically extreme activism is the proposition that deficient policing tactics 
or violent and racist propaganda of the far-Right will be excused in the process. This 
is not the case. For instance, racist, aggressive and militant fascist propaganda and 
unjust incidents of fascist violence, such as the brutal stewarding at Olympia and the 
failure of the police to respond appropriately have been rightly condemned within this 
thesis. The BUF’s method of preaching their particularly provocative political doctrine 
was principally conducted in a legally astute manner which ‘circumvent[ed] legal 
measures’.14  
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The fact that far-Right groups tend to provoke disorder, rather than initiate it presents 
further policing complications which are hindered by ill-defined legal powers. The 
Public Order Act 1936 removed some of the more contentious issues for the police, 
who could now apply to the Home Secretary for a procession ban which, although 
still controversial, was directed by statute rather than ambiguous common law 
powers. Even so, poor definitions within the Act also hindered effective and 
consistent policing. There was no definition of political uniform to direct police 
officers under s1. More controversially, with the use of ambiguous terms like 
threatening, abusive and insulting, and no definition of a breach of the peace, s5 was 
open to very wide discretion, and ultimately inconsistency. Yet, as has been 
demonstrated in Chapter 3, the use of this subjective provision was also reliant on 
factors other than political partiality, and police responses had both targeted and 
overlooked abusive anti-Semitic fascist propaganda. It was also acknowledged that 
fascists moderated their language when senior officers were present which implies 
that low level officers were in some cases more sympathetic to fascist propaganda. 
Indeed, according to East End resident Arthur Harding, a senior Special Branch 
officer admitted that they had a particular problem of police officers joining the BUF 
in the early stages of the War. Harding responded, ‘I’m not surprised because if 
they’ve not the experience you and I have had, you might stand there and think they 
were the saviours of the country.’15  Yet, this does not mean that fascist partiality was 
endemic within the lower tiers of the police force. A further likely suggestion on why 
some officers were more hesitant in utilising s5 at fascist meetings was that it could 
potentially create disorder from an otherwise amenable crowd. The problem of 
policing public order in the 1930s did not solely rely on how the law should be 
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applied, but also when it is appropriate to apply it. This highlights both the value and 
deficiency of police discretion, especially when utilising either the common law 
powers of breach of the peace or subjective provisions under s5.     
Even when public order law is applied without political motivation, crime prevention 
by its very nature relies, somewhat tentatively, on the uncertain and risky process of 
prediction and intervention, leaving the preventative nature of the breach of the 
peace doctrine to be extremely questionable. Criminologist Daniel Gilling 
emphasized that the path from prediction to intervention is filled by the ‘very human 
process of implementation’; demonstrating that these two constituent elements of 
crime prevention create a ‘rough terrain’ that in practice the police ultimately 
traverse. 16  Decisively, as police tactics are judged retrospectively, their use of 
discretion in anticipating a breach of the peace and the actions taken to prevent it 
are inevitably open to retrospective criticism. Balancing this difficult equation of 
preserving both order and liberty under largely discretionary legal provision, 
ultimately leads to inconsistency which effects public confidence in the police. While 
political partiality would have influenced the actions of some police officers its 
importance to the responses of political extremism has been overstated. The 
existence of discretion which allows police officers to selectively enforce the law 
naturally leads to inconsistency between individual officers as well as the practice of 
provincial forces. In addition, these inconsistencies were also present when 
considering the enforcement of public order law in the eras either side of the BUF’s 
activism. By selecting from a wide range of sources, this difference demonstrated 
many instances of autocratic police action which hindered fascist activism. The 
Home Office correspondence which included consultations with Chief Constables 
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and successive Metropolitan Police Commissioners highlighted the deficiencies 
within the law when policing the legally astute BUF activism. The Blackshirts 
obedience to police instruction, such as closing meetings when requested, 
significantly reduced any potential of conflict with the police.      
4) Fascists and the Judiciary 
 
During the reading of the Public Order Bill an ILP MP, Campbell Stephen, made an 
accusation that Magistrates were biased stating, ‘the trouble in London has been due 
to the fact that the police and the magistrates have been inclined to take sides’.17 
This accusation was based on two similar cases receiving different sentences from 
the same magistrate, although the exact details were absent from his argument. Yet, 
ascertaining whether activists from different extreme political movements are treated 
partially within the courts is of central importance. Therefore, any assessment of 
comparable case judgments must be the result of a comprehensive legal enquiry 
which also acknowledges its historical contextualization.  
In the inter-war era, there were two controversial cases which seriously restricted 
individual liberties related to political activism. The verdicts from Thomas v Sawkins 
and Duncan v Jones were both against far-Left activists, although the implications of 
these judgments also affected fascist propaganda. In both cases, Hewart LCJ 
presided and, according to Lawyer David Walker, he has since gained a notorious 
reputation as ‘perhaps the worst Chief Justice since the seventeenth century, not as 
being dishonest but as lacking dignity, fairness and a sense of justice’.18 It may also 
be considered that the unfavourable outcomes from these judgments were partly 
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attributable to the cynicism and danger with which the authorities regarded 
communist activism. Although fascist activism provoked serious public disorder, the 
activism of the far-Left was considered the most serious threat to national security as 
it advocated unconstitutional methods including the subversion of the armed forces 
and industrial sabotage. 19 Previous case law such as Beatty v Gillbanks also 
favoured the lawful exercise of fascist activism. With no Constitutional ‘right’ to 
assemble in public, the Beatty judgment was fundamental in providing the BUF with 
this freedom prior to the Public Order Act 1936. Hewart’s judgment in Duncan v 
Jones is perhaps the most significant here, in so far as it could perhaps be argued as 
a politically biased decision. The principle of this case closely resembled that of 
Beatty, and it was argued for the appellant that on this principle the bad conduct of 
another person could not make an otherwise legal act unlawful. Ewing and Gearty 
declared that Hewart’s quick dismissal of the appeal is noteworthy ‘for the vacuity of 
its reasoning [and] for its long term deleterious effect on civil liberties.’20  
At the Police Courts, the magistrates’ judgments that have been examined have 
demonstrated that fascists were often given firm sentences as well as their political 
opponents. For example, three of the fascists at the Plymouth meeting were 
sentenced to six weeks hard labour for committing a breach of the peace and in 
London, BUF speaker Earnest Clarke was effectively prevented him from utilising 
abusive propaganda when he was convicted of a s5 Public Oder Act 1936 offence 
and bound over in the sum of £50 to be of good behaviour for 12 months. These 
judgments and others help demonstrate some judicial consistency. In fact, in cases 
regarding political uniforms judgments have tended to favour more moderate 
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expressions of political expression. For example, on balance the Greenshirts 
received more lenient punishments than the Blackshirts. Furthermore, the 1965 
judgments involving three of the members of the KKK utilised the full sentencing 
power of three month’s imprisonment. Judicial consistency was also present in cases 
relating to accusations of unnecessarily violent stewarding. The charges brought 
against communist and Conservative stewards in 1936 and 1958 respectively, were 
both dismissed by the magistrates who ruled in favour of the steward despite the 
evidence suggesting they had both used undue force.    
This thesis has primarily demonstrated that legal responses to far-Right propaganda 
have not intrinsically been applied in a partial manner by Parliament, the police or 
the judiciary. Although, this is not to deny that fascist sympathies may have existed 
within these institutions. For example, while it must be recognised that there were 
police officers who had deliberately acted partially in favour of the fascists, this 
research demonstrates that it was not an attitude that was inherent amongst the 
majority of police practice, which has been demonstrated in a number of ways.  
Firstly, the study of a wide range of sources has indicated that fascists have also 
been the victims of autocratic police practice, and the study of several magistrates’ 
judgments has also determined that they were not necessarily treated with anymore 
leniency in the courts. Secondly, it has been established that public order policing 
has had a history of inconsistency at local levels. The different local strategies 
applied to the 1908 march of the Manchester unemployed in Birmingham and 
Coventry clearly identifies the diverse responses to the same problem by different 
police forces and local authorities. This was further demonstrated by the Report of 
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the Departmental Committee 21  in 1909 which recognised that three distinctive 
policing strategies were practised in different localities. These significant 
inconsistencies were largely attributable to the evolution of local policing tactics and 
the influence of Chief Constables. This was also witnessed in the 1930s with the 
controversial police practice at Manchester, Hull and Exeter in particular, when 
legally contentious steps were taken in an attempt to prevent or stifle BUF activity.  
Thirdly, even within the same location, the discretionary nature of public order law 
has undoubtedly led to inconsistency which is evidenced by the response of lower 
level police officers. While the ability to apply discretion provides police officers the 
opportunity to be politically influenced in their decision making, it more significantly 
provides the prospect that different police officers may assess a similar scenario 
differently and enforce the law in contrasting ways regardless of any political 
motivation or bias. Therefore, because of the necessary existence of discretion, 
police officers are able to act with different rationales as ‘street-level bureaucrats’.  
Fourthly, the different methods of activism employed by the far-Right and Left also 
account for a proportionately larger number of arrests being made. The BUF’s legal 
shrewdness meant that they knew how to deliver provocative political propaganda 
and contentiously stay within legal boundaries. Also, even when police responses 
were autocratic, instruction was usually obeyed and the police’s authority was not 
challenged, which largely contrasts with the policing of far-Left activism. In relation to 
this, the origin of disorder had significantly shifted with the arrival of BUF activism. 
Apart from the disorder associated with the Salvation Army in the 1880s, the 
authorities were largely concerned with disorder that originated from public 
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assemblies and the arrival of BUF propaganda that provoked disorder from the anti-
fascists presented a significantly challenging problem. Concern of disorder at public 
meetings on private premises had also been focused on the actions of the interrupter, 
rather than the steward. The Public Meeting Act 1908 and the report of the 
Departmental Committee the following year were both directed towards preventing 
interruption. While the use of force by stewards was regarded as a necessity to 
remove the need for police at political meetings, the violence used by the organised 
Blackshirt stewards again presented new problems until the judgment of Thomas v 
Sawkins.  
Finally, the enactment of the Public Order Act 1936 provided the authorities with 
decisive legal provisions which had the power to restrict and stifle fascist activism. 
Although the Act was also utilised against other political movements and protesters, 
it cleared much of the previous legal ambiguity which surrounded the responses to 
the provocation of the far-Right. The BUF’s political uniforms and their public 
processions were consistently prohibited despite the vagueness within the respective 
provisions. Most controversially, the subjective s5 provided police officers with such 
wide discretion that it was unsurprisingly inconsistently applied. While some officers 
demonstrated either fascist partiality, or at the very least a disliking of Jews and/or 
communism, officers such as Inspector James were disciplined and a proactive 
police response was implemented to remedy fascist provocation that consisted of 
threatening, abusive or insulting language or behaviour. Therefore, whilst 
recognising that this historico-legal methodology does not prove that pro-fascist 
police partiality did not exist within this period, it has demonstrated that this theory is 
too simplistic and has been over-stated by lawyers such as Ewing and Gearty and 
historians such as Lewis and Renton. Furthermore, it re-establishes the position of 
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Thurlow and Anderson who recognised that many of the inconsistences by lower 
ranking police officers at street level were caused by problems of interpreting the law. 
It reinforces this position by adding a legal lens which evaluates the developing law 
of public order combined with the consideration of police discretion. It has identified 
other decisive factors which contribute to the argument why there was a perception 
that the policing of politically extreme movements differed, and must be considered.     
Stevenson stated that as a ‘mediating force in the political conflicts of the inter-war 
years, the police still remain very much an unknown quantity.’22 This thesis has 
demonstrated that a wider historico-legal analysis of the controversial police tactics 
of this era has brought us closer to understanding the contemporary issues of public 
order policing and the nature of the relationship between the police and the extreme 
political movements. Evidence clearly suggests that throughout the 1930s the police 
commissioners and Chief Constables wanted more power to limit fascist activism. 
Although it is evident that this attitude may not have always filtered down to street 
level, it is subject to more factors than the potential of political partiality. The 
examples analysed here demonstrates that police discretion across the provincial 
police forces and the Metropolitan police has varied, revealing vast inconsistency 
which has not just been confined to the over-policing of the far-Left and the 
protection and collusion with the far-Right. The autocratic policing of the BUF and the 
activity of the Home Office, both behind the scenes and in the drafting of the Public 
Order Act 1936, demonstrates that they were not explicitly tolerant of fascist activism 
and their engagement in reducing BUF activism should not be overlooked in the 
discourse of the BUF and public order law. 
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